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vi Reimagining Rescue
Editorial Preface
The advent of the European Insolvency Regulation (“EIR”) in 2000, and which 
came into force in 2002, brought a new framework for the coordination of cross-
border insolvency proceedings. Though its paradigm of main and secondary 
proceedings was not always convenient, leading to strategies evolved in practice 
to effect COMI-shifts, the structure it gave to the conduct of such cases was a great 
improvement on the rules of private international law and traditional recognition 
and enforcement frameworks. Over the years, the implementation of the EIR, aided 
by interpretations offered by the European Court of Justice (now Court of Justice 
of the European Union), led to increasing familiarity by judges and practitioners 
with the particular demands of cross-border and the need to foster good practice 
by courts and insolvency professionals alike.
In 2012, mandated by Article 46 of the EIR, the European Commission published 
the first of the drafts that would eventually become the Recast EIR, adopted in 
early 2015 and which is due to come into force in 2017. Many of the difficulties 
encountered in practice and which were reflected in the case law have been dealt 
with, while others, deemed contentious still, await further consideration. Already, 
though, much speculation in print has occurred as to the way in which the Recast 
EIR will work, compared to its predecessor. One of the issues that the Recast EIR 
attempted to deal with was that occasioned by the extension of the EIR to the 
workings of groups, a feature that was not intended in the way the text was first 
conceived. Through the use of collocation of COMI of group entities and/or the 
treatment of subsidiaries as emanations of their parent, the ability to create synergy 
in cross-border restructurings was promoted. This led, incidentally, to a virtual 
competition between jurisdictions whose laws were perceived to be favourable to 
restructurings, workouts and other forms of turnaround.
The by-product of this process was to bring to the fore consideration at member 
state level of the strengths and weaknesses of domestic procedures. From the 
introduction of rescue in the mid-1980s to the development of pre-insolvency 
measures in the 2000s and the more recent rise of the pre-pack version of rescue, 
national systems have attempted to respond to stakeholders’ needs for better crafted 
and tailored procedures able to give proper support to rescue attempts. Over the 
period that the EIR has been in operation, many member states have reformed their 
laws, some more often than others. The result has been to place a premium on the 
development of good and effective domestic procedures alongside the availability 
of strong international structures able to deal with cross-border rescues. The two 
go hand in hand!
The intention behind the present text, consisting of papers delivered at two 
conferences: a Joint Conference with the Academy of European Law in Trier, 
Germany on 19-20 March 2015 on the theme of reforms to the EIR and a further 
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Joint Conference with the Nottingham Law School in Nottingham, the United 
Kingdom on 25-26 June 2015 on the topic of reimagining rescue, is that it will 
form an up to date account of viewpoints on reform measures taking place at 
national and European levels. It is particularly noteworthy that members of both 
INSOL Europe and the Academic Forum have been engaged in the process by 
which various texts have been elaborated, from the Recast EIR to the texts 
that are likely to emerge as a result of the most recent European Commission 
Experts’ Group as well as initiatives within domestic arenas. Furthermore, many 
members have also added their voices to deliberations and studies looking into 
how the legal and regulatory structures for insolvency law and policy are being 
developed across the European Union. The skills and talent of members of the 
Academic Forum have played a more than modest role in shaping the texts that 
have emerged and those that are forthcoming.
As such, the papers here are truly cutting edge and will increase awareness of 
the impact of insolvency law within domestic, regional and global contexts. 
Submissions for this collection have come from prominent academics, doctoral 
students and other researchers, practitioners and policy-makers in the field 
representing a number of jurisdictions from common law, civilian and mixed 
traditions within Europe and further afield. This has ensured that the contents 
of the research and analyses included in this text are of the highest quality 
and will be useful and thought-provoking. It is hoped that this will render the 
contributions here as well as the further references they contain of great value 
for researchers in the field.
In summary, we would like to express our appreciation to all those who have 
assisted in making the project a success, not least the contributors themselves, 
but also the administrative staff members of INSOL-Europe, particularly 
Caroline Taylor and Wendy Cooper, together with other members of the team. 
Special thanks go to Myriam Mailly and Emmanuelle Inacio, INSOL Europe 
Technical Officers, and Jennifer Gant, Chair of the Young Academics’ Network 
in Insolvency Law, who helped organised the submission of conference papers 
by contributors. If not otherwise noted by the contributors, the law is stated as 
at 30 June 2016.
Rebecca Parry 
Professor of Insolvency Law 
Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University 
Email: rebecca.parry@ntu.ac.uk
Paul J. Omar 
Professor of International and Comparative Insolvency Law 
Nottingham Law School, Nottingham Trent University 
Email: paul.omar@ntu.ac.uk
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A Note on the Academic Forum
The INSOL Europe Academic Forum, founded in 2004, is a constituent body 
of INSOL Europe, a Europe-wide association of practitioners in insolvency. 
The Academic Forum’s primary mission is to engage in the representation of 
members interested in insolvency law and research, to encourage and assist in 
the development of research initiatives in the insolvency field and to participate 
in the activities organised by INSOL Europe. The membership of the Academic 
Forum includes insolvency academics, insolvency practitioners with recognised 
academic credentials as well as those engaged in the research and study of 
insolvency. The Academic Forum meets annually in conjunction with the main 
conference of INSOL Europe and also arranges half-yearly conferences around 
suitable themes of interest to the practice and academic communities. Previous 
meetings have taken place in Prague (2004), Amsterdam (2005), Monaco 
(2007), Leiden and Barcelona (2008), Brighton and Stockholm (2009), Leiden 
and Vienna (2010), Milan, Venice and Jersey (2011), Nottingham and Brussels 
(2012), Trier and Paris (2013), Leiden and Istanbul (2014), Trier, Nottingham 
and Berlin (2015) as well as a further visit to Berlin (2016). A number of smaller 
events, including University seminars and colloquia, are also co-hosted by the 
Academic Forum with institutions across Europe.
At Paris, Professor Christoph Paulus (Humboldt University Berlin, Germany) 
was elected Chair of the Academic Forum for a three-year term. Anthon Verweij 
(Leiden University, the Netherlands) serves as Secretary to the Board, while 
Florian Bruder (Max Planck Institute, Germany), Jessica Schmidt (University of 
Bayreuth, Germany), Jennifer Gant (Chair of the Young Academics’ Network 
in Insolvency Law), Emmanuelle Inacio and Myriam Mailly (INSOL Europe 
Technical Officers), Rolef de Weijs (Amsterdam University, the Netherlands) 
and Michael Veder (Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands) are 
ordinary members of the Board. Professor Rebecca Parry (Nottingham Trent 
University, the United Kingdom) is the Editor of the Conference Proceedings 
series and ex officio a member of the board. A Supervisory Committee has also 
been established as a consultative board for Academic Forum projects whose 
membership includes senior insolvency academics and practitioners.
With sponsorship made available by Edwin Coe LLP over a seven-year 
period from 2007-2014 and Shakespeare Martineau from 2015 onwards, the 
Academic Forum has been able to offer young scholars travel grants to attend 
its conferences. The sponsorship has also permitted for an annual lecture to be 
given by a scholar of international repute. These have included Professor Jay 
Westbrook (University of Texas, the United States), Gabriel Moss QC (3/4 South 
Square, Gray’s Inn, the United Kingdom), The Hon Mr Justice Ian Kawaley 
(Supreme Court of Bermuda), Professor Karsten Schmidt (President of the 
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Bucerius Law School, Germany), Professor Bob Wessels (Leiden Law School, 
the Netherlands), Professor Ian Fletcher QC (University College London, United 
Kingdom), Professor Rosalind Mason (Queensland University of Technology, 
Australia) and Professor Axel Flessner (Humboldt University Berlin, Germany).
These lectures and many of the presentations at the Academic Forum conferences 
have been collected in the conference proceedings booklets that have been 
regularly published since the publications series arising from conferences was 
inaugurated in 2009 by reports from the 2008 Leiden and Barcelona events. 
The intention is that conference proceedings booklets will be published from 
all of the conferences listed above and will accompany other publications in the 
Technical Series produced by INSOL Europe and the Judicial Wing. Overall, the 
publications are intended to form a comprehensive report of the conferences and 
contain accounts of recent research in the insolvency field useful for academics, 
judges, policy-makers and practitioners alike.
The Academic Forum’s next meeting is scheduled to take place in conjunction 
with the INSOL Europe conference in Cascais, Portugal on 21-22 September 
2016, with further conferences being planned for 2017 and beyond. Details of 
academic conferences will be posted at the Academic Forum website at: www.
insol-europe.org/academic/ as and when available. An on-line registration facility 
for academic conferences as well as further information about the work of the 
Academic Forum can also be obtained via the website as well as a dedicated 
Facebook page.
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A Note on the Academy of European Law
The Academy of European Law is a non-profit public foundation that provides 
training in European law to legal practitioners. Its patrons include most EU 
member states and it is supported by the EU. ERA organises conferences and 
seminars around Europe. It also has an e-learning platform and publishes a legal 
journal titled “ERA Forum”.
The Academy of European Law began its work in Trier in March 1992. Its 
genesis was associated with the rapid pace of European integration during the 
late 1980s and 1990s. With the Single European Act in 1986 and the Maastricht 
Treaty in 1992, the scope of European legislation became wider than ever before. 
It was clear that lawyers, judges and other legal practitioners at all levels and 
in almost all fields of law would need regular training and a forum for debate 
in order to keep up-to-date with the latest developments. In 1990, the European 
Parliament recommended that the Commission invest in a centre for the 
continuing education of lawyers in order to improve the application of European 
law. At about the same time, Peter Caesar, the Minister of Justice of the German 
Land of Rhineland-Palatinate, together with Horst Langes and Willi Rothley, 
Members of the European Parliament from the same region, were drawing up 
proposals for an Academy of European Law to be established in Trier. In 1991, 
the European Parliament endorsed these proposals in a report drafted by the 
Dutch MEP James Janssen van Raay.
An Association for the Promotion of the Academy of European Law was 
established to turn the idea into reality. The association continues to support 
the Academy’s work and is known as the “Friends of ERA”. The Luxembourg 
Government, led by Prime Minister Jacques Santer and Justice Minister Marc 
Fischbach, also lent its support, and the European Commission agreed to the 
Parliament’s decision to provide the Academy with regular funding. Trier was 
chosen as the location of the Academy because of its proximity to the judicial 
capital of the European Union in Luxembourg. On 8-9 November 1991, the 
project of an Academy of European Law was formally launched at a ceremony 
in Trier with, as founding patrons, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Land of 
Rhineland-Palatinate and the City of Trier. In the intervening years, a majority 
of EU Member States has joined the foundation.
Many other leading figures in the field of European law have actively supported 
the launch of the Academy. Notable among these was Ole Due, then President 
of the European Court of Justice, who together with many of his fellow judges 
began a tradition of close co-operation between the Court in Luxembourg and the 
Academy. The Academy took possession of its purpose-built premises, provided 
xi
by the Land of Rhineland-Palatinate, in the summer of 1998, where its activities 
are hosted. The Academy has also built up a specialised library that includes 
publications on all areas of Community law from both the European and national 
perspectives. Since 1999, it has also served as a European Documentation Centre 
with an up-to-date archive of all official EU publications in English, French 
and German.
Academy of European Law
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2 Reimagining Rescue
3Chapter 1
Annex Proceedings and the Continued 
Interplay with the Brussels Ia Regulation
Rimvydas Norkus
1 Introduction*
On 10 January 2015, a recast version of the EU Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council No. 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters1 (“Brussels Ia”) became 
applicable.2 The same as its predecessors Brussels I Regulation3 and Brussels 
Convention,4 it excludes from its scope “bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the 
winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, 
compositions and analogous proceedings” (Article 1(2)(b) Brussels Ia).
The intention5 of the European legislator to leave jurisdiction in these matters 
to be regulated by Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on 
insolvency proceedings6 (“EIR”) and its proposed recast version (“EIRa”)7 did 
not resolve questions concerning the applicability of one or another regulation 
to numerous proceedings featuring connections to insolvency. The proceedings 
“deriving directly from the insolvency proceedings and which are closely linked 
to them” are broadly referred to as annex proceedings. These proceedings are 
independent civil proceedings, and the judgments in these proceedings can be 
handed down not necessarily by the insolvency court but also by another court.
Since there are no express provisions on such proceedings either in EIR or in 
Brussels Ia, the concurrence of the two instruments comes into being when it 
comes to jurisdiction to resolve this type of case and recognition and enforcement 
1 OJ L 351 of 20 December 2012, pp. 1–32.
2 Ibid., Article 81.
3 OJ L 12 of 16 January 2001, pp. 1–23.
4 OJ L 299 of 31 December 1972, pp. 32–42.
5 Fletcher [2], p. 347.
6 OJ L 160 of 30 June 2000, pp. 1–18.
7 Proposal for Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council Regulation (EC) No. 
1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings. 20 November 2014, No. 15414/14 ADD 1.
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of their legal results. The concept expressed in Schlosser,8 Virgos-Schmit9 reports 
and also endorsed by the CJEU in F-Tex10 is that the two Regulations should be 
interpreted so that proceedings should not fall within both but within one or the 
other without leaving any gap between them.11 Nevertheless, it is conceivable that 
there are some questions which are on the borderline of the two instruments, as 
well as questions which will not come within the scope of application of either 
Regulation No. 1346/2000 or Regulation No. 1215/2012.12 Therefore, the main 
purpose of this article is to assess the interplay between the above mentioned legal 
instruments and to analyse problematic aspects of annex proceedings.
2 Main Differences stemming from the Applicability of EIR or Brussels I
2.1 The Scope
The current EIR is applicable to collective insolvency proceedings which entail a 
partial or total divestment of a debtor and the appointment of a liquidator (Article 
1(1) EIR). In the revised version of the EIR, the scope of the Regulation will 
be extended with the aim of including pre-insolvency proceedings and debtor-in-
possession proceedings.13 However, there are no changes in the approach that the 
revised EIR will remain applicable only to those proceedings which are listed in 
Annex A to the Regulation. It causes no difficulty to determine that proceedings 
listed in Annex A fall within the scope of EIR14 and not within Brussels Ia. Annex 
proceedings are individual proceedings featuring certain connections to insolvency 
proceedings, therefore there is an ambiguity as to the Regulation applicable to these. 
Unlike collective proceedings listed in Annex A, there is no explicit provision in 
the EIR as to what extent this Regulation is applicable to in proceedings which 
are not collective insolvency proceedings, but which feature close connection to 
those proceedings. However, some implications may be drawn from the systemic 
analysis of both texts.
8 OJ C 59 of 5 March 1979, para. 53.
9 Virgos/Schmit [16], para. 77.
10 Case C-213/10 F-Tex SIA v Lietuvos-Anglijos UAB ‘Jadecloud-Vilma’ [2012] ECR I-(19 April) 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:215.
11 Magnus/Mankowski/Rogerson [9], art 1 note 29.
12 Case C-213/10 F-Tex SIA v Lietuvos-Anglijos UAB ‘Jadecloud-Vilma’ [2012] ECR I-(19 April) 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:215.
13 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the Application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency 
proceedings, Strasbourg, 12 December 2012, COM(2012) 743 final.
14 Case C-116/11 Bank Handlowy w Warszawie SA and PPHU «ADAX»/Ryszard Adamiak v Christianapol sp. z 
o.o.[2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:739 point 33.
5The scope of Brussels Ia Regulation, which definitely is a new cornerstone of 
private EU law, like its precursors, is based on a long-standing principle of 
its general applicability15 with some exceptions which should be interpreted 
narrowly,16 whereas the EIR sets forth independent criteria for the scope of the 
Regulation. Different approaches concerning the construction of the two legal 
instruments presuppose that the scope of the EIR is not an “exact opposite” of the 
Brussels Ia Regulation in the relevant field, as it should in principle be in order to 
avoid regulatory loopholes.17 “Bankruptcy, proceedings related to the winding-up 
of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions 
and analogous proceedings” are excluded from the new Brussels I Regulation. 
Although the phrasing of Article 1(2)(b) Brussels Ia itself causes no particular 
problems, the Regulation remains silent on autonomous criteria (or a direct link to 
the EIR) of how and whether particular proceedings, in the eyes of the Regulation, 
should be evaluated as “analogous proceedings” and thus excluded from Brussels 
Ia. Even assuming the fact that both Regulations are interrelated, in reality, the 
change in scope of one Regulation does not necessarily have an influence on the 
applicability of the other legal instrument.18
In the light of the F-Tex case, where the Court held that the relevant sphere of EU 
private law should in principle be gapless, it seems logical that one or another of 
the above mentioned legal instruments should include a provision expressly stating 
that all the relevant questions which do not fall within the scope of one regulation 
are to be included into another automatically. The main criterion and a starting 
point for consideration for the sake of simplicity and efficiency of application 
should be as plain and as straightforward as possible. The question which should 
determine which instrument is applicable is whether an action at hand is in its 
essence related to insolvency. If a right to an action is of an independent nature 
with a possibility to raise it even without one of the parties being insolvent, then 
it should, in principle, be governed by the Brussels Ia; if the right to an action has 
its roots in insolvency, the EIR should apply. Ideally, the above-mentioned criteria 
should be sufficient to determine whether either Brussels Ia or the EIR is applicable 
15 Study by Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional 
Affairs, Possibility and terms for applying Brussels I Regulation (recast) to extra EU disputes, PE 493.024. 
(2014), p. 9.
16 Case No 2T-89/2014, Decision of 13 August 2014 of the Court of Appeal of Lithuania [2014].
17 Virgos/Garcimartín [17], p. 56.
18 Recital 7 in the preamble to Regulation Brussels I states that the intention on the part of the EU legislature was to 
provide for a broad definition of the concept of ‘civil and commercial matters’ referred to in Article 1(1) of that 
Regulation and, consequently, to provide that the Article should be broad in its scope. By contrast, the scope of 
application of the EIR, in accordance with Recital 6 in the preamble should not be interpreted broadly (judgment 
in Case C-292/08, German Graphics Graphische Maschinen [2009] EU:C:2009:544, paragraphs 23 to 25).
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to a particular dispute. In the sphere where risks of disputes over competence are 
very high, ambiguity or over complication of jurisdictional rules undoubtedly lead 
to devastating effects: the paramount principle of fast and efficient insolvency 
proceedings may be rebutted if complex procedural matters have to be resolved 
prior to approaching the essential questions.
In its report on the application of EIR, the Commission has acknowledged the 
fact that 15 Member States have pre-insolvency or hybrid proceedings which are 
currently not listed in Annex A of the Regulation in their legal systems, as well as 
the fact that a substantial number of such proceedings are currently not covered 
by the EIR, which means that their effects are not recognizable throughout the EU 
by virtue of Articles 16, 17 and 25 of the EIR.19 Furthermore, forasmuch as these 
proceedings may perfectly fall within the “analogous proceedings” exclusion, 20 
this type of proceeding may be excluded from the Brussels regime altogether. It is 
self-evident that the current state of affairs is highly unsatisfactory since it is quite 
reasonable to assume that pre-insolvency and hybrid proceedings are arguably 
more progressive forms of insolvency proceedings, giving a distressed debtor the 
possibility to get over their financial difficulties and the possibility to preserve an 
employer and a taxpayer, thus protecting wider interests.21
Luckily, the proposed EIRa will be much broader in scope than its predecessor 
and is expected to cover hybrid and pre-insolvency proceedings as well.22 
Proceedings falling within the scope of the revised EIR no longer need to be 
insolvency proceedings and it is sufficient that they “are based on a law relating 
to insolvency”.23 For the purpose of simplification, all the procedures included in 
Annex A to the Regulation are referred to as “insolvency proceedings”.24 If the 
new types of proceedings which at the present moment do no fall within the scope 
of the old text are included in Annex A of the proposed Recast version of EIR, this, 
in the eyes of the Regulation, will create new types of insolvency proceedings, thus 
19 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency 
proceedings, Strasbourg, 12 December 2012, COM(2012) 743 final.
20 OJ L 351 of 20 December 2012, Article 1(2)(b).
21 McCormack [10], p. 31.
22 Recitals 10 and 11 in the preamble lay down that the scope of this Regulation should extend to proceedings which: 
- promote a rescue of economically viable but distressed businesses;
- provide for a restructuring of a debtor at a stage where there is only a likelihood of insolvency and proceedings;
- leave the debtor fully or partially in control of his assets and affairs;
- provide for a debt discharge or a debt adjustment of consumers and self-employed persons;
- grant a temporary moratorium on enforcement actions brought by individual creditors where such actions may 
adversely affect negotiations and hamper the prospects of a restructuring of the debtor’s business.
23 OJ L 160 of 30 June 2000, Article 1(1).
24 OJ L 160 of 30 June 2000, Article 2(a).
7creating novel types of annex proceedings as well – proceedings related to newly 
included types of insolvency proceedings.
Therefore, the applicability of criteria developed by the CJEU concerning various 
questions related to those proceedings will inevitably emerge when the EIRa 
becomes applicable. It is self-evident that the jurisprudence of the CJEU, based 
on an old instrument and excluding pre-insolvency and hybrid proceedings, may 
not be well suited for the evaluation of the types of insolvency proceedings newly 
included into the Regulation, since they may derogate from classic concepts of 
insolvency by a considerable margin. Therefore, it is not clear whether the existing 
jurisprudence of the CJEU will be sufficient to fill possible gaps.
2.2 Jurisdiction
One of the main differences stemming from the applicability of either EIR or 
Brussels Ia Regulations is jurisdictional issues. Jurisdictional rules in Brussels 
Ia are based on a private international law approach. Therefore, the Regulation 
differentiates issues of jurisdiction within the EU from the questions of competence 
in non-EU cases.25 The central rule of allocation of competence to resolve 
disputes laid down in the Recast Brussels I Regulation is founded on the well-
known principle that jurisdiction is generally based on the defendant’s domicile 
irrespective of his or her nationality.26 As a rule of general jurisdiction, as it is 
sometimes referred to, it applies to whatever the matter falling within the ratione 
materiae of the Regulation. Although the rule has been adopted from Article 2 of 
the old Brussels I Regulation, the basis of the rule has its roots in Roman law and 
its actor sequitur forum rei principle.27
25 Study by Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional 
Affairs, Possibility and terms for applying Brussels I Regulation (recast) to extra EU Disputes, PE 493.024. (2014) 
pp. 6–7. “The ‘private international law’ approach is based on the basic and fundamental difference between 
issues of judicial jurisdiction and issues of territorial allocation of disputes in different domestic courts within a 
Member State: the approach focuses on judicial jurisdiction (though the rules might sometimes be equally applied 
for territorial allocation of disputes). The ‘procedural law’ approach consists of using the procedural rules on 
territorial allocation within a State as a basis for judicial jurisdiction in international disputes.”
26 OJ L 351 of 20 December 2012, Article 4, Recital 15 of the preamble of the Regulation.
27 Kruger [7], p. 61.
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It should also be noted that derogations from the actio sequitur forum rei principle 
are possible28 under the Brussels Ia. This is of particular importance especially when 
it comes to the assessment of the interaction between the vis attractiva concursus 
principle and the due process rights of the defendant.29 Despite the fact that the 
core features of the jurisdictional regime of the old regulation were preserved in 
the new text, some of the changes, especially those concerning its applicability to 
third state defendants, are worth a separate mention. The old Brussels I Regulation 
applied only if the defendant was domiciled in the European Union.30 It was only 
a matter of exclusive jurisdiction or of a jurisdictional agreement in favour of the 
EU court that the Regulation could be applicable despite the defendant having his 
domicile outside the European Union.31
In addition to the above mentioned heads of jurisdiction which remain unchanged, 
the Brussels Ia removes the condition of domicile in the EU in Articles 17 to 18 
(cases concerning consumer contracts where the defendant is a non-consumer) 
and 20 to 22 (cases concerning individual contracts of employment where the 
defendant is an employer). Therefore, the territorial reach of the Recast Brussels I 
is significantly widened.
The EIR jurisdiction is based on a concept of centre of the main interests (COMI), 
giving the court at debtor’s COMI the right to exercise universal insolvency 
jurisdiction.32 The notion of COMI is subject to autonomous interpretation.33 
Article 3(1) of the EIR gives the Member State within the territory of which the 
28 Article 7(2) (corresponds to Article 5(3) of the old instrument) lays down that proceedings in matters relating to 
tort, delict or quasi-delict may be decided in courts of the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur;
- Article 21 (in its essence corresponds to Article 19 of the old Regulation) allows an employer domiciled in a 
Member State to be sued in the courts of either the Member State in which the latter is domiciled or in another 
Member State:
- in the courts for the place where the employee habitually carries out his work or in the courts for the last place 
where he did so;
- if the employee does not or did not habitually carry out his work in any one country, in the courts for the place 
where the business which engaged the employee is or was situated;
- Article 24(1) (former Article 22(1) of Regulation No 44/2001) states that disputes regarding immoveables are 
to be decided in the courts of the Member State where the property is situated;
- Article 25 of the Brussels I a Regulation (corresponds to Article 23 of the old Brussels I) allows parties to agree 
that a court or courts of a Member State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which 
may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship;
- Article 26(1) (in its essence corresponds to Article 24 of the Brussels I Regulation) allows the court before 
which a defendant enters an appearance to have jurisdiction.
29 Critics do emphasize that attraction of claims to the insolvency court might infringe due process rights and 
legitimate expectations of the defendant.
30 OJ L 12 of 16 January 2001, Article 4.
31 OJ L 12 of 16 January 2001, Articles 22 and 23.
32 McCormack [11], p. 129.
33 Case 341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd. [2006] E.C.R. 1-3813 para. 31, Case C-191/10 Rastelli Davide e C. Snc v 
Jean-Charles Hidoux [2011] 2011 I-13209 para. 31.
9COMI is situated the exclusive power to open main insolvency proceedings with 
EU-wide effect.34 This kind of effect is created by virtue of Articles 3, 4, 16 and 
17 of the EIR. Under Article 4(1), the law applicable to insolvency proceedings 
and their effects shall be that of the Member State within the territory of which 
such proceedings are opened. This means that lex fori concursus determines all 
the effects of the insolvency proceedings, both substantive and procedural, on the 
persons and legal relations concerned,35 save for a few exceptions.36
Secondary insolvency proceedings may be opened in a Member State where the 
insolvent debtor has an establishment, however, territorial insolvency proceedings 
are limited to assets in that country. The opening of a secondary proceeding in its 
essence bars the effect of the main proceedings in respect of creditors and assets 
located in that particular country, thus creating an exemption from the general 
principle laid down in Article 3(1) of the EIR.
Annex proceedings are essentially independent civil proceedings which may be 
determined by the insolvency court or by another court. Therefore, it is necessary 
to establish whether a certain question does fall within the scope of Brussels Ia, 
which would allow it to rely on its jurisdictional rules and, most importantly, actor 
sequitur forum rei principle, or whether it is subject to the vis attractiva concursus 
principle and therefore falls within the competence of the insolvency court at the 
debtor’s COMI or a court opening secondary insolvency proceedings. Since the 
claimant is the subject who has an intention to modify the current status quo in 
one way or another, it is he who ought to appear before the defendant’s court. In 
other words, there is a general legal expectation of the defendant to be sued in his 
domicile.37 Cases in which the subject-matter of the dispute warrants another rule 
of jurisdiction should be well justified.
While from the perspective of the insolvency administrator, concentration of annex 
proceedings in the forum of a Member State which opened insolvency proceedings 
34 Omar [13], p. 226.
35 OJ L 160 of 30 June 2000, Recital 23.
36 EIR permits some exceptions to this general rule and allows certain matters to be governed by a different law. 
These include rights in rem of creditors or third parties (Article 5), rights to set-off (Article 6), reservations of 
title (Article 7), contracts relating to immoveable property (Article 8), rights and obligations of the parties to a 
payment or settlement system or to a financial market (Article 9), contracts of employment (Article 10), effects 
of insolvency proceedings on the rights of the debtor in immoveable property, a ship or an aircraft subject to 
registration in a public register (Article 11), community patents and trademarks (Article 12), detrimental acts 
(Article 13), questions concerning the protection of third-party purchasers (Article 14) and effects of insolvency 
proceedings on lawsuits pending (Article 15).
37 “The rules of jurisdiction should be highly predictable and founded on the principle that jurisdiction is generally 
based on the defendant’s domicile. Jurisdiction should always be available on this ground save in a few well-
defined situations in which the subject-matter of the dispute or the autonomy of the parties warrants a different 
connecting factor.” (Recital 15 in the preamble to Brussels Ia).
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can be seen as significant facilitation of pursuit of his actions, at the same time it 
may undermine the legitimate expectations of the defendant to be sued according 
to the rules of general jurisdiction (Art. 4(1) Brussels Ia). Hence, effectiveness and 
efficiency of insolvency proceedings may conflict with the legitimate expectation 
of the defendant. Therefore, the defendant’s protection guaranteed on the basis 
of the jurisdictional principle actor sequitur forum rei can only be ousted by an 
overarching insolvency–specific interest.38 Criteria to describe actions which fall 
outside the scope of Brussels Ia and which are subject to rules of jurisdiction in 
EIR should be a result of a careful balancing act of these diverging interests.
It is discernible that the Gourdain39 principle indirectly establishing jurisdictional 
rules for the insolvency-related actions de lege lata does not find its reflection40 
in the current text of the Regulation in its entirety when it comes to the main 
purpose of this principle – to establish jurisdictional rules – Article 1 EIR governs 
“collective insolvency proceedings which entail the partial or total divestment of 
a debtor and the appointment of a liquidator”, while Article 3 lays down rules of 
jurisdiction concerning the opening of main or secondary insolvency proceedings.
Thus, the Regulation contains no jurisdictional rules as to actions “deriving 
directly from the insolvency proceedings and which are closely linked to them” 
whatsoever. It is merely mentioned in Article 25(1) subparagraph 2 EIR that rules 
on recognition and enforceability of judgments concerning the course and closure 
of insolvency proceedings shall also apply to judgments deriving directly from the 
insolvency proceedings and which are closely linked with them, even if they were 
handed down by another court.
In addition, some insights on applying the EIR in respect of annex proceedings 
may be found in Recital 641 of the preamble to the Regulation. Until the CJEU 
reached its decision in the Deko Marty case, different solutions had been discussed 
by commentators concerning the applicability of different legal instrument to 
38 Laukemann [8], p. 102.
39 Case 133/78 Henri Gourdain v Franz Nadler [1978] ECR 1979 p. 733.
40 It is rather unusual since jurisdictional rules laid down in a certain legal instrument and rules concerning 
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments are usually interrelated in the sense that application of certain 
algorithm to allocate the competence in sphere of private international law allows for recognition of the resulting 
judgment under the same legal instrument.
41 In accordance with the principle of proportionality, this Regulation should be confined to provisions governing 
jurisdiction for opening insolvency proceedings and judgments (emphasis added) which are delivered directly 
on the basis of the insolvency proceedings and are closely connected with such proceedings. In addition, this 
Regulation should contain provisions regarding the recognition of those judgments and the applicable law which 
also satisfy that principle.
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annex proceedings.42 In Deko Marty the CJEU held that Article 3(1) EIR “must be 
interpreted as meaning that it also confers international jurisdiction on the Member 
State within the territory of which insolvency proceedings were opened in order 
to hear and determine actions which derive directly from those proceedings and 
which are closely connected to them” (Point 21), thus putting the debate to an end. 
Although, as we will see infra, this did not resolve all the questions as to what 
constitutes an action which derives directly from and is closely connected to the 
insolvency proceedings.
The state of affairs is slightly different under the revised version of the EIR. Article 
6(1) of the Revised EIR indicating that “the courts of the Member State within 
the territory of which insolvency proceedings have been opened in accordance 
with Article 3 shall have jurisdiction for any action which derives directly from 
the insolvency proceedings and is closely linked with them, such as avoidance 
actions” which is, apparently, a codification of Deko Marty and fills the legislative 
lacuna as to jurisdictional rule applicable in respect of related actions. The rule is 
further explained in Recital 6 of the preamble to the Regulation.43 The revised EIR 
even takes a step further expressly stating that annex proceedings are excluded 
from the Brussels Ia Regulation,44 although emphasizing that the mere fact that a 
national procedure is not listed in Annex A to the EIRa should not imply that this 
procedure is covered by Brussels Ia. Although introducing jurisdictional rules as 
to annex proceedings, the EIRa is generally silent as to the criteria of what exactly 
42 International jurisdiction in annex proceedings must be determined according to national law; partial or total 
applicability of Brussels I to annex proceedings; applicability of Art. 3(1) EIR to annex proceedings by virtue of 
analogy. Simotta [15], pp. 65–79.
43 This Regulation should encompass provisions governing jurisdiction for opening insolvency proceedings and 
actions which are deriving directly from the insolvency proceedings and are closely linked with them. This 
Regulation should also contain provisions regarding the recognition and enforcement of judgments issued in such 
proceedings.
44 Recital 7 of the preamble to the Regulation states that “bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of 
insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings and 
actions related to such proceedings are excluded from the scope of Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012…. These 
proceedings should be covered by the present Regulation. The interpretation of this Regulation should, as much 
as possible, avoid regulatory loopholes between the two instruments.”
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constitutes annex proceedings. The drafters merely provide a few examples, based 
on the jurisprudence of the CJEU.45
2.2.1 Is Jurisdiction in Annex Proceedings Exclusive Jurisdiction?
One more relevant question to be answered is whether jurisdiction in annex 
proceedings is exclusive or not and if so, how exactly the vis attractiva concursus 
principle works in the EIR, i.e. whether jurisdiction is exclusive vis-à-vis the 
Member State, or in respect of the particular court who has opened the insolvency 
proceedings. Since the Regulation is not intended to alter national rules of allocation 
of cases between the courts of a given Member State, both alternatives seem quite 
reasonable, especially giving due consideration to the fact that vis attractiva 
concursus may have different properties in the legal systems of Member States.
The text of the EIR does not give a direct answer to these questions, but a closer look 
at Articles 18 and 25 of the EIR might suggest that the Regulation acknowledges 
the possibility of claims submitted to courts which are not the insolvency court. 
The mere existence of such provisions gives a strong impression of non-exclusivity 
of jurisdiction as to annex proceedings.
This issue has not been addressed directly in Deco Marty. Nevertheless, in his 
opinion in the same case, Advocate General Dámaso Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer 
has carried out a significant analysis as to whether the jurisdiction laid down 
in Regulation No 1346/2000 is alternative or exclusive. The Advocate General 
suggests that jurisdiction to hear an action to set aside a transaction in the context 
of insolvency is relatively exclusive, which is to be construed as meaning that it 
comes within the powers of the liquidator. Accordingly, it is for the liquidator 
alone to bring the most appropriate actions in the course of the proceedings for the 
purposes of protecting the assets as a whole (Point 65).
45 Recital 34 in the preamble to the EIRa states actions which “derive directly from the insolvency proceedings and 
are closely linked with them” include:
- avoidance actions against defendants in other Member States;
- actions concerning obligations that arise in the course of the insolvency proceedings, such as advance payment 
for costs of the proceedings.
 In contrast, actions for the performance of the obligations under a contract concluded by the debtor prior to the 
opening of proceedings do not derive directly from the proceedings. Where such an action is related with another 
action based on general civil and commercial law, the insolvency practitioner should be able to bring both actions 
in the courts of the defendant’s domicile if he considers it more efficient to bring the action in that forum. This 
could, for example, be the case if the insolvency practitioner wishes to combine an action for director’s liability 
on the basis of insolvency law with an action based on company law or general tort law.
 Recital 15 in the preamble to the EIRa indicates proceedings that are based on general company law not designed 
exclusively for insolvency situations should not be considered to be based on a law relating to insolvency. 
Similarly, the purpose of adjustment of debt should not include specific proceedings in which debts of a natural 
person of very low income and very low asset value are written off, provided that this type of proceedings never 
makes provisions for payment to creditors.
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The Advocate General observes that the same approach may also be inferred from 
the second subparagraph of Article 25(1) of the Regulation. With regard to the 
rules concerning the recognition and enforcement of judgments, that provision lays 
down an obligation to recognise judgments “deriving directly from the insolvency 
proceedings and which are closely linked with them, even if they were handed 
down by another court.” Thus the Regulation provides that judgments arising from 
an action in the context of insolvency to set a transaction aside may be adopted by 
the court seised of the insolvency proceedings or by another court which is situated 
either in the same Member State or in a different one.46
The CJEU neither gave any comments on the suggestion of the Advocate 
General, nor directly answered the question. However, some passages in this 
judgment indicate the exclusivity of jurisdiction in annex proceedings. The CJEU 
held that “concentrating all the actions directly related to the insolvency of an 
undertaking before the courts of the Member State with jurisdiction to open the 
insolvency proceedings also appears consistent with the objective of improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of insolvency proceedings having cross-border effects” 
(Point 22) and that “possibility for more than one court to exercise jurisdiction as 
to actions to set a transaction aside by virtue of insolvency brought in various 
Member States would undermine the pursuit of such an objective” (Point 24), 
which is to prevent forum shopping.
Despite the fact that the Court refrained from answering all the relevant questions, 
important conclusions may still be drawn from the judgment. The CJEU explained 
that the words “even if they were handed down by another court” at the end of 
the last sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 25(1) EIR do not mean 
that the Community legislature wished to exclude the jurisdiction of the courts 
of the State within the territory of which the insolvency proceedings for the 
type of actions concerned were opened. Those words mean, in particular, that it 
is for the Member States to determine the court with territorial and substantive 
jurisdiction, which does not necessarily have to be the court which opened the 
insolvency proceedings. Moreover, the Court explained that those words refer to 
the recognition of judgments opening insolvency proceedings, which is provided 
for in Article 16 EIR (point 27).
The question about the exclusivity of jurisdiction in annex proceedings has 
been raised in the F-Tex case. The referring court asked whether the jurisdiction 
conferred by Regulation No 1346/2000, as interpreted by the CJEU, on the courts 
46 Case C-339/07 Christopher Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV [2009] 2009 I-00767, Opinion of AG Colomer.
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of the Member State in which insolvency proceedings have been opened to hear 
and decide actions which derive directly from those proceedings and are closely 
connected with them constitutes exclusive jurisdiction. The question originated 
from the proceedings in the Lithuanian national court in which F-Tex, as creditor 
to whom claims of an insolvent undertaking had been assigned, launched its claim 
not in the courts of the Member State which opened insolvency proceedings 
against the debtor (Germany) but in the courts of the Member State in which the 
debtor of the assigned claim had its domicile (Lithuania). The question remained 
unanswered since the CJEU found applicability of Brussels I Regulation and 
not EIR to an action taken against a third party by an applicant acting on the 
basis of an assignment of claims which was granted by a liquidator appointed in 
insolvency proceedings.
The proposed Recast version of the EIR, namely Article 6(2), sets down that where 
an action which derives directly from the insolvency proceedings and is closely 
linked with them is related to an action in civil and commercial matters against the 
same defendant, the insolvency practitioner may bring both actions in the courts 
of the Member State within the territory of which the defendant is domiciled, or, 
where the action is brought against several defendants, in the courts of the Member 
State within the territory of which any of them is domiciled, provided that these 
courts have jurisdiction pursuant to the rules of Regulation Brussels Ia. The same 
shall apply to the debtor in possession, provided that he is able under national law 
to bring actions on behalf of the insolvency estate. Article 6(2) of the EIRa adds 
that for the purpose of Article 6(1), actions are deemed to be related where they 
are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together 
to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.
The EIRa does not give a direct answer as to whether the jurisdiction in annex 
proceedings per se is exclusive or not. Although, as it may be seen from the 
phrasing of Articles 6(2) and 6(3), the Regulation does not expressly exclude 
jurisdiction of the court which would have had competence to resolve a particular 
dispute in lieu of the insolvency court. Since Article 6(1) is a codification of Deko 
Marty, therefore the rationale of this judgment should apply to the interpretation 
of the newly included text, which would mean that jurisdiction is rather exclusive.
Additionally, the sheer fact that alternative jurisdiction is permitted in the very 
next articles in respect of situations where annex proceedings are closely related 
to ordinary civil or commercial proceedings, but not in Article 6(1), might suggest 
that the jurisdictional rule contained in the latter is intended to be of an exclusive 
nature. While Article 6(2) speaks of an action “in civil and commercial matters”, 
hence governed by the provisions of Brussels Ia and therefore not attractable to the 
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insolvency proceedings, it seems rational for the insolvency practitioner to “travel” 
in order to pursue both actions in the same forum, thus possibly facilitating the 
insolvency proceedings. Obviously, the explanation by the CJEU will be welcome.
The vast array of possible annex proceedings could lead to the question whether 
the administrator should be granted a possibility to implement his litigation 
strategy by choosing a forum in each individual case based on different criteria 
(e.g. speed of proceedings)? Possibility to have the judgment in annex proceedings 
recognized and enforced could be one of the relevant criteria. While the issue 
of the enforcement of judgments causes no difficulties within the EU, it may 
become problematic to enforce a judgment in annex proceedings outside the EU 
if jurisdictions against a third state defendant were based on the provisions of 
the EIR.
2.2.2 Jurisdiction as to Annex Proceedings against Third State Defendants
Article 3(1) of the current EIR determines the jurisdiction of courts of the EU 
to open main insolvency proceedings. According to Article 3(1) of the EIR, 
the location of the centre of the debtor’s main interests (COMI) is the one and 
only relevant criterion for determining which court is competent to open main 
insolvency proceedings. In addition, Recital 13 in the Preamble to EIR, in essence, 
precludes the possibility to apply the Insolvency Regulation to proceedings where 
the centre of the debtor’s main interests is located outside the EU. At this stage, 
the distinction is crystal clear without any additional analysis being necessary. 
Nevertheless, real-life situations may be far more difficult, especially in cases 
related to parties from non-EU member states. One of the most controversial topics 
in this field is the possibility of application of EIR jurisdictional provisions in 
respect of defendants situated outside the European Union.
As already noted in scientific texts, opinions are divided on the question of whether 
it is possible to rely on the EIR in situations where insolvency proceedings have 
been opened in a Member State, but the subject against whom the avoidance action 
is brought is from a third country and, as Leukeman has observed, whether the 
Regulation’s applicability ratione loci presupposes cross-border implications with 
another Member State or whether a simple connection to a third state suffices.47
In Schmid v Hertel,48 the CJEU had to assess whether the courts of the Member 
State within the territory of which main insolvency proceedings have been 
opened have jurisdiction to decide on an Actio Pauliana that is brought against a 
47 Laukeman [8], p. 102.
48 Case C-328/12 Ralph Schmid v Lilly Hertel [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:6.
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person whose place of residence or registered office is outside the EU. The Court 
responded affirmatively and concluded that:
• Neither Article 1 of the Regulation nor Annex A limits the application of the 
Regulation to proceedings that involve a cross-border element other than with 
two or several Member States. Application of Article 3(1) of the Regulation 
cannot, therefore, as a general rule, depend on the existence of a cross-border 
link involving another Member State (Point 29);
• At the time when the request to open insolvency proceedings is lodged, 
the existence of any cross-border element may be unknown. However, 
determination of the court which has jurisdiction cannot be postponed until 
such time as the residence of a potential defendant to an ancillary action is 
known (Point 28);
• The objectives of the EIR49 may encompass not solely relations between 
Member States but, by their nature and in accordance with their wording, any 
cross-border situation (Point 25);
• Harmonisation in the European Union of the rules governing jurisdiction over 
actions to set a transaction aside by virtue of insolvency contributes to the 
attainment of the objectives of the EIR irrespective of whether the defendant’s 
place of residence is in a Member State or in a third country. These objectives 
prevail over the concern to avoid the defendant being sued in a foreign court. 
(Point 33).
• The fact that the courts of a third country would be under no obligation at all to 
recognize a result of such proceedings is not decisive (Points 36 and 37), since 
the judgment may be recognised and enforced in the third state on the basis of 
a bilateral convention or by the other Member States under Article 25 of the 
Regulation, in particular if part of the defendant’s assets are in the territory of 
one of those States (Point 38).
In order to evaluate the findings in Schmid v Hertel, it is useful to get sight of 
jurisdictional rules as to third state defendants laid down in both Brussels 
Regulations. It would be rather fair to observe that the old Brussels I was built 
to accumulate jurisdiction within the Union. It was done by applying Brussels I 
49 The CJEU emphasized that the relevant objectives of the EIR are: 1) to ensure the proper functioning of the internal 
market (Recitals 2–4); 2) to avoid forum shopping (Recital 4); 3) to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
insolvency proceedings having cross-border effects (Recital 8); to ensure universal scope of the main insolvency 
proceedings (Recital 12). The Court added that in the light of Recital 8, Article 3(1) is intended to promote 
foreseeability and, therefore, legal certainty as regards bankruptcy and liquidation jurisdiction (Point 27).
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jurisdictional rules to non-nationals domiciled in the EU50 by allowing Member 
States to apply their own rules of jurisdiction in respect of defendants from 
third states.51 Furthermore, the Regulation, while expressly banning exorbitant 
grounds of jurisdiction52 in respect of defendants within the EU, did encourage 
the application of such jurisdictional heads laid down in the procedural laws of 
Member States regarding third state defendants,53 save for some exceptions.54
Furthermore, the old Brussels I contains different possibilities to apply the 
methods of resolution of jurisdictional collisions, such as lis pendens and forum 
non-conveniens in respect of Member States and third states.55 While the ECJ in 
its (in)famous decision in Owusu v. Jackson held that a court cannot decline the 
jurisdiction conferred on it by Article 2 of that Convention on the grounds that a 
court of a third state would be a more appropriate forum to hear the action,56 it is 
unclear whether lis pendens rules could be applicable in favour of third states.57 
The Cour de Cassation, while remaining completely silent on the implications 
of Owusu v. Jackson, suggested that this was possible.58 The Recast Brussels Ia, 
however, has introduced a novelty – lis pendens provisions to be applied in respect 
of third states.59 These, obviously, are most welcome, even though the conditions 
required are largely strict and it is still up to the court to decide whether to apply 
the new instrument in a certain case.60
While jurisdictional rules in Brussels Ia are generally more third-state friendly 
than the corresponding rules of its predecessor, it is doubtful whether the same 
conclusions can be made as to the EIR and the proposed EIRa when it comes to 
50 OJ L 12 of 16 January 2001, Article 2.
51 OJ L 12 of 16 January 2001, Articles 3 and 4.
52 “Exorbitant” jurisdiction is jurisdiction validly exercised under the jurisdictional rules of a state, which, 
nevertheless, appears unreasonable to non-nationals because of the grounds used to justify jurisdiction. See: 
Russell [14], pp. 57–59 and citations.
53 OJ L 12 of 16 January 2001, Article 4.
54 OJ L 12 of 16 January 2001, Articles 22, 23 and 24.
55 Case No. 2T-28-186/2015, Decision of 2 February 2015 of the Court of Appeal of Lithuania.
56 Case C-281/02, Andrew Owusu v. Nugent B. Jackson, trading as “Villa Holidays Bal-Inn Villas”, Mammee Bay 
Resorts Ltd., Mammee Bay Club Ltd., The Enchanted Garden Resorts & Spa Ltd., Consulting Services Ltd., 
Town & Country Resorts Ltd. [2005] ECR I-1383.
57 Magnus/Mankowski/Magnus [9], pp. 498 –499.
58 Cour de Cassation, Civile, Chambre Commerciale, 19 février 2013, 11-28.846.
59 OJ L 351 of 20 December 2012, Articles 33 and 34.
60 Under the new Regulation, proceedings may be stayed provided that: 1) third state court is the court first seized; 2) 
an expected judgment of the foreign court must be capable of recognition and, where applicable, of enforcement 
by the court of the Member State; 3) the EU court must be satisfied that a stay is necessary for the proper 
administration of justice. In cases where the actions are related, the EU court must also be satisfied that it is 
expedient to hear and determine the related actions together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting 
from separate proceedings.
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annex proceedings against third state defendants. Schmid v Hertel is a great arrival 
for insolvency universalism, nevertheless, possible effects of the judgment still 
leave some uncertainty. While the Deco Marty rule may be entirely reasonable 
for intra-EU situations, the extension of the rule into the realm of third states may 
not. First and foremost, it is unilateral. From the perspective of non-EU countries, 
this may be seen as diminution of comity and mutual trust. Therefore, a treaty 
may arguably be a better choice to secure the same result. Although the arguments 
concerning different possibilities for reaching the assets located in another states 
are at least partially61 correct, they are somewhat aggressive and do not complement 
the establishment of an efficient and predictable legal framework in the sphere of 
international insolvency between EU and other countries.
These findings, therefore, seem to be aimed at protecting the interests of the EU 
itself rather than the interests of the parties, and thus, may be construed as justifying 
exorbitant grounds of jurisdiction.62 Meanwhile, there is a notable trend to move 
away from exorbitant heads of jurisdiction, which are sometimes referred to as 
“shockingly uncivilized”63 in private international law. As expressed by the Court 
of Appeal of Lithuania in considering the interplay between a rule of exorbitant 
jurisdiction laid down in national law and the possibilities of both parties in seeking 
an efficient real remedy in a cross-border situation and taking their domicile into 
account, nominal legal connections even though they are of paramount importance 
cannot supersede genuine legal connections ascending from objective reality.64
Article 6(1) of the EIRa governing jurisdiction in annex proceedings, however, 
does not make any distinction as to its applicability in respect of defendants 
within the EU or outside the EU. The word “any”, while encompassing the widest 
possible array of annex proceedings, additionally gives the impression that it is 
applicable irrespective of the domicile of the defendant, which would be in line 
with Schmid v Hertel.
2.3 Recognition and Enforcement
Judgements are not intrinsically extraterritorial. Due to the principle of sovereign 
equality,65 a judgment rendered in one state must be recognized in another so that it 
61 Laukemann observes that Article 3 EIR itself does not guarantee that insolvency practitioner can take possession 
of sold or transferred assets through coercive measures, because foreign judgments on avoidance might be neither 
recognized nor enforced, as it is the case in Switzerland. See: Laukemann [8], p. 102.
62 See Kessedjian [5], No. 138.
63 Clermont and Palmer [1], p. 475.
64 Case No. 2T-58/2014, Decision of 22 December 2014 of the Court of Appeal of Lithuania.
65 Kelsen [6], pp. 207–220; Civil case No 2-703/2009, Ruling of 30 July 2009 in of the Court of Appeal of Lithuania.
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could create legal consequences in that foreign country. According to Hartley, there 
are two main theories that explain the legal nature of recognition and enforcement 
of foreign judgements. The “comity theory”66 states that it is done out of respect 
for the foreign State concerned. This theory is often regarded as requiring the 
application of reciprocity. It may also be considered as requiring a treaty between 
the two States. Under the second theory – the “obligation theory”67 – judgments 
are recognized in order to do justice to the parties.
The idea is that if the proceedings were fair and if the foreign court had jurisdiction, 
a judgment in favour of the claimant creates an obligation in the same way as a 
contract.68 There are also diverging theories as to the effect of a recognized foreign 
judgment. The modern “extension of power”69 theory postulates that recognition 
of a judgment transfers its legal power from the country of origin to a state of 
recognition, whereas timeworn “assimilation” theory incorporates the foreign 
judgement and its legal result into the national legal system treating the foreign 
judgement as if it were rendered in the recognizing country, adopting its legal 
effect into the legal regime of the latter.
Since the European Union aims to form an integral space of freedom, security 
and justice, the architecture of legal instruments concerning recognition and 
enforcement of judgements rendered in other EU Member States is significantly 
different. Whilst some EU Regulations do to some extent still contain a requirement 
for judgements to be declared enforceable by Member States other than its country 
of origin before actual execution takes place,70 so-called “Regulations of the second 
generation”71 have abolished the exequatur requirement. The rationale behind a 
66 Hilton v Guyot [1895], 159 U.S. 113
67 Schibsby v Westenholz [1870] LR 6 QB 155.
68 Hartley [3], pp. 319–320.
69 Case 145/86 Horst Ludwig Martin Hoffmann v Adelheid Krieg [1988].
70 See: Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ L 12 of 16 January 2001); Council Regulation 
(EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of decisions 
and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations as to judgments rendered in the Member State 
not bound by the 2007 Hague Protocol (OJ L 7 of 10 January 2009, pp. 1–79); Council Regulation (EC) No 
2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in 
matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000 (except 
access and child abduction cases) (OJ L 338 of 23 December 2003, pp. 1–29).
71 See: Regulation (EC) No 805/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 creating 
a European Enforcement Order for Uncontested claims (OJ L 143/15 of 30 April 2004); Regulation (EC) No 
1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 creating a European Order for 
Payment Procedure (OJ L 399 of 30 December 2006, pp. 1–32); Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 11 July 2007 establishing a European Small Claims Procedure and Council 
Regulation (EC) No 4/2009 of 18 December 2008 on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and enforcement of 
decisions and cooperation in matters relating to maintenance obligations as to judgments rendered in the Member 
State bound by the 2007 Hague Protocol (OJ L 199 of 31 July 2007, pp. 1–22).
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simplified regime of recognition of judgements within the EU is based on the idea 
of free movement of judgements which is intended to improve the functioning of 
the internal market.
Therefore, the Brussels Ia Regulation takes a significant leap forward from its 
predecessor and abolishes the requirement of exequatur as well. The abolition 
of exequatur is sometimes regarded as the most significant change in the new 
Regulation.72 By virtue of Articles 36 and 39 of the Recast Brussels I, a party 
seeking to enforce the judgment of another EU Member State no longer needs 
to request a competent court of that country to declare the judgment enforceable. 
Such a party may get in touch with a competent enforcement authority (e.g. bailiff, 
enforcement agent, etc.) directly. Provided that the service of process upon a 
defendant has been effected,73 the competent authorities may carry out the actual 
enforcement right away. The defendant still has the possibility to request that the 
competent courts of the Member State where the enforcement is to take place 
refuse recognition or enforcement.74
The ones who undoubtedly will benefit from the varied legal landscape the most, 
surprisingly, are the courts, since the removal of all the intermediate actions 
preceding actual enforcement will take away a significant deal of their workload. 
Despite the fact that the first stage of exequatur used to be an ex parte matter of 
a formal nature, the procedural questions which had to be performed during the 
procedure (e.g. verification that procedural documents submitted by the claimant 
met the requirements,75 issuance of exequatur itself,76 service of documents upon 
the parties,77 control over the entrance into force of the judgment78 etc.) aggregated 
a significant workload, which, according to Brussels Ia, no longer belongs to the 
courts’ competence. The functions which formed the first stage of exequatur have 
been handed over to enforcement authorities, which now have greater powers and 
responsibilities. This is a hugely significant reduction because, as the Heidelberg 
report indicates, most decisions on the declaration of enforceability are not 
appealed; the percentage of appeals is between 1% and 5% of all decisions.79 
Therefore, a court involvement will be needed in a tiny fraction of situations thus 
simplifying cross-border litigation.
72 Nielsen [12], p. 62.
73 OJ L 351 of 20 December 2012, Article 43.
74 OJ L 351 of 20 December 2012, Subsections 1 and 2 of Section 3.
75 OJ L 12 of 16 January 2001, Articles 40(1) and 53.
76 OJ L 12 of 16 January 2001, Article 41.
77 OJ L 12 of 16 January 2001, Article 42.
78 OJ L 12 of 16 January 2001, Articles 43 and 47(3).
79 Hess/Pfeiffer/Schlosser [4], p. 22.
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Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements work differently under the 
EIR. Firstly, Article 16 of the EIR provides that any judgment opening insolvency 
proceedings handed down by a court of a Member State which has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Article 3 of the EIR shall be recognised in all the other Member States 
from the time that it becomes effective in the State of the opening of proceedings. 
In the eyes of the Regulation, it is irrelevant whether the proceedings are main 
or secondary, the judgment concerning the opening of proceedings is subject 
to automatic recognition under Article 16 of the EIR. Article 25 (1) of the EIR 
governs the recognition of:
1) judgments which concern the course and closure of insolvency proceedings;
2) compositions approved by the court;
3) judgments deriving directly from insolvency proceedings and judgments 
which are closely linked to them; and
4) judgments relating to preservation measures taken after the request for the 
opening of insolvency proceedings.
Subject to the provisions of Article 25(1), these types of judgments are also 
recognized automatically. Such judgments are to be enforced in accordance with 
Articles 39 to 60 of the Brussels Ia Regulation (Articles 38 to 58 of the Brussels I 
Regulation), with the exception of Article 46 of the Brussels Ia Regulation (Article 
45(2), of the Brussels I Regulation). Under the provisions of EIR, the recognition 
and enforcement of judgments other than those referred to in Article 25(1) are 
to be governed by the Regulation referred to in Article 25(1), provided that it is 
applicable. Possibilities for refusing the recognition or enforcement of a judgment 
are very limited under the EIR: Article 25(1) rules out any prospect of relying on 
the grounds of non-recognition laid down in Brussels Ia; therefore, there remain 
only two grounds: a judgment may be refused of recognition for reasons of public 
policy (Article 26, EIR) or in situations which might result in a limitation of 
personal freedom or postal secrecy (Article 25(3), EIR).
After the Recast Brussels I abolishing the exequatur requirement has entered 
into force, the difference between the regimes of recognition of judgments under 
the latter and the EIR may seem marginal. The principal change regarding the 
interaction of the two Regulations after the renewal of Brussels I mainly concerns 
actual enforcement of judgments: under the new Brussels I, there is no need to 
request the exequatur in the country of enforcement, as mentioned above, thus the 
successful party may advance the enforcement directly. This rule also applies when 
a judgement subject to enforcement has been rendered in insolvency proceedings. 
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Although the grounds for non-recognition remain unchanged in the Brussels I 
Recast as compared to the old version of the instrument, the examination of these 
grounds is impossible without a request from the interested party.
While Brussels Ia keeps “classic” grounds of non-recognition, the EIR and its 
renewed version EIRa are limited to the possibility of invoking the orde public 
ground and to assess whether the judgement does not infringe personal freedoms or 
postal secrecy of the party. Therefore, since the grounds of non-recognition under 
the EIR (as well as in the EIRa) and Brussels Ia differ, the instrument applicable 
to annex proceedings still bears a particular importance due to the difference in 
possibilities available to challenge the enforcement.
Contrary to jurisdictional rules, the provisions concerning recognition and 
enforcement of judgements, which establish the closest possible regime of legal 
cooperation, work efficiently in practice and cause no significant issues. Therefore, 
the proposed EIRa itself does not change the existing framework of recognition 
and enforcement of foreign insolvency judgements.
3 Possible Actions as Annex Proceedings
In its judgment in Deko Marty, the CJEU explained that insolvency related actions 
are subject to the vis attractiva concursus principle, although this important 
clarification did not have much impact on the ambiguity as to precisely which 
actions derive directly from the insolvency proceedings and are closely connected 
to them. Nevertheless, the silence of the EIR as to the characterization of annex 
proceedings has been comparatively compensated by the CJEU in its numerous 
judgments. According to the previous jurisprudence of the CJEU, the evaluation 
of an action at hand must be rendered in each and every case and it should not 
be formalistic, hence the main criteria allowed in labelling ancillary actions is 
obviously the purpose: if the core purpose of the related claim is insolvency 
specific, then it should be regarded as an annex proceeding. It is worth mentioning 
that the term “insolvency specific purpose” is far from being self-explanatory; 
however, according to the jurisprudence of the Court, the insolvency specificity of 
an action may be determined with reference to the following criteria:
- an ancillary action is based on insolvency law;
- an action is based on general rules of law, although altered by the insolvency 
law as to its essence;
- the potential result of an ancillary action is aimed at creating a benefit for the 
general body of insolvency creditors.
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The essence of insolvency as a social, legal and economic phenomenon may entail 
numerous complex issues to be resolved. Since insolvency affects the rights and 
interests of various individuals in one way or another, the spectrum of possible 
questions arising from it is eminently extensive. As a certain right of an individual 
is to be implemented according to a particular set of procedural rules, it is greatly 
important to classify the exact methods of enjoyment of these rights. In the 
context of insolvency law where a collision between ordinary civil proceedings 
and insolvency comes into being, a choice of the correct forum is indispensable.
As we have already seen from the jurisprudence of the CJEU, some of the 
indistinct actions have been classified by the Court itself: insolvency law-related 
lawsuits on personal liability of the de facto manager of an entity have been found 
falling within the ambits of insolvency in Gourdain. As to avoidance actions, a 
delimitation line may be drawn upon the strength of the subject asserting the claim: 
Actio Pauliana filed by the liquidator is indeed an insolvency-related action both 
in situations where the defendant resides in the European Union80 or elsewhere,81 
but not in cases where such a claim is pursued by an assignee.82 In SCT Industri,83 
the CJEU stated that a decision, in which a court of another Member State held a 
transfer of shares effected in the context of insolvency proceedings to be invalid on 
the ground that the liquidator who made the transfer lacked the power to dispose of 
assets situated in that Member State, derived directly from insolvency proceedings 
and was closely linked with them. In German Graphics,84 the CJEU found that 
a seller’s action based on reservation of title against the insolvent purchaser of 
assets was not related to insolvency proceedings and ruled on the applicability of 
Brussels I. In Nickel & Goeldner Spedition,85 the Court rejected a direct link of 
the action with insolvency proceedings as to the action brought by an insolvency 
administrator against the debtor of an insolvent company for payment in respect 
of services involving the international carriage of goods.
As shown by the delimitation criteria laid down in the jurisprudence of the CJEU, 
actions which presuppose insolvency-specific interests, such as the protection of 
the paritas creditorum principle, should be attracted to insolvency proceedings. 
Therefore, challenges by one creditor concerning the recognition of another 
80 Case C-339/07 Christopher Seagon v Deko Marty Belgium NV [2009], I-00767 ECLI:EU:C:2009:83.
81 Case C-328/12 Ralph Schmid v Lilly Hertel [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:6.
82 Case C-213/10 F-Tex v UAB Jadecloud-Vilma [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:215.
83 Case C-111/08 SCT Industri AB i likvidation v Alpenblume AB [2009] ECR 2009 p. I-5655 ECLI:EU:C:2009:419.
84 Case C-292/08 German Graphics Graphische Maschinen GmbH v Alice van der Schee [2009] 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:544.
85 Case C-157/13 Nickel & Goeldner Spedition [2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2145.
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creditor’s claim in insolvency proceedings, or questions concerning the priority 
of claims, naturally should be attracted to insolvency proceedings. The same 
conclusion is to be drawn about claims concerning the approval of debt-repayment 
plans or discharge of the obligations of the debtor or similar actions. These types 
of actions are insolvency specific; secondly, resolution of this kind of dispute is 
the most rational and economic if it takes place before the insolvency court. The 
jurisdiction over actions concerning insolvency practitioners’ liability for damages 
should also fall within the competence of an insolvency court, provided this 
liability is based on the wrongful carrying out of his duties during the insolvency 
as opposed to claims based on a general tort law, which should not be subject to 
vis attractiva concursus.
Actions which ought not to be accumulated are those which would have been 
possible irrespective of insolvency. This category of lawsuits includes actions to 
recover property in possession of the debtor, disputes between the insolvent entity 
and a provider of services that are necessary for the former to maintain its functions 
during the insolvency and disputes concerning ownership of the assets. Other 
actions, such as claims of preferential creditors concerning separate satisfaction of 
their claims, although featuring connections to insolvency, should not be subject to 
the vis attractiva conscursus principle, since the essence of the legal relationship 
presupposes the bypassing of insolvency law.
4 Conclusions
The Brussels Ia Regulation is the main instrument in the private EU law framework 
projected to cover the widest possible spectrum of issues, whereas the EIR is 
specifically tailored to govern the sphere of insolvency within the EU. Therefore, 
the scopes of the two Regulations in principle should neither cause any gaps nor 
overlap. However, it is not always so: systematic analysis of the two instruments 
and assessment of the jurisprudence of the CJEU leads to the conclusion that grey 
areas are present, since both the EIR and Brussels Ia fall short of clear delimitation 
between the spheres of coverage of those two Regulations.
As it follows from the political agreement concerning the new EIR, the Recast 
EIR will be broader in scope than its predecessor and is expected to include 
pre-insolvency proceedings and hybrid proceedings. Since these types of 
proceedings are in essence different from traditional insolvency proceedings, 
it is unclear whether the criteria laid down in existing judgements of the CJEU 
will be sufficient to accommodate annex proceedings related to hybrid and pre-
insolvencyproceedings.
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Jurisdiction to open insolvency proceedings is governed by Article 3 of the 
EIR. However, the Regulation is silent concerning the jurisdiction in respect 
of ancillary actions. The muteness of the EIR in relation to these questions led 
to two fundamental judgments by the CJEU establishing the general principles 
of delimitation between actions subject to vis attractiva concursus and those 
belonging to the rules of general jurisdiction laid down in theBrussels I Regulation. 
The findings in Gourdain led to the exclusion of annex proceedings from the 
scope of Brussels I while the inferences in Deko Marty implicitly state that these 
questions are subject to jurisdictional rules of Article 3 of the EIR.
The findings of the CJEU in Deko Marty have been codified in Article 6(1) of 
the EIRa. Nevertheless, there still is a great deal of ambiguity concerning what 
exactly constitutes an annex proceeding. Therefore, it may be assumed that the 
inferences in SCT Industri, F-Tex, German Graphics and finally in Nickel & 
Goeldner Spedition will continue to provide the basis of the determination. Under 
the above mentioned jurisprudence of the CJEU, the main criterion which allows 
a given action to be labelled as “deriving directly from the insolvency proceedings 
and which are closely linked to them” is the insolvency-specific purpose of the 
action, which is to be examined on a case-by-case basis.
Although not expressly confirmed by the CJEU, it may be construed that the 
jurisdiction under Article 3 of the EIR is exclusive. Under the new EIRa, 
jurisdiction in respect of annex proceedings per se seems to be exclusive as well, 
except for the cases when the ancillary action at hand is related to another action 
which is subject to jurisdictional rules laid down in Brussels Ia. In this case, there 
is a possibility to bring both actions before the court according to the jurisdictional 
rules of Brussels Ia.
The rules of recognition and enforcement of judgements under the EIR may be 
construed as efficient and, therefore, have remained unchanged in the Recast 
Insolvency Regulation. After the abolishment of exequatur in the Recast version 
of Brussels I Regulation, the regime of recognition and enforcement of judgments 
looks very similar under both legal instruments; however, the Brussels I Regulation 
provides more possibilities to challenge the enforcement than the EIR.
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Chapter 2
EU-wide Interconnection of 
Insolvency Registers
Pál Szirányi
1 Origins of the Idea of a Europe-wide Interconnection of 
Insolvency Registers*
The collective nature of insolvency proceedings speaks for their publication: 
everyone who has an interest in the assets or affairs of the debtor should be 
informed about the opening of such proceedings in sufficient time to prepare and 
perform any appropriate action. Openness and publication of collective insolvency 
proceedings is also in the interest of the insolvency debtor, since this improves 
the chances of a genuinely universal solution covering all persons affected 
directly or indirectly by the opening. National insolvency laws deal in with the 
issue of publication of insolvency proceedings1 very different ways, which are 
familiar for and accessible to their own residents, but pose a serious challenge 
to interested persons from other states. This was known before the creation of 
the first EU Insolvency Regulation,2 which found it necessary to reinforce the 
universal treatment of cross-border insolvency proceedings in the Regulation by 
certain uniform rules on publication and registration in Member States outside 
the opening of the proceedings. The relatively modest approach of these rules 
received criticism in the relevant literature,3 and the system indeed proved to be 
problematic in practice when it came to the evaluation of the Regulation after a 
decade of its application.
The Report of the Commission on the application of the Regulation named on 
the one hand the inability of creditors to become informed about the opening of 
insolvency proceedings, on the other hand the risk of concurrent proceedings 
1 See Annex VI of the Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a Regulation amending the Insolvency 
Regulation, Commission staff working document, Strasbourg 12 December 2012, SWD(2012) 416 final―
hereinafter as “Impact Assessment”.
2 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, OJ L 160 of 30 June 2000, p. 1-18―
hereinafter as “the Insolvency Regulation”.
3 Moss/Fletcher/Isaacs [1], paragraph 8.298.
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in different Member States relating to the same debtor as the main difficulties 
resulting from the failure of publication of the opening of proceedings in a public 
register.4 The Impact Assessment of the Commission added to these arguments 
that also potential customers, employers or banks of an insolvent company or a 
person may be negatively affected if they are not informed about the fact that their 
future commercial partner is subject to an insolvency proceeding or debt-discharge 
scheme.5 This diagnosis of the assessment was confirmed by the results of the 
public consultation carried out by the Commission in 2012, where three quarters 
of respondents (75%) agreed that the absence of mandatory publication of the 
decision opening insolvency is a problem.6
Against this backdrop, it is easily comprehensible that the provisions of the 
Regulation on publication constituted an issue for consideration when the 
Commission undertook the preparation of its revision proposal; it remained, 
nevertheless, to be decided how to improve these rules. A guidance of political 
nature and an incentive for action came from the European Parliament in 2011. 
Based on a report of Klaus-Heiner Lehne, former chair of the Committee on Legal 
Affairs, the EP adopted a resolution on insolvency proceedings with concrete 
recommendations to the Commission, among others on the issue of publication.7 
In this resolution the EP proposed the creation of “an EU insolvency register in the 
context of the European e-Justice Portal, which should contain, for every cross-
border insolvency opened, at least: the relevant court orders and judgments, the 
appointment of the liquidator and that person’s contact details, the deadlines for 
filing claims. Transmission of this data to the EU registry by the courts should 
be compulsory.”
Another incentive pointing to this direction was given by the evaluation study 
prepared by the Consortium Heidelberg/Vienna University.8 Although the 
relevant conclusion maintained the idea of a single electronic platform for on-line 
accessibility of information, the technique preferred was less intrusive in terms of 
national approaches: instead of creating a uniform EU register with obligations 
to courts to feed in data directly, the study suggested the interconnection of 
4 Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social 
Committee on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency 
proceedings Strasbourg, 12 December 2012 COM(2012) 743 final, p. 16.
5 Impact Assessment p. 25.
6 See Annex II of the Impact Assessment, p. 53. 
7 European Parliament resolution of 15 November 2011 with recommendations to the Commission on insolvency 
proceedings in the context of EU company law (2011/2006(INI)), document no. P7_TA(2011)0484. The relevant 
recommendations can be found in Part 4 of the Annex to the resolution.
8 Hess/Oberhammer/Pfeiffer [2].
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the national electronic registers: “the creditors’ access to information could be 
improved by using public registers as information tools. Such an approach could 
build upon the infrastructure that does already exist in most Member States, i.e. the 
national insolvency registers (or equivalent registers) which are available online. 
Providing a platform that interconnects existing databases would not only avoid a 
duplication of the process, i.e. a consequence the adoption of a new database would 
entail, but also provide a quick and efficient way to spread information.”9
The suggested approach was confirmed by the conclusions of the Impact 
Assessment, which demonstrated that maintaining the existing solution, even 
with the soon to be implemented system of interconnection of national company 
registers, would not bring a satisfactory solution to the problems raised. Although 
the system set up by the relevant EU directive10 requires the publication of 
information on the opening and termination of any winding-up or insolvency 
proceedings of the companies registered, this would improve the situation only 
partially, since:
(i) in most Member States only limited liability companies are registered;
(ii) natural persons, sole traders or self-employed persons are not covered by the 
Directive; and
(iii) the circle of information to be published in relation to insolvency is 
very limited.11
The preferred option by the Impact Assessment, therefore, suggested that Member 
States publish all relevant decisions of insolvency proceedings in a national 
electronic register and define common categories for interconnection of national 
registers through the e-justice portal. According to the evaluation of the Commission, 
such a solution could adequately satisfy the demand for information throughout 
the entire life-cycle of insolvency proceedings which is highly supportable even 
if the implementation and maintenance of the system of interconnection would 
generate some extra costs for Member States.12 It was, therefore, not a surprise 
that the solution aimed at improving publication of insolvency proceedings within 
the European Union put forward by the Commission in its legislative proposal 
9 Evaluation Study pp. 382–383.
10 Directive 2012/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2012 amending Council Directive 
89/666/EEC and Directives 2005/56/EC and 2009/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as 
regards the interconnection of central, commercial and companies registers, OJ L 156 of 16 June 2012, p. 1–9.
11 Impact Assessment p. 37.
12 See estimation with regard to costs on p. 41 of the Impact Assessment.
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amending the existing Regulation13 envisaged the Europe-wide interconnection of 
national electronic insolvency registers.
2 Interconnection of National Insolvency Registers in the Recast 
Insolvency Regulation
2.1 Key Features of the System of Interconnection
Although the system adopted by the recast Insolvency Regulation differs in 
certain features from the solution proposed by the Commission in 2012, one can 
acknowledge with satisfaction that the structure and the core elements of the 
regime establishing the interconnection were left unchanged by the co-legislators. 
This approach anticipates a system which is composed of publicly accessible 
electronic insolvency registers of the Member States, which will be interconnected 
via the European e-Justice Portal. On the one hand Member States are obliged to 
establish and maintain such electronic registers, on the other hand they are obliged 
to publish in these national registers a minimum amount of information with regard 
to insolvency proceedings opened in their jurisdiction, which set of information 
is well defined by the Regulation and labelled as “mandatory information”.14 This 
information will then be made accessible through the European e-Justice Portal 
which will serve as central public electronic access point to the national databases, 
and which will operate a single search service in all official languages of the 
European Union.
The “mandatory information” under the Regulation constitutes a minimum 
standard: nothing precludes Member States from publishing in their national 
registers documents or additional information which they consider relevant 
regarding insolvency proceedings.15 The final list of mandatory information 
maintained, with some necessary clarification and adjustment,16 all elements 
suggested by the proposal of the Commission, and added a few new ones, such as 
13 Proposal of the Commission for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, Strasbourg 12 December 2012, COM(2012) 744 final.
14 Article 24(2) of the recast Insolvency Regulation.
15 Article 24(3) of the recast Insolvency Regulation.
16 E.g. the adopted Regulation dispensed with the idea of obligatory publication of (court) decisions, such as those 
of opening insolvency proceedings or of appointing the liquidator, since it was held satisfactory that the legally 
relevant information contained in such decisions are published. Another adjustment concerned the time limits 
for lodging claims and challenging decisions: namely, some Member States considered it technically demanding 
to calculate this information on a case-by-case basis, due to the specific circumstances such calculations may be 
influenced by. As a compromise it was agreed that this information may be provided in a general way, by adding 
hyperlinks to the European e-Justice Portal, which links contain self-explanatory information on the criteria for 
calculating those time limits (see recast Insolvency Regulation recital (77)).
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the information relating to the ground of jurisdiction for opening proceedings,17 or 
the information with regard to the exercise of the right granted by the Regulation 
to challenge the opening decision.18
2.2 Scope of the Future System Interconnection of Insolvency Register
Defining the scope of those national insolvency proceedings which should 
be included in the interconnected system of national registers was one of the 
issues most intensively debated during the legislative procedure in the Council. 
The political difficulty of the question derived partly from the “data protection” 
sensitivity of the matter, partly from the divergence in policy lines which Member 
States follow in terms of accessibility of registered insolvency proceedings, in 
particular concerning the proceedings for natural person debtors.
With regard to the first issue, it is to be noted that even the Commission proposal 
paid attention to the possible impacts of the on-line accessible interconnection on 
the protection of personal data. The Impact Assessment underlined the importance 
of the obligation of Member States to comply with the currently applicable EU 
standards in this context, which led to an express reference in the proposal to the 
two legislative instruments of EU law on data protection.19 The awareness for the 
principles of data protection was one of the reasons why the original legislative 
proposal of the Commission did not extend the scope of the interconnection to 
proceedings which concerned “consumer” debtors, meaning natural persons not 
exercising an independent business or professional activity.20
As it appeared, this approach was not satisfactory to all Member States. There were 
those, which were in their national registration more liberal and put information 
concerning natural person debtors without any restriction on the internet, and which 
consequently did not accept the idea that the system of interconnection would 
not provide full transparency with regard to “consumer” debtors. While another 
group of Member States wished to exclude from the scope of interconnection all 
proceedings relating to natural persons, even those concerning self-employed 
and independent professionals. They argued that the exclusion of non-consumer 
individuals from the obligation of the interconnection serves the interest of 
protecting their clientele.
17 In order to inform the public if the insolvency proceeding opened is a main, a secondary or a territorial one.
18 Article 5 of the recast Insolvency Regulation. In the original proposal of the Commission this piece of information 
should have been provided to the (known) creditors through individual notices by the court of opening; but finally 
this idea was rejected, since the co-legislator considered it more effective to include it in the publicly available 
system of interconnection.
19 See Article 46a of the 2012 Commission proposal.
20 See Article 20d of the 2012 Commission proposal, as well as point 3.1.4. of its explanatory memorandum.
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The data protection aspect of the proposal gained on importance in the legislative 
procedure due to the fact that the European Data Protection Supervisor issued 
an opinion on the Commission’s proposal.21 In this opinion the supervisor 
also addressed the proposed system of interconnection. On the one hand, he 
acknowledged that the aims pursued by the Commission are legitimate, and 
understood that transparency regarding the opening and closing of insolvency 
proceedings and the need for creditors and courts involved to be well informed 
and to avoid the parallel opening of proceedings are important objectives.22 
On the other hand, he asked for a clearer justification in terms of necessity and 
proportionality of the suggested measure and recommended some additional 
safeguards in this context.23
On the basis of these recommendations, the legislator introduced more detailed 
provisions on data protection in compliance with Directive 95/46/EC and Regulation 
(EC) No 45/2001. These rules clarify the responsibilities of the Member States and 
of the Commission with regard to the system of interconnection. Furthermore they 
make it clear that no personal data relating to data subjects shall be stored in the 
European e-Justice Portal, and that all such data shall be stored in the national 
databases operated by the Member States or other bodies. Consequently, the time 
of accessibility of personal data via the European e-Justice Portal will correspond 
to the retention period of that data in the national registers under the respective 
national laws.24 In addition, for the purpose of satisfying the requirement of 
proportionality, the Regulation establishes a regime of conditionality, which 
Member States may apply in terms of requests on information concerning 
“consumers” and non-consumer natural person debtors subject to proceedings 
which are not related to their economic activity (see point 2.3 below).
With regard to the second source of difficulty, which is the difference of national 
policies, it is to be noted that in some Member States registers containing data 
on insolvency proceedings for natural persons are not accessible to the public 
on the internet, but can be accessed only through competent authorities. Those 
who would like to have information from such registers may get it only on a 
justified request through those authorities.25 In addition, there are Member States 
21 Opinion of 27 March 2013 on the Commission proposal for a Regulation amending Council Regulation (EC) 
No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, available at: https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/
mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2013/1-03-27_Insolvency_Proceedings_EN.pdf.
22 See paragraph 21 of the opinion.
23 Paragraphs 24 and 56 of the opinion.
24 Chapter VI of the recast Insolvency Regulation.
25 Member States which have registers containing data on personal insolvencies, but these are not accessible publicly 
on the internet, include e.g. Finland, Belgium, Ireland.
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where insolvency proceedings for natural persons are designed “profile neutral”, 
i.e. they are available both for individuals exercising an independent business or 
professional activity and for “consumers”.26
Another relevant factor discussed was that in some Member States all types of 
debts of the natural persons subject to insolvency proceedings are considered 
collectively, i.e. irrespectively of the fact if they were generated by the natural 
person debtor in his/her “consumer” capacity or in the course of his/her economic 
activity.27 The interests of these Member States were hardly reconcilable with 
the interests of those Member States, where data on natural persons subject to 
insolvency proceedings are freely accessible on the internet.28 The former group 
stressed e.g. that it would be harmful and illogical to require the launching of 
different sets of proceedings because the nature of the debts of the same natural 
person differs even though both types of debt are included among the debtor’s 
liabilities. They also said that it would require an inappropriate extra effort in 
terms of technical adjustment, if they would be obliged to filter out from their 
single national registers for the purpose of interconnection those proceedings 
which relate to economically active persons. Generally they wished to exclude 
from the scope of interconnection proceedings relating to all natural persons, 
including those concerning self-employed and independent professionals, going 
even beyond the original proposal of the Commission, which did not extend the 
system to proceedings relating to consumers.
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that the Regulation reflects a compromise 
solution. As a starting point, it says that all insolvency proceedings covered by 
the scope of the Regulation which are included in its Annex are subject to the 
provisions on interconnection. This includes proceedings in relation to all natural 
persons, should they be self-employed persons or professionals or just “consumers” 
in the sense of the Regulation. The Regulation acknowledges only one exception 
from this general rule, which applies only if three cumulative conditions are met:
(a) the information is generated in relation to a proceeding of a “consumer” debtor;
(b) there is a decision by the Member State operating the national register not 
to include information concerning such persons in the national register 
or not to make such information publicly available through the system of 
interconnection; and simultaneously; and
26 E.g. “debt adjustment proceedings” in Finland.
27 Such as the “collective debt settlement procedure” in Belgium.
28 E.g. United Kingdom, Slovenia.
EU-wide Interconnection of Insolvency Registers
34 Reimagining Rescue
(c) this Member State ensures in its law that foreign known creditors are 
individually informed in the course of such proceedings.
Those Member States which do not opt for this exemption with regard to 
proceedings concerning “consumer” debtors in their territory may still avail 
themselves of the conditionality of access to information introduced by Article 
27 of the Regulation (see details under subchapter 2.3). As far as the proceedings 
concerning economically active natural persons are concerned, finally the principle 
of transparency prevailed over the right to privacy: such proceedings are treated 
equally to the ones relating to companies or other legal persons. Since the role and 
function of this circle of individuals in the single market is similar to that one of the 
SME’s, this was a decisive factor. In the times of crisis, it is especially important 
that creditors are informed in a full-scale manner on the financial situation of their 
business partners.
Another question during the legislative procedure concerned the issue if Member 
States were obliged to include into their national electronic registers to be 
connected with the e-Justice Portal information on purely domestic insolvency 
proceedings, without any cross-border implications. Taking into account the legal 
basis of the proposal and the objectives pursued by the Regulation both in general 
and in the context of establishment of the interconnection, one shall answer that 
the obligation to include data on proceedings only relates to cases with cross-
border elements. This interpretation appears to be confirmed by recital (76) of the 
recast Regulation, which expressly refers to “cross-border insolvency cases” in 
connection with the information to be published in the electronic registers.
Nevertheless, this interpretation does not pay attention to the aspect of practical 
feasibility, namely that in most of the cases one cannot estimate with certainty 
at the time of opening, if the proceeding does or does not have any international 
connection, since such a certainty would presuppose that information with regard 
to all (even possibly not known) creditors are at the disposal of the court. Once a 
cross-border implication is there, the Member State does not have any choice but to 
publish and interconnect the data relating to the proceeding. This means, therefore, 
that Member States which would like to prevent any unintentional infringement of 
the obligations imposed by the rules on interconnection of registers, have to feed in 
information with regard to all insolvency proceedings opened within their territory.
2.3 Conditions of Access of Information
The recast Regulation guarantees access to all “mandatory information” with 
regard to insolvency proceedings free of charge. This means that Member States 
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are not entitled to charge any fee for the provision of this information through 
the e-Justice Portal. This approach corresponds with the one proposed by the 
Commission. Still it should be appreciated as a great success, since during the 
negotiations there were attempts going in the opposite direction. Beyond that, 
Member States are free to charge a reasonable fee for access to the documents or 
additional information which they decide to share through the system voluntarily.29
Member States otherwise have very limited opportunities to restrict access to 
information included in the national registers. The Regulation allows such a 
restriction only with regard to a limited circle of debtors, namely to individuals 
who are either “consumers” or economically active persons in their capacity 
as consumers.30 Even within this circle, the acceptable ways of restriction of 
accessibility are clearly defined by the Regulation: Member States may either 
require a supplementary search criteria relating to the debtor from the users of the 
service of interconnection, or they may make the access of information conditional 
upon the verification of the existence of a legitimate interest. In order to avoid 
any impairment of the effectiveness of the provision, the legislator did not want 
to expose its conditions to the practical implementation of the Member States. 
Instead, there are clearly defined criteria and procedures, which a State has to 
comply with once it decides to use the restrictions to the data referred.
• Although the determination of the “normal” search criteria is deferred to, an 
implementing act to be adopted by the Commission simultaneously with the 
establishment of the system of interconnection, the possible supplementary 
search criteria at the disposal of the Member States are listed in the Regulation. 
Recital (79) states that the following factors may constitute such additional 
criteria: the debtor’s personal identification number, his/her address, his/her 
date of birth or the district of the competent court. The supplementary nature 
of these criteria means that they may be required from users for getting access 
to the requested information in addition to the minimum search criteria, and 
in such a case (but only in such cases) at least two fields have to be filled in in 
the search service of the e-Justice Portal.
• If a Member State decides that it will provide information on consumer 
debtors upon verification of a legitimate interest from the side of the searcher, 
the Member State has to follow the uniform rules of the verification procedure 
as set out in Article 27(4) of the recast Regulation. According to these rules, 
29 Paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 27 of the recast Insolvency Regulation.
30 With the language used in Art 27(3) and 27(4) “individuals exercising an independent business or professional 
activity when the insolvency proceedings are not related to that activity.”
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Member States shall ensure that such requests are submitted to their competent 
authorities electronically by means of a standard form via the European 
e-Justice Portal. If they require written justification of the interest, they 
must accept electronic copies of relevant documents. Furthermore, Member 
States are prohibited from requiring translation of the documents justifying 
the request by the searcher, or charge any cost of such translation which 
their competent authority may incur. Finally, the decision on the request for 
access to document shall be delivered by the competent authority within three 
working days upon arrival of the request.
2.4 Technical Implementation of the Europe-wide Interconnection of 
Insolvency Registers
The actual establishment of the system of interconnection is entrusted to the 
implementing powers of the Commission, which by means of implementing acts 
shall adopt by 26 June 2019 all measures necessary for the deployment of the 
system. These measures include in addition to the technical specification defining 
the electronic information exchange and the measures ensuring information 
technology security also the minimum criteria for the search service and the 
minimum criteria of the presentation of the results of such searches.31 This implies 
that the system of interconnection will be accessible through a uniform search 
mask (available in all official languages of the European Union), and that also the 
results will be displayed in a uniform user experience.
As a necessary preliminary measure, Member States are obliged to establish their 
own national electronic registers complying with the Regulation’s requirements by 
26 June 2018.32 The Regulation also specifies that the costs for the establishment 
and maintenance of the system of interconnection of insolvency registers shall be 
financed by the budget of the European Union, while the costs of adjustment of 
national insolvency registers needed for the interoperability with the European 
e-Justice Portal, or the costs of the establishment of national electronic registers 
in those Member States where such registers do not exist shall be borne by the 
Member States.33
Although we still have to wait almost four years to enjoy the benefits of a Europe-
wide interconnection of insolvency registers on the internet, we may right now 
experience how the future system may look like in reality. This is due to an 
31 Article 25 of the recast Insolvency Regulation.
32 Article 92(2)(b) of the recast Insolvency Regulation.
33 Article 26 of the recast Insolvency Regulation.
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e-Justice pilot-project developed and delivered under the umbrella of the European 
Union.34 The project was implemented on the basis of and executed further to the 
two subsequent Multi-annual Council e-Justice Action Plans.35 The objective of 
the pilot project was to establish a single access point to interconnected national 
insolvency registers and to provide – to the greatest extent possible – a multi-
lingual user experience. The project was based on a voluntary interconnection 
of insolvency registers (or data) originating from Member State registers. The 
integration was completed with 7 Member States: Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania and Slovenia. The technical 
implementation was concluded in 2012, and the project went live in July 2014.36
The system enables a real-time search in the national registers of the Member States 
involved. The search functionality currently allows for two types of searches: the 
“simple” search runs a parallel search on a debtor’s name (legal or natural person) in 
all participating registers; while the “advanced” search function works with different 
user interfaces depending on the own designs of the involved Member States. 
Although one can easily realise that the interconnection established by the pilot-
project has a greater sensitivity to differences of national laws than the future system 
to be developed by the recast Insolvency Regulation will have, it provides already an 
impressive demonstration of the potential benefits of such an interconnection.
3 Conclusion
The interconnection of national insolvency registers via the European e-Justice 
Portal constitutes a major improvement in terms of openness and publication 
of insolvency proceedings throughout Europe. As one of the important changes 
introduced by the recast Insolvency Regulation, the system of interconnection 
will provide with certainty an appropriate tool for achieving the objectives set 
by the legislator, i.e. the avoidance of concurrent insolvency proceedings and the 
accessibility of information by all creditors. Another advantage of the adopted 
system appears to be its sensitivity to different national solutions and its attention 
to the EU data protection regulation. It serves as a good example showing that the 
European Union is ready to provide genuine solutions to the challenges set by the 
financial crisis.
34 I would like to thank to Alexander Ivantchev for the valuable information given about the details of the e-justice 
pilot project.
35 Multiannual European e-Justice Action Plan 2009-2013, OJ C 75 of 31 March 2009, p. 1–12; Multiannual 
European e-Justice Action Plan 2014-2018, OJ C 182 of 14 June 2014, p. 2–13.
36 The interconnection is now available at: https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_interconnected_insolvency_registers_
search-246-en.do.
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Chapter 3
Communication and Cooperation in 
International Insolvency: On Best Practices for 
Insolvency Office Holders and Cross-Border 
Communication between Courts
Bernard Santen
1 Introduction*
Over the past 20 years, communication, coordination and cooperation have become 
key concepts in international insolvency law.1 This chapter surveys the present and 
coming position of these concepts in European Union hard law and soft law. It 
starts with a discussion in section 2 on the “communication”, “coordination” and 
“cooperation” concepts in the European Insolvency Regulation (EIR).2 Section 3 
subsequently discusses the use of these concepts in the Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on insolvency proceedings (EIR Recast).3 As section 
4 will show, soft law seems the most appropriate means to operationalise the 
communication, coordination and cooperation-concepts in practice. This section 
discusses three sets of soft law which Leiden Law School prepared during 2013-
2014, i.e. the draft INSOL Europe 2014 Statement of Principles and Guidelines 
for IOHs in Europe, the EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation 
Principles and the connected EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court 
Communication Guidelines.
2 Communication, Coordination and Cooperation in the EIR
The EIR mentions communication, coordination and cooperation (further on 
indicated as: the three C-s concept) as one of the means to achieve the objective of 
1 See for example the 1995 European Convention on insolvency proceedings and the 1996 Virgós/Schmit report 
(L6500/96). For a complete survey, see Wessels [4].
2 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 as subsequently updated until the moment of writing of 
this chapter.
3 As mentioned in: Position (EU) No 7/2015 of the Council at First Reading with a view to the adoption of a 
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on insolvency proceedings (recast), 2012/0360 (COD), 
adopted by the Council on 12 March 2015, (2015/C 141/01); as approved by the European Parliament legislative 
resolution of 20 May 2015; and as published as Regulation (EU) 2015/848 in OJ L 141/19 of 5 June 2015.
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the EIR, formulated in Recital 2 as “cross-border insolvency proceedings should 
operate efficiently and effectively”. This is not a hollow phrase. When e.g. KPN-
Qwest NV became insolvent in 2002, its European data-stock ring-network was 
sold piecemeal instead of under a central direction, which could have maintained 
the European ring and concluded in a much better central deal. Implementing the 
three C-s concept would avoid many of the pointless quarrels between insolvency 
office holders4 (IOHs) and long lasting discussions before courts, often costing 
creditors huge amounts of money. In short, the three C-s concept was implemented 
in order to improve the recovery rates.
The EIR introduced these “three C-s concepts” moderately. As Table 3.1 
shows, “communication” is mentioned only four times, all of these in the text; 
“coordination” four times only in the recitals; and “cooperation” twice in the 
recitals and twice in the text.
Table 3.1: Survey of Presence of Communication, Coordination and 
Cooperation in the EIR56
EIR No 1346/2000
Recital Text
communication - 4 (Article 31)
coordination 4 (Recital 3, 12, 20, 21) -
cooperation 26 (Recitals 2, 20) 2 (Article 31)
The main presence of cooperation and communication is found in Article 31 
EIR (“Duty to cooperate and communicate information”). According to Article 
31(1), the IOH in the main procedure and the IOH in the secondary procedure are 
duty bound to communicate information to each other which may be relevant to 
the other proceedings. This regards, as the text states, in particular the progress 
made in lodging and verifying claims and all measures aimed at terminating the 
proceedings. Article 31(2) EIR provides for a duty of cooperation between the 
main and the secondary IOH. Finally, Article 31(3) EIR requires a secondary 
IOH to give to the main IOH an early opportunity of submitting proposals on the 
liquidation or use of the assets in the secondary proceedings.
4 The abbreviation “IOH”, coined by the EBRD in their 2007 report: Office Holders Principles (2007), is 
used throughout this chapter to indicate the liquidators mentioned in Annex C of the EIR and the insolvency 
practitioners of Annex B of the EIR Recast.
5 Or related verbs.
6 Found in Recital 2, referring to “judicial cooperation” as meant in Article 65 of the former Treaty. Recital 20 is 
elaborated in Article 31 EIR.
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While communication apparently implies sharing of information as the text 
indicates7, neither the recitals nor the articles provide insight into the application 
of “cooperation” or “coordination”. Moreover it is remarkable that whilst 
“coordination” is found four times in the Recitals, it is found nowhere in the text. 
Apparently, according to the European legislator “coordination” implies either 
communication (and/) or cooperation. The question arises whether coordination 
and cooperation may be (largely) identical concepts. According to the Virgós/
Schmit report:8 “the liquidators have a duty to act in concert with a view to 
the development of proceedings and their coordination, and to facilitate their 
respectivework.”
In their view cooperation comes down to “act in concert”. The on-line Oxford 
dictionaries give for coordinate: “Negotiate with others in order to work together 
effectively”. And for cooperate: “Work jointly towards the same end”. Since 
“act in concert” and “jointly working” imply a further stage of accommodation 
than “negotiation in order to work together” and “effectively” in the coordination 
description leaves open the presence of several aims instead of “the same end” in 
the cooperation description, the conclusion must be that:
(1) “cooperation” is the farthest stage of tuning between IOHs in proceedings;
(2) “coordination” is the stage where IOHs negotiate in order to work together 
effectively; and
(3) “communication” comes down to sharing information with each other which 
may be relevant to the other proceedings.
In short, it seems that in the present text of the EIR, the legislator draws the 
relatively far reaching “cooperation-card” albeit only between IOHs. As the next 
section of this chapter shows, the EIR Recast leans heavily on coordination as well.
7 The 1996 Virgós/Schmit report refers to “communication” in nos. 230–231. No. 230 states: “The exchange of 
information between the liquidators concerns in particular:
• the assets;
• the actions planned or under way in order to recover assets; actions to obtain payment or actions for set aside;
• possibilities for liquidating assets;
• claims lodged;
• verification of claims and disputes concerning them;
• the ranking of creditors;
• planned reorganisation measures;
• proposed compositions;
• plans for the allocation of dividends; and
• the progress of operations in the proceedings.”
 Nr. 231 adds that the duty to communicate “may be limited by national legislation on data exchange, e.g. by 
legislation relating to the protection of computerised personal data.”
8 Nr. 232.
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3 Communication, Coordination and Cooperation in the EIR Recast
Contrary to the EIR, the EIR Recast mentions the “three C-s concepts” in 
abundancy. Already eight Articles show “cooperation and communication” in 
their headings, and there are five with “cooperation” in their heading, but only as 
in “group coordination”. Table 3.2 gives a breakdown of the presence of the “three 
C-s concepts” in the EIR Recast.
Table 3.2: Survey of Presence of Communication, Coordination and 
Cooperation in the EIR and the EIR Recast91011121314
EIR No 1346/2000 EIR Recast
Recital Text Recital Text
communication - 4 (Article 31) 5 (Recitals 48, 52, 59, 61, 62)
339 (Articles 25, 
36, 41-44, 53, 56-
59; 73, 74, 79)
coordination 4 (Recitals 3, 12, 20, 21) -
3810 (Recitals 4, 6, 
23, 50, 54-63)
9611 (Articles 41-
43; 56, 57, 60-74; 
77, 99)
cooperation 212 (Recitals 2, 20) 2 (Article 31)
1713 (Recitals 3, 
48, 49, 50, 52,  
61, 62)
3714 (Articles 41-
44; 56-59; 74  
and 85)
The EU apparently considers these “three C-s concepts” even more important 
today. Instead of 12 referrals to the concepts, the EIR Recast shows 226 referrals. 
Essentially, the present Recital 20 will be replaced by three new ones, 48, 49 and 
50, and the current Article 31 by the new Articles 41, 42 and 43. Moreover, the 
EIR Recast adds Chapter V Insolvency Proceedings of Members of a Group of 
Companies, whose section 1 begins with cooperation and communication, and 
proceeds with coordination in section 2. A short glance at the Articles 41, 42 
and 43 EIR Recast shows that Article 41(1) requires IOHs of the main and the 
secondary proceedings to:
“cooperate with each other to the extent such cooperation is not 
incompatible with the rules applicable to the respective proceedings. 
Such cooperation may take any form, including the conclusion of 
agreements or protocols.”
9 In Article 79, “communication” refers to communication to the European Commission.
10 In Recital 4, “coordination” refers to “a need for a Union Act”. Figures including “coordinator”: 6x in Recitals, 
39x in Articles.
11 In Article 90, “coordination” is used in the review clause.
12 In Recital 2, “cooperation” refers to Article 65 of the former Treaty establishing the European Community.
13 In Recital 3, “cooperation” refers to Article 81 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
14 In Article 85 “cooperation” refers to Treaties having “Cooperation” in their name.
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This goes beyond the present Article 31 EIR, since being duty bound to 
communicate (para. 1) and to cooperate (para. 2) as it is now, seems more restricted 
than cooperation to the extent of incompatibility with the law.15 Article 41 EIR 
Recast requires (“shall”) IOHs specifically:
(a) to communicate as soon as possible to each other any information which may 
be relevant to the other proceedings;16
(b) to explore the possibility of restructuring the debtor;17 and
(c) to coordinate the administration of the realisation or use of the debtor’s assets 
and affairs.18
This specification goes beyond the present Article 31(1) e.g. on restructuring and 
coordination. In order to facilitate coordination of insolvency proceedings Article 
42 EIR Recast requires:
“a court before which a request to open insolvency proceedings is 
pending, or which has opened such proceedings, (to) cooperate with 
any other court before which a request to open insolvency proceedings 
is pending, or which has opened such proceedings, to the extent that 
such cooperation is not incompatible with the rules applicable to each 
of the proceedings.”
According to Article 42(3) EIR Recast cooperation may, in particular, concern:
(a) coordination in the appointment of the IOH;
(b) communication of information by any means considered appropriate by the court;
(c) coordination of the administration and supervision of the debtor’s assets 
and affairs;
(d) coordination of the conduct of hearings; and
(e) coordination in the approval of protocols, where necessary.
15 Although Article 41(1) EIR Recast refers to “the rules applicable to the respective proceedings” it should be 
interpreted in the author’s view as “the law”.
16 The section continues: “in particular any progress made in lodging and verifying claims and all measures aimed 
at rescuing or restructuring the debtor, or at terminating the proceedings, provided appropriate arrangements are 
made to protect confidential information.”
17 The section continues: “and, where such a possibility exists, coordinate the elaboration and implementation of a 
restructuring plan.”
18 The section continues: “the insolvency practitioner in the secondary insolvency proceedings shall give the 
insolvency practitioner in the main insolvency proceedings an early opportunity to submit proposals on the 
realisation or use of the assets in the secondary insolvency proceedings.”
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Finally, Article 43 EIR Recast requires IOHs to communicate and cooperate with 
(in short) all courts related to the insolvency proceedings to the extent that such 
cooperation is not incompatible with the law.
Already these Articles form a huge extension of the present obligation formulated 
in Article 31. The new Chapter V “Insolvency Proceedings of Members of a Group 
of Companies” adds to this two extensive and detailed sections applicable where 
insolvency proceedings relate to two or more members of a group of companies. 
The first section, on cooperation and communication in general, requires in Article 
56 EIR Recast (“shall”) an IOH appointed in proceedings concerning a member of 
the group to cooperate with any IOH appointed in proceedings concerning another 
member of the same group to the extent that such cooperation is appropriate to 
facilitate the effective administration of those proceedings, is not incompatible with 
the rules applicable to such proceedings and does not entail any conflict of interest. 
That cooperation may take any form, including the conclusion of agreements or 
protocols. It continues in Article 56(2):
“In implementing the cooperation set out in paragraph 1, IOHs shall 
(a) as soon as possible communicate to each other any information 
which may be relevant to the other proceedings, provided appropriate 
arrangements are made to protect confidential information; (b) consider 
whether possibilities exist for coordinating the administration and 
supervision of the affairs of the group members which are subject to 
insolvency proceedings, and if so, coordinate such administration and 
supervision; (c) consider whether possibilities exist for restructuring 
group members which are subject to insolvency proceedings and, 
if so, coordinate with regard to the proposal and negotiation of a 
coordinated restructuring plan.”
Article 57 EIR Recast provides for a similar requirement (“shall”) concerning 
cooperation between courts, including the same list of areas as mentioned in 
Article 42(3) EIR. And Article 58 EIR Recast:
(a) requires an IOH to cooperate and communicate with any court before which 
a request for the opening of proceedings in respect of another member of the 
same group of companies is pending or which has opened such proceedings; 
and
(b) allows an IOH to request information from that court concerning the 
proceedings regarding the other member of the group or request assistance 
concerning the proceedings in which he has been appointed; to the extent 
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that such cooperation and communication are appropriate to facilitate the 
effective administration.
Essentially, these articles are similar to those in the general part of the EIR Recast 
(Articles 41-43). Section 2 of Chapter V provides for a very detailed procedure of 
coordination in these group proceedings.19 Since the coordination and cooperation 
in “group of companies proceedings” is very well arranged for, the question arises 
how the European legislator envisages to operationalise the “three C-s concept” in 
situations of “main/secondary proceedings”. This is the subject of the next section.
4 Operationalisation of the “Three C-s Concept” in Main and 
Secondary Proceedings
Contrary to the Chapter V regulation, there is no regulation at all in the articles of 
the EIR Recast on the operationalisation of the “three C-s concept” in the case of 
main and secondary proceedings. However, the Recitals show a way out. When 
cooperating, Recital 48 reads in the fifth sentence:
“IOHs and courts should take into account best practices for 
cooperation in cross-border insolvency cases, as set out in principles 
and guidelines on communication and cooperation adopted by 
European and international organisations active in the area of 
insolvency law, and in particular the relevant guidelines prepared 
by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL).”20
In light of such cooperation, Recital 49 continues:
“insolvency practitioners and courts should be able to enter into 
agreements and protocols for the purpose of facilitating cross-border 
cooperation of multiple insolvency proceedings in different Member 
States concerning the same debtor or members of the same group 
of companies.”21
As so often, this clarification gives rise to new questions. What are best practices, 
principles and guidelines? What is adoption? Which organisations are active in 
19 Interestingly, an opt-out for each of the proceedings is foreseen in the law, Article 65(1) EIR Recast.
20 The Recital starts as follows: “Main insolvency proceedings and secondary insolvency proceedings can contribute 
to the efficient administration of the debtor’s insolvency estate or to the effective realisation of the total assets 
if there is proper cooperation between the actors involved in all the concurrent proceedings. Proper cooperation 
implies the various insolvency practitioners and the courts involved cooperating closely, in particular by exchanging 
a sufficient amount of information...” Thus, the text does not refer to a group of companies’ proceedings.
21 Remarkably, there is nothing on “coordination” in these recitals.
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insolvency law? And what are agreements and protocols? Of these questions, 
only the meaning of best practices, principles and guidelines will be dealt with in 
this chapter.22
According to the text of the recital, best practices are found in principles and 
guidelines. What are these? In a study for INSOL Europe,23 TRI-Leiden defined 
“Principles” as general standards (Kaplow 1992;24 Davies 201025) of behaviour, 
to be made specific in a specific situation by the IOH himself.26 A Guideline is 
defined in that report in accordance with the online Merriam-Webster dictionary as 
“a rule or instruction that shows or tells how something should be done.”27 A best 
practice then, could be described as either a general standard or a rule or instruction 
that ought to be followed save an acceptable explanation to the contrary (“comply 
or explain”). Over the past two years, Leiden Law School (LLS) has designed two 
sets of Principles and Guidelines to be applied in accordance with (now) Recital 48 
EIR Recast. This section will subsequently discuss the rules for IOHs and courts 
that LLS designed.
4.1 The Draft Statement of Principles and Guidelines for IOHs
Immediately after the publication of the EC evaluation report of the EIR,28 INSOL 
Europe took the initiative to assign a project to LLS to formulate Principles and 
Guidelines for IOHs in Europe.29 Governed by an Academic Committee and 
a Review and Advisory Group, LLS drafted three reports. Report I contains a 
framework and a model, which are subsequently applied on the analysis of 
regionally and globally established rules for IOHs. Report II contains an analysis 
based on the framework and model developed in Report I, of the rules for IOHs 
in a number of European countries e.g. France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Spain and the UK. The comparative 
analysis shows the differences in approach and solution on the various issues. In 
22 TRI-Leiden is currently working on a “protocols” project, see: <www.TRI-Leiden.eu>.
23 Adriaanse/Wuisman/Santen [1], p. 15.
24 Kaplow [3].
25 Davies [2].
26 Whether the actual behaviour of an IOH was in compliance with that Principle can be assessed only ex post by a 
judicial or supervisory body.
27 These resemble “rules” in Davies’ [2] typology.
28 Report of 12 December 2012, see: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/insolvency-regulation_en.pdf.
29 The initial assignment was to draft Principles and Best Practices, but after an analysis of the text of (now) Recital 
48 and the meaning of the concepts, TRI-Leiden suggested to INSOL Europe to change the wording of the 
assignment in Principles and Guidelines.
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their turn, those differences indicate the room for Principles and Best Practices. 
Report III contains the draft Principles and Guidelines.30
The Statement of Principles and Guidelines for IOHs in Europe contains 7 
Principles, 33 Guidelines and 83 Comments. Although it is explicitly non-binding 
of character and recognises that all national law and (professional) regulations have 
priority, it cannot be denied that its character may evolve in a “comply or explain” 
nature. After all, if there is supposedly a Principle or Guideline in the Statement 
that would have avoided certain damage that has occurred when administering the 
proceedings, a judge could easily question the IOH why (s)he has not followed the 
best practice as described in the Statement.
The Principles contain general standards for IOHs i.e. on the role of the law, 
regulations and the Statement itself (Principle 1); on professional (Principle 2) 
and ethical (Principle 3) conduct; on the administration of the estate (Principle 4); 
on communication (Principle 5); on coordination and cooperation (Principle 6); 
and on insolvency governance (Principle 7). Guidelines, sorted by Principle, and 
comments complete these and make them applicable in day-to-day IOH work. As 
an example, Principle 3 on ethics reads:
“An IOH performs with
(a) integrity, meaning that an IOH is straightforward and honest;
(b) objectivity, including impartiality and independence, meaning 
that an IOH does not allow bias, conflict of interests or undue 
influence of others to override professional or business judgments 
and is solely guided by the interests of the estate;
(c) confidentiality, meaning that an IOH complies with the 
confidentiality of information acquired as a result of the 
appointment and avoids the abuse of confidential information.”
As Comment 32 on the Statement notes, “serving as an IOH solely guided by the 
interests of the estate” is added since there should not be any other motive. “The 
interests of the estate” means primarily – but not only31 – all that would be helpful 
to secure or enlarge the estate. The Statement supports – not undisputedly – that 
an IOH in being “solely guided by the interests of the estate” should serve the 
30 All reports can be retrieved from: www.TRI-Leiden.eu.
31 See for Dutch law regarding the importance to be given to the interests of the employees: HR, 24 February 1995, 
NJ 1996, 472 (Sigmacon II); HR 19 April 1996, NJ 1996, 727 (Saint Maclou). And regarding the interests of the 
insolvent person: HR 16 February 2015, ECLI:NL:HR:2015:87 (X/Van der Molen q.q.).
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benefits of the creditors as a whole and in doing so have regard to – in short – other 
stakeholder issues.32 This ethical principle is made more specific in Guideline 6.2:
“Best Practice 6.2
When assets will be sold an IOH cooperates to the maximum extent 
possible with other IOHs as well as with all parties involved, in order 
to obtain the maximum aggregate value for the assets of the insolvent 
debtor as a whole, across legal entities and across national borders. If 
this cooperation would turn out to be detrimental to a specific estate, 
the concerned estate(s) will be offered full compensation for the 
consequences of cooperation from the other estates that are better off 
by the cooperation.”
This Guideline 6.2 shows how the INSOL Europe (draft) IOH Statement attempts 
to make more abstract provisions of Article 31(3) EIR and Article 41(2.c) EIR 
Recast relevant and applicable in practice.
All Principles, Guidelines and Comments of the IOH Statement are focussed on 
improving the effectivity and efficiency of insolvency proceedings. In short, they 
require an IOH to behave diligently, with courtesy and consideration towards all 
parties involved; to behave with integrity, objectivity and confidentiality, solely 
guided by the interests of the estate; to coordinate their actions and to cooperate 
to the maximum extent possible with each other and with courts involved in the 
insolvency proceedings, in order to:
(a) promote the orderly, effective, efficient, and timely administration of the 
proceedings;
(b) provide for timesaving procedures to avoid unnecessary court proceedings or 
unnecessary costs; and
(c) secure and enlarge the collectivity of assets.
Up to this Statement, IOHs did not have a specific set of rules of their own.33 
The Statement was presented at the annual congress of INSOL Europe in Istanbul 
(Turkey) in October 2014 and was apparently well received. However, INSOL 
Europe did not decide to “adopt”34 these rules as required by Recital 48 of the EIR 
32 Comment 32 refers to Article 172 UK Companies Act concerning the meaning of the “have regard to” phrase.
33 See, however: European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-border Insolvency, developed 
under the aegis of the Academic Wing of INSOL Europe by Professor Bob Wessels and Professor Miguel Virgós 
July 2007.
34 Whatever this might mean exactly.
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Recast, since it felt they did lack support of their members. Another reason may 
have been the rather detailed and not completely parallel dealing with coordination 
in group of companies proceedings in the EIR Recast as published by the end of 
2014. Anyway, all that remains of the project for now is the draft Statement, to be 
found on the website of INSOL Europe35 as well as on that of TRI-Leiden.36
4.2 The EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Cooperation Principles
In the same development, LLS – together with Nottingham Law School – received 
funds to draft Principles and Guidelines for Court-to-Court Cooperation. The 
project was co-funded by the Civil Justice Programme of the European Union 
and the International Insolvency Institute (III). The project’s focus was to adapt 
the ALI and III Report on “Transnational insolvency: Global principles for 
Cooperation in international Insolvency cases” (2012) to the European context 
and subsequently train European judges on the subject of judicial cooperation. 
The process of reworking the principles was executed by Professor Bob Wessels 
in collaboration with experts representing around 25 different countries, especially 
a Review and Advisory Group of over 40 consultees (chaired by Professor Ian 
Fletcher), including some 25 judges, which has been consulted five times over a 
period of two years, and a Members’ Consultative Group, formed by III Members. 
The project was terminated with the publication of the Principles on the project 
website by the end of December 2014 and the execution of three training sessions 
in the last months of that year.37
Here again, as in the IOH-project, the Principles have the overriding objective of 
enabling courts and insolvency practitioners to operate effectively and efficiently 
in international insolvency cases with the goals of maximising the value of the 
debtor’s global assets, preserving where appropriate the debtor’s business, and 
furthering the just administration of the proceeding (Principle 3.1). This principle 
is subsequently elaborated in 26 Principles in all. Determination of the language 
of the proceedings is one of them (Principle 14) and during the training session38 
it appeared to be an important one since judges ascertained that knowledge 
of English in courts except where English is the mother tongue, is generally 
insufficient. Other Principles, e.g. Principle 5 (Case Management), 6 (Equality 
of Arms), 7 (Decision and Reasoned Explanation), 8 (Stay or Moratorium), 13 
(Court Access), 16 (Communications between Courts), 18 (Notice to Creditors), 
35 www.insol-europe.org/download/resource/167.
36 www.TRI-Leiden.eu.
37 http://www.tri-leiden.eu/uploads/files/EU_Cross-Border_Insolvency_Court-to-Court_Cooperation _Principles.pdf.
38 Of over 60 judges from 16 countries.
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19 (Coordination), 20 (Notice to Insolvency Practitioners), 21 (Cross-border sales), 
all aim to contribute to this overriding objective of efficient and effective dealing 
in insolvency proceedings.
Importantly, Principle 16 (“Communications between Courts”) attempts to have 
communication between courts, as it provides:
“16.1. Courts before which insolvency cases are pending should, 
if necessary, communicate with each other directly or through the 
insolvency practitioners to promote the orderly, effective, efficient 
and timely administration of the cases. 16.2. Such communications 
should utilise modern methods of communication, including 
electronic communications as well as written documents delivered 
in traditional ways.”
Moreover, Principle 13 (“Court Access”) provides for the “main IOH” to have 
direct access to any court in any other Member State necessary for the exercise of 
its legal rights.
4.3 The EU Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court Communication Guidelines
These Guidelines, 18 in all, are based on Principle 16.339 that states:
“For such (i.e. Communications between Courts) communications 
the EU JudgeCo Cross-Border Insolvency Court-to-Court 
Communication Guidelines should be employed.”
These Guidelines, to be considered as a sequel to the Principles dealt with 
in paragraph 4.2. of this chapter, prescribe in detail how the communication 
as prescribed in the Principles should be executed. According to Guideline 2 
(“Consistency with Procedural Law”):
“[e]xcept in circumstances of urgency, prior to a communication with 
another court, the court should be satisfied that such a communication 
is consistent with all applicable Rules of Procedure in its state.”
In Guidelines 3.2 and 4.2 it is stated that when communicating between courts, 
or between a court and an IOH, a court should, in advance, obtain the consent of 
all parties affected by these communications before disclosing the information. 
Moreover, the Guidelines contain e.g. detailed Guidelines on Methods of 
communication (Guideline 7), on E-communication (Guideline 8 and 9) and on 
39 See also Guideline 1.2.
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Joint-Hearings (Guideline10), mostly inspired by USA- and Canadian practice in 
e.g. the Nortel Case.40
Both the IOH Statement, the EU JudgeCo Principles and the EU JudgeCo 
Guidelines reflect a non-binding statement and therefore add to the volume of “soft 
law” in the area of international insolvency law. Although there is no organisation 
yet that has adopted these principles, they will probably play a role in future cases, 
as the ALI Principles and Guidelines already do in common law countries.41
5 Conclusion
The new version of the EIR, the EIR Recast, introduces the “communication, 
coordination and cooperation” concepts almost 20 times more than the present 
EIR. This is a major change. Not only lawyers of the 27 EU members42 have 
to comply with these provisions, but courts will have to cooperate from 201743 
as well, not only amongst themselves but also with IOHs. Experience from the 
training sessions in the EU JudgeCo project shows that both professional groups, 
lawyers and judges, urgently need procedures and training on how to comply 
with these new rules. The Leiden Law School (LLS) projects described above, 
which intend to improve and clarify communication, coordination and cooperation 
between IOHs (the IOH-project) as well as between courts and courts and IOHs 
(the JudgeCo project), offer examples of sets of soft law, which will likely be of 
importance to actually execute the provisions of the EIR Recast.
40 For example: “On May 12, 2015, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) and the United States 
Bankruptcy Court released consistent decisions requiring the allocation of assets from the sale of Nortel’s 
businesses and intellectual property be based on a pro rata approach.(…) A joint hearing of the US and Canadian 
courts is scheduled for June 25, 2015 to determine some points of clarification following the decisions of the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice (Commercial List) and the U.S. Bankruptcy Court dated May 12, 2015.” See: 
http://www.kmlaw.ca/nortelnetworkscorporation. Also: blog Bob Wessels “2014-05-doc8 Nortel Network Joint 
hearing as a test case for EU JudgeCo Principle 10?”
41 The ALI-III Global Principles and Global Guidelines are not just non-binding soft law. A strong signal of the 
practical use and guidance has been given by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom in Conjoined Appeals 
in (1) Rubin & Anor v Eurofinance SA & Ors and (2) New Cap Reinsurance Corp Ltd & Anor v Grant and 
others [2012] UKSC 46 (24), that supported its arguments that “the modern approach […] which is that the 
jurisdiction with international competence is that of the country of the centre of main interests of the debtor 
(an expression not without its own difficulties)” by referring to the 2012 Global Principles report. The Global 
Principles also contribute to the development of American law. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit (in Re ABC Learning Centres) on 23 August 2013 made references to Global Principle 1, and cites that 
“the overriding objective [is to] enable courts and insolvency administrators to operate effectively and efficiently 
in international insolvency cases with the goals of maximising the value of the debtor’s global assets, preserving 
where appropriate the debtors’ business, and furthering the just administration of the proceeding.” Another part 
of the Global Principles report is cited too: “[t]he emphasis must be on ensuring that the insolvency administrator, 
appointed in that proceeding, is accorded every possible assistance to take control of all assets of the debtor that 
are located in other jurisdictions. Id. at cmt. to Global Principle 24.” See: Wessels/Boon/Kluwer [5].
42 Excluding Denmark.
43 The EIR Recast comes into force on 26 June 2017 (Article 92, as published).
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Chapter 4
The Recast Insolvency Regulation  
and Groups of Companies
Robert van Galen
1 Introduction*
This chapter will attend to the issue of insolvent groups of companies. Many 
enterprises are actually structured as groups of companies. If the activities of 
such enterprises are limited to one jurisdiction, the companies will usually all 
be established under the same law and the centre of main interests (“COMI”) 
of all companies belonging to the group will be in that jurisdiction. However, if 
the activities of an enterprise are deployed in more jurisdictions, there may be 
subsidiaries in several of them and the COMI’s of these companies may also differ. 
This of course gives rise to questions as to how to deal with a possible insolvency 
of such an enterprise.
The European Insolvency Regulation of 28 May 20001 does not contain any 
provisions on groups of companies. The drafters of this regulation were aware that 
this was a topic that needed attention, but the 2000 Regulation already constituted a 
giant leap forward with respect to the intra-European development of cross border 
insolvency law, and including provisions on groups of companies was left to be 
dealt with when the Regulation had to be revised, as has been the case now.
This chapter will first make some introductory remarks on some specific aspects 
of groups of companies. It will then turn to possible mechanisms for dealing 
with insolvent groups of companies in general and to integrated approaches to 
restructuring such groups. Finally it will discuss the provisions on groups of 
companies as laid down in the recast of the European Insolvency Regulation as 
adapted by the European Parliament on 20 May 2015.2
1 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, OJ L 160/1 of 30 June 2000.
2 Regulation (EU) No 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings (recast), OJ L 141/19 of 5 June 2015.
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2 Groups of Companies
The basic structure of a group of companies consists of a holding company which 
owns all the shares in several subsidiaries, each of the subsidiaries may own all the 
shares in further subsidiaries. Ownership of subsidiary shares entails control over 
these subsidiaries. The holding company may be owned by one, several or many 
shareholders, but from the holding company down there is one line of ownership 
and control. However, more complicated structures are used as well, involving dual 
holding companies, joint ventures, special control rights and so on. For that reason 
it is not always easy to determine which companies are included in the group. 
Both shareholdership and control are relevant elements, but control is not always 
the determining factor. Where a small company manufactures parts solely for a 
monopolist and the monopolist can therefore more or less dictate the terms of the 
contract, this does not make the small manufacturing company a group company.
One area where groups of companies play an important role is the consolidation of 
annual accounts. For that purpose the Directive 2013/34/EU3 and its predecessor 
Directive 83/349/EC4 contain provisions and definitions of “groups” and of the 
parent. For the purpose of cross-border insolvencies the question arises whether 
a consolidated effort to restructure the business or align the sales of a group of 
insolvent companies should be provided for, and if so, whether the proceedings 
with respect to one of the group companies should be in the lead. If that is so, the 
question arises which proceedings that should be.
One possibility is to have the proceedings of the holding company – if such a single 
holding company can be determined – in charge. However, an obvious objection 
against such a rule would be that this company might be a postbox company, 
whereas the real decisions might be taken somewhere else in the structure. 
Another possibility might be to have the proceedings of the company of the core 
activities in charge, but this may also be difficult to determine. Moreover, not all 
groups have the same level of integration. Sometimes there are subsidiaries with 
completely independent activities, conducted from separate headquarters. In other 
cases there are group companies which conduct activities that are for the benefit 
of other group companies only, and such group companies might not be able to 
continue their existence independently from the group or at least from some of the 
3 Directive 2013/34/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the annual financial 
statements, consolidated financial statements and related reports of certain types of undertakings, amending 
Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directives 78/660/
EEC and 83/349/EEC Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 182 of 29 June 2013, p. 19–76.
4 Seventh Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 based on the Article 54 (3) (g) of the Treaty on 
consolidated accounts, OJ L 193 of 18 July 1983 p. 1–7.
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other companies in the group. Sometimes functions have been distributed over 
several group companies: one group company may own the real estate, another 
may serve as the financing company, a third one may conduct the trading or 
manufacturing activities.
The recast of the Insolvency Regulation does not contain a provision which 
determines which proceeding should be in the lead. So-called coordination 
proceedings can be opened in any of the jurisdictions where insolvency proceedings 
with respect to group companies have been opened. Two key themes around 
which the problems with respect to coordination of group proceedings revolve are 
“synergy” and “conflicts of interests”.
There may be synergy between two or more group companies which may be lost 
if the assets of the companies are sold separately. The KPNQwest insolvency is 
a clear example of such a loss of synergy. KPNQwest owned rings of fibre cable 
through which data were transported. The rings ran through several countries. For 
example, one ring ran through Germany, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. 
However, the sections of the rings were owned by local KPNQwest companies. So 
the German part was owned by a German subsidiary, the French part by a French 
subsidiary and so on. Clearly, the proceeds of the sale of a ring would be much 
greater if sold as a whole rather than in sections, but in practice this proved to be 
impossible to achieve with respect to most of these rings.
Another example is a conglomerate in which several products are manufactured 
in different companies, but sales and distribution are combined. Preserving 
synergy may be important in the case of liquidation. A better price may be 
obtained if the business or coherent parts of the business which are dispersed 
over several companies are sold as a whole. However, preserving synergy may 
also be important in cases where reorganisation is considered. Outside insolvency 
proceedings synergy is preserved and interdependency is managed by the chain 
of command. There may be a unified management or at least instructions from 
the holding company which looks after the interests of the group as a whole. In 
some insolvency proceedings the chain of command is preserved. Often this is 
the case in preservation or reorganisation proceedings where there is some kind 
of debtor-in-possession concept. Even in liquidation proceedings this may be 
the case. However, if different liquidators are appointed in these companies or if 
creditors’ committees of individual companies have substantial influence, the chain 
of command may effectively be broken and in such cases provisions of insolvency 
law might constitute the only possible means to manage synergy and dependency.
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As to conflicts of interests, it should be noted that in an insolvency situation, 
conflicts of interests between group companies become much more pronounced 
than in a situation where the group companies are solvent. In the standard case 
with one holding company, the assumption in a solvent situation is that all creditors 
can be paid anyway so that there is no manifest conflict of interest between the 
individual group companies as far as these stakeholders are concerned, whereas 
all shareholders have a direct interest in the performance of the holding company 
only. In a situation of insolvency this becomes very different. The interests of the 
individual group companies are now the interests of the pools of creditors of each 
of them and proceeds attributed to or obtained by one group company may increase 
the rate of recourse of the pool of creditors of that company to the detriment of the 
pools of creditors of other group companies.
Since group companies are not always formed primarily to create separate pools 
of assets and liabilities for recourse purposes, and since creditors do not always 
rely on this separateness, these legal structures could conceivably be ignored in 
insolvency proceedings so that all assets and liabilities of the group are pooled. 
That would be a way of dealing both with the conflict of interests issue and with 
disentanglement problems. However, it seems to me that this approach would 
turn things upside down. The essence of a legal entity is still that it constitutes a 
separate ‘container’ of assets and liabilities and that its assets are only available to 
its own creditors. The prevailing view is – rightly – that this basic premise should 
be maintained in insolvency proceedings.
In my experience in domestic insolvency cases the conflict of interests issue 
between group companies is relatively often disregarded. In many cases the same 
liquidator is appointed in proceedings of several group companies and issues 
between these companies are then wallpapered over. On the one hand this practice 
supports an efficient liquidation or reorganisation in the insolvency proceedings. On 
the other hand it may insufficiently take into account the differing interests of the 
creditor pools. Interestingly, in international situations where different liquidators 
are appointed in each jurisdiction, the conflicts of interests between the insolvent 
companies/liquidators often prevent an efficient solution. One way of overcoming 
this problem has been to deem all the subsidiaries to have their COMI in the same 
jurisdiction and then appoint the same liquidator in all those proceedings.
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3 Regimes for Dealing with Insolvent Groups of Companies
I will now turn to several solutions that have been suggested for the integrated 
treatment of insolvencies of international groups in relation to the European Union. 
In more or less ascending order of integration these are:
(1) coordination between the courts supervising the insolvency proceedings or 
between the liquidators on a non-hierarchical basis;
(2) designation of group main proceedings and coordinating powers for the 
liquidator of these group main proceedings;
(3) appointment of the same liquidator in all main proceedings;
(4) opening of all main proceedings in the Member State of the group COMI5 
(joint administration by the court); and
(5) substantive consolidation.
3.1 Coordination on a Non-Hierarchical Basis
The lightest form of coordination is coordination on a non-hierarchical basis 
between the courts and/or between the liquidators. Rules of coordination have 
been fundamental both in legislation such as the European Insolvency Regulation 
and in guidelines such as the IBA Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat, the ILA 
Guidelines and the CoCo Guidelines, as well as in protocols drafted for the 
purpose of individual cases. Most of these guidelines and items of legislation 
concern multiple insolvency proceedings with respect to a single debtor, for 
example where there are main and secondary proceedings. Some of the protocols 
in individual cases concern multiple debtors (groups of companies). Legislation 
and guidelines with respect to single companies could to a large extent also be used 
for coordinating proceedings in a group setting, but not without caution. Since 
situations with multiple debtors involve different sets of creditors, conflicts of 
interests are much more likely to occur between the estates of group companies 
than between the creditors in main and secondary proceedings involving the same 
company. Examples of protocols with respect to particular cases are the Lehman 
protocol and the Nortel protocol.
Communication and cooperation between liquidators is good, but saying that 
they must cooperate to the maximum extent possible and in good faith may be 
insufficient. Should they not do so anyway? In group situations each liquidator 
5 Centre of main interests.
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may act in good faith, but he still has to act in the interest of the creditors of his 
debtor. In practice, such obligations may be insufficient to resolve conflict-of-
interest and synergy issues. If nobody is in charge, it must be doubted whether an 
obligation to cooperate is sufficient to bring about the integrated administration 
and liquidation of the group’s assets. What is needed is some kind of centralised 
control or coordination.6
3.2 Liquidators with Coordinating Powers
Under the second regime one liquidator is designated to fulfil a role in the interest 
of the group as a whole and has certain powers to do so. Under the European 
Insolvency Regulation such rules presently exist with respect to multiple 
proceedings involving the same debtor. The liquidator in the main proceedings 
has some powers with respect to the secondary proceedings. However, most of 
those powers involve the intervention of the court in the Member State where 
secondary proceedings have been opened. For example, the liquidator of the main 
proceedings may ask the court which opened secondary proceedings to stay the 
process of liquidation in whole or in part (Article 33(1)).
If a similar regime were to be applied in the context of groups of companies 
there should be a rule how the group should be determined and also a rule which 
liquidator should have the coordinating powers. I will label the proceedings of the 
liquidator with coordinating powers as the group main proceedings.
3.3 Mutual Liquidator Regime
One step further than the regime in which the liquidator of the group main 
proceedings has:
(i) certain powers of coordination, subject to supervision by the courts of the 
subsidiaries; and
(ii) the power to propose a plan subject to confirmation by the courts of each of 
the group proceedings,
is the regime in which the same liquidator is appointed in the main proceedings of 
all group companies, but the proceedings themselves remain under the supervision 
of the local courts.7 This solves many of the problems inherent in the former regime 
because under the mutual liquidator regime it is much easier to adopt one common 
policy. However, one major problem with the main liquidator regime is that it 
6 Mevorach [2] p. 155.
7 Advocates of this solution are Paulus [3], Mevorach [2], p. 159 et seq. and Tollenaar [4].
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glosses over the conflicts of interests between the group companies and between 
their creditors.8
An additional issue of the mutual liquidator regime is that the liquidator has to 
deal with different laws and legal cultures with respect to the group companies. 
Basically, this means that they have to act in an area in which they have no 
expertise and may be faced with court documents and proceedings in languages 
they have not mastered. Furthermore, courts that do not speak the language of the 
liquidator may not be capable of supervising his work adequately.
3.4 Joint Administration Regime
The next regime is the joint administration regime. Joint administration is very 
popular in the United States. There it means that all proceedings of the group 
companies are conducted in one and the same bankruptcy court, which joins the 
proceedings for procedural and administrative matters. In such proceedings a joint 
restructuring plan can be proposed for all the companies included in the joint 
administration, but it has to be accepted and confirmed for each of the companies 
concerned separately. There are, however, important differences between the 
American and European situations and some of these make joint administration 
less attractive in a European setting.
Joint administration in the United States may mean that a company which is 
actually located in San Francisco could be subject to Chapter 11 proceedings in 
New York. However, although this may be a different location, the insolvency 
proceedings will still be conducted by an American federal court and there will 
be virtually no change in the applicable law because bankruptcy law is federal 
law.9 In Europe, of course, this is quite different. If rules were developed to allow 
joint administration of group companies with COMI’s in different jurisdictions, 
there would be two possibilities. First, if Article 4 EIR were to be applied, all 
these proceedings would be subject to the same law. For example, if the group 
were to consist of a French parent company (i.e. with its COMI in France) and 
Belgian, Italian and Greek subsidiaries, and those companies were to be subject 
to joint administration by the French court, French law would apply to all these 
proceedings and therefore also to questions such as the ranking of creditors and the 
termination of contracts with respect to the Belgian, Italian and Greek companies.
8 Eidenmüller [1], p. 541.
9 “Virtually” because there are some issues of state law that may affect the bankruptcy, but these concern only a 
limited number of topics such as the assets that are not included in the bankruptcy estate.
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This solution is unattractive, inter alia, because it would mean that the law 
applicable to the insolvency of a group company, and therefore too many questions 
which have a substantial impact on the recovery of individual creditors, would 
depend on where the joint administration is opened. It would entail a substantial 
redistributive effect. And it would also be very easy for the group to manipulate 
the applicable law by moving a subsidiary around inside the group or by moving 
it outside the group. The second possibility is that the French court would apply 
Belgian law to the Belgian subsidiaries, Italian law to the Italian subsidiaries and 
Greek law to the Greek subsidiaries, but this too is very unattractive, because 
the French court will not know all these laws and may not even be able to read 
the languages.
Another disadvantage of this kind of joint administration is that it infringes on 
the sovereignty of the States more than is necessary, because it relocates the 
proceedings of the subsidiary to another jurisdiction. Joint administration has been 
attempted in several cases, of which the Daisytek, Rover and Collins & Aikman 
cases are the best known. Joint administration could also involve the appointment 
of the liquidator in the main proceedings as the liquidator in the proceedings of 
all the subsidiaries. This is actually a combination of the joint administration and 
mutual liquidator regimes.
3.5 Substantive Consolidation
The highest level of integration is obtained under the substantive consolidation 
regime. Under this scenario all the assets of the group companies are pooled and 
the proceeds of that pool are distributed to all the creditors of all group companies 
concerned as if the whole group of insolvent companies constituted one company 
only. Substantive consolidation benefits the creditors of the companies that suffer 
a deeper insolvency to the detriment of creditors of relatively richer insolvent 
companies. Substantive consolidation is unavoidable where the assets or liabilities 
of the debtor are entangled to such an extent as to be inseparable.
4 Restructuring Scenarios
There are essentially two scenarios in which restructurings of insolvent companies 
take place. The first type of restructuring scenario is a restructuring or rescue plan. 
The essence of this kind of restructuring is that the creditors agree to relinquish or 
modify their claims in such a way that the company becomes solvent again. Often 
such rescue plans entail much more than a mere write-off of debts or postponement 
of repayment. The activities of the company itself need to be restructured in the 
sense that less profitable activities have to be sold or ceased, employees may need 
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to be dismissed, management may need to be changed and more profitable activities 
may need to be developed. Rescue plans adopted in insolvency proceedings contain 
mechanisms by which obstructing creditors may be outvoted. In order to safeguard 
the interests of the disgruntled creditors some kind of court involvement is needed.
The second type of restructuring scenario is the going-concern assets sale. Under 
this scenario the liquidator sells off the assets which comprise the company’s 
business (or the viable part of the business) to another legal entity. Such an entity 
may be external, but it may also happen that the entity is financed by creditors or 
shareholders of the insolvent company. From the perspective of the company’s 
creditors, such a sale often produces the same result in economic terms as a rescue 
plan: the rights of recourse against the debtor’s assets are replaced by a pot of 
money which is distributed among the creditors and reflects the value of the 
debtor’s viable business.
Which of these two basic scenarios is chosen depends on a number of legal factors, 
which I will now list. I will focus on the issues under Dutch law but many of these 
legal factors play a role under other legal systems as well:
(1) For historical reasons rescue plan proceedings are much more complicated and 
require much more creditor and court involvement under Dutch law than the 
going-concern sale of assets.
(2) The possibilities of accomplishing a Dutch rescue plan are very limited. Only 
ordinary creditors can be affected by the plan in the sense that a minority 
can be bound by a majority voting in favour of the plan, but preferred and 
secured creditors are not affected at all. In many other jurisdictions preferred 
and secured creditors can be included in the plan.
(3) A going-concern asset sale may have negative tax consequences and it may 
not always be possible to transfer all contracts or licences to the buyer.
(4) Rescue plans may provide a more flexible approach than the going- concern 
asset sale liquidation scenario.
(5) Because rescue plans involve stronger creditor participation, creditors 
accepting the plan may be more willing to continue their relation with the 
business than would be the case if the asset sale scenario had been applied.
If several group companies are involved it may be attractive to arrange for a 
coordinated sale of the assets. This involves the cooperation of the liquidators in 
multiple proceedings. Similarly, if several group companies are involved rescue 
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plans that are offered and adopted for the individual companies could conceivably 
be coordinated.
In a group situation, two scenarios can be added to the two scenarios described 
above. The first additional scenario concerns a consolidated sale of the assets of 
the viable business of group companies, not by way of coordination between the 
liquidators of the individual companies, but at the direction of one liquidator (i.e. a 
unified sale with one seller). The second additional scenario involves the adoption 
of one consolidated plan for the whole group or a number of group companies. 
Thus we can distinguish between the following scenarios for a group:
(1) coordinated asset sales by the individual group companies;
(2) coordinated rescue plans for the individual group companies;
(3) unified sale of assets; and
(4) unified plan. 
In discussing these scenarios, I will disregard national groups and move on 
straightaway to international groups which have group companies in a large 
number of jurisdictions.
4.1 Coordinated Asset Sales by Individual Group Companies
Under the regime (3.2) involving a liquidator with coordinating powers, the 
liquidator of the group main proceedings has the right to ask the court of the 
proceedings of the group companies to suspend asset sales by the group company’s 
liquidator. The purpose of this power is to allow a coordinated sale of the assets of 
several group companies or to include those assets in a reorganisation e.g. through 
a set of coordinated rescue plans. A coordinated sale of this kind could thus ensue, 
but would be difficult to achieve in a multi-jurisdictional case because all the courts 
would need to become aligned. Under the regime involving coordination on a 
non-hierarchal basis (a), the liquidators of the subsidiaries may need to become 
aligned as well.
4.2 Coordinated Rescue Plans
Under the preferred regime involving a liquidator with coordinating powers the 
liquidator of the group main proceedings can propose rescue plans in all subsidiary 
proceedings. Although in such a case the role of the liquidator of the subsidiary 
proceedings may be somewhat reduced, the plan still needs to be accepted in each 
jurisdiction under local law and each of the courts needs to confirm the plan. To 
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my knowledge, no plan involving continuation of the business of group companies 
has ever been accepted in three or more jurisdictions.
4.3 Unified Asset Sale
One way of achieving a concerted sale of the business is by providing that the 
liquidator of the group main proceedings has the power to sell all or part of the 
assets of the companies in the group under the sole supervision of that liquidator’s 
own court. To a large extent this meets with the same difficulties as administration 
of multiple group companies by the same liquidator, because there may be conflicts 
of interests with respect to such sales between the group companies and because 
there is no creditor influence similar to the influence involved in the adoption of a 
rescue plan. Such a conflict of interests may, for example, concern the question of 
which assets should be included in the consolidated sale, but also the question of 
how the purchase price should be attributed to the individual estates.
4.4 Consolidated Plan
Finally, there is the possibility of having one rescue plan for the whole group. A 
single plan of this kind is more appropriate for adequately resolving conflict-of-
interest issues than a unified asset sale. Under U.S. bankruptcy law especially, 
rules on reorganisation plans have been developed to deal with conflicts of 
interests. Although the provisions on rescue plans under Chapter 11 concern 
single companies, the underlying principles can be applied in a multi-company 
situation as well. The U.S. system with respect to Chapter 11 rescue plans has 
been the basis of legislation in other countries such as Germany. INSOL Europe 
has developed a European Rescue Plan based on these principles.10 The conflict of 
interest issue is dealt with under the plan by the idea that majorities of the classes 
of creditors of all the group companies are required and that in fact the rescue 
plan is the result of structured negotiations between the creditors of all the group 
companies concerned.
5 The Recast Insolvency Regulation of 20 May 2015
An important part of the revision of the European Insolvency Regulation is taken 
up by the addition of a chapter on “Insolvency Proceedings of Members of Group 
Companies” (Chapter V, Articles 56-77). The various drafts that have been 
circulated over the last two years show the struggle of the legislator to reach a 
politically acceptable solution. It seems that Member States had difficulty allowing 
10 The report of INSOL Europe on the revision of the EIR can be found at: <http://www.insol-europe.org/technical-
content/european-insolvency-regulation>.
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courts or liquidators located in other Member States to take decisions with respect 
to their group companies. The solution enacted in the Recast is therefore not 
very forceful.
Article 2 contains definitions of “parent undertaking” and “group of companies”. 
The gist of it is that a group of companies has the same meaning as it has under 
Directive 2013/34/EU which deals with annual accounts and in particular with 
consolidated accounts. The definition is of importance because, as will be shown 
below, insolvency practitioners of proceedings of group companies have certain 
rights and obligations with respect to proceedings of other group companies. 
Section 1 (Articles 56-60) concerns cooperation and communication. Article 56 
contains an obligation for insolvency practitioners11 appointed in proceedings 
concerning a member of a group to cooperate with insolvency practitioners 
appointed in proceedings concerning another member of the same group. The 
obligation to cooperate is limited in three ways:
(1) It only applies to the extent the cooperation is appropriate to facilitate the 
effective administration in the receiving proceedings;
(2) It should not be incompatible with rules applicable to the proceedings; and
(3) It should not entail any conflict of interest.
These limitations considerably weaken the obligation to cooperate. As discussed 
above, in insolvency situations there often are conflicts of interests between group 
companies. It is interesting to note that Article 56-2 also provides for the possibility 
for the insolvency practitioners to grant additional powers to one of them and to 
agree an allocation of tasks.
Article 57 contains a similar provision on cooperation between courts in group 
proceedings, with inclusion of the same limitations. It is remarkable that there 
is an obligation for the courts to cooperate. The INSOL Europe Judicial wing 
had advised including a provision that courts “may” cooperate, rather than “shall” 
cooperate. According to this forum there was no need for an obligation. Presently 
the problem is that in several jurisdictions the courts are of the view that they 
cannot engage in cooperation, because there is no basis for such action in the 
domestic law. A “may” provision would cure that problem. I do not think that 
the “shall” provision adds very much to that. It will be difficult to force courts 
to cooperate with each other if they do not want to, in particularly in view of the 
limitations they may rely on.
11 This is the new term for liquidators.
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No similar transfer provision as is included in Article 56-2 applies to courts. 
However, the court may appoint an independent person in order to deal with 
the cooperation. Article 58 provides for similar cooperation between courts and 
insolvency practitioners in other group proceedings. I do not know what I should 
envisage in respect of this obligation.
The insolvency practitioner has certain powers in proceedings concerning members 
of other group companies. Important ones are:
(1) The right to be heard in proceedings concerning group companies; and
(2) The right to request a stay of any measure related to the realisation of assets. 
Thus an insolvency practitioner in proceedings of Group Company A can 
request a stay of the sale of the assets of Group Company B. There are, 
however, limitations here. The most important ones are that a restructuring 
plan must have been proposed and that no coordination proceedings have been 
opened with respect to Companies A and B. The stay can have a maximum 
duration (including extension) of six months.
It should be noted that these rights are attributed to the insolvency practitioners 
of all group proceedings. Therefore several requests for stays can be made vis-
à-vis the same entity and all insolvency practitioners have the right to be heard. 
If, however, Group Coordination Proceedings have been opened, insolvency 
practitioners of the individual group company proceedings no longer have the right 
to request a stay with respect to another group company included in the Group 
Coordination Proceedings. The stay request concerns a “stay of any measure 
related to the realisation of the assets in the proceedings opened with respect to 
any other member of the group.” 12 It appears that this stay is not limited to stay of 
actions of the local insolvency practitioner. Based on the wording of the provision, 
the stay may also concern actions of secured creditors. If the provision has to be 
interpreted this way indeed, the provision might set aside Article 5 EIR (Article 8 
of the Recast).
Section 2 concerns Group Coordination Proceedings. As Article 61-1 provides, 
Group Coordination Proceedings (“GCP”) may be requested before any court 
having jurisdiction over the insolvency proceedings of a member of the group. 
The GCP will thus be opened by the court of first seizure (as is confirmed by 
Article 62). Obviously this rule can give rise to manipulation of the state of the 
GCP. It is even conceivable that some dormant subsidiaries are put into insolvency 
12 Part of the wording of Article 60-1 Recast.
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proceedings with the sole purpose of creating jurisdiction in the Member State 
where these proceedings are opened, for the opening of GCP. There is, however, a 
carve out and more importantly, it remains to be seen whether it is very important 
where the GCP are opened, because the powers of the Group Coordinator (“GC”) 
are very limited. The request should be accompanied inter alia by a proposal for 
the person to be appointed as GC.
After the request for the opening of the GCP has been filed a waiting period 
of 30 days commences. Insolvency Practitioners appointed in respect of group 
companies may object to the proposed GC. An Insolvency Practitioner may also 
opt out of the GCP (Article 64-1(a) and 65-1), in which case the proceedings in 
which this insolvency practitioner is appointed shall not be included in the group 
coordination proceedings. Furthermore, where at least two-thirds of all insolvency 
practitioners appointed in insolvency proceedings of group companies have agreed 
that the court of another Member State having jurisdiction is the most appropriate 
court, that court shall have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to the GCP. The GC 
shall not be one of the insolvency practitioners appointed in respect of any of the 
group companies.
The essential tasks of the GC are to:
(1) Make recommendations for the coordinated conduct of the insolvency 
proceedings; and
(2) Propose a Group Coordination Plan.
The Group Coordination Plan is not a rescue plan in the classic sense that it 
can modify creditors rights and resolve the insolvency. It is more of a plan on 
how to coordinate the proceedings. Article 72-1(b) provides that it may contain 
proposals for:
(i) measures to be taken in order to re-establish the economic performance and 
the financial soundness of the group; 
(ii) the settlement of intra-group disputes; and
(iii) agreements between the insolvency practitioners of the group companies.
Article 70 provides that the Insolvency Practitioners shall consider the 
recommendations of the Group Coordinator and the content of the Group 
Coordination Plan, but that they shall not be obliged to follow the recommendations 
or the plan. However, if the Insolvency Practitioner does not follow the 
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recommendations or the plan he has to give reasons for that. So actually, there is 
a comply or explain rule here.
Important rights of the GC are:
(1) He has the right to be heard and participate in any of the proceedings with 
respect to included group companies.
(2) He can request information from any insolvency practitioner in respect of any 
member of the group that is included, where the information might be of use 
when identifying and outlining strategies and measures in order to coordinate 
proceedings. It should be noted that the limitations of such rights between 
insolvency practitioners under Article 56 are not repeated here.
(3) He may request a stay of proceedings opened in respect of any member of 
the group that is included, provided, inter alia, hat such a stay is necessary 
to ensure the proper implementation of the plan. As mentioned above, under 
Article 60 insolvency practitioners have similar rights to request a stay in 
other insolvency proceedings of group companies, provided neither company 
is included in a GCP.
Thus the idea seems to be that in the case of GCP this right transfers to the Group 
Coordinator. However, it seems that if a group company opts out of GCP, neither 
the Group Coordinator nor any insolvency practitioner of included insolvency 
proceedings can ask for a stay of a realisation measure, because that situation is 
excluded under Article 60 and not included under Article 72.
It seems to me that these rules on group proceedings may constitute a small 
step forward, but a small step indeed. Apart from the GCP there is no dominant 
proceeding and if GCP are opened the powers of the GC are very limited. There is 
no provision on a unified rescue plan, in the vein as proposed by INSOL Europe, 
nor actually on coordinated plans. The future will learn whether stronger provisions 
are needed, but then this part of the Recast will have to be revised within five years.
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Chapter 5
Applicable Law and Carve Outs: Cross-Border 
Security and Rights in rem
Tom Smith
1 Introduction*
In practice, when faced with an insolvency of a counterparty, the essential issues 
to be confronted by any creditor will typically include:
• his ability to enforce his security and to obtain payment notwithstanding the 
insolvency;
• his ability to withstand challenges to security under the law of the insolvency 
proceedings provided the security is valid as a matter of its governing law and/
or lex situs.
Moreover, in the cross-border context, a creditor is likely to be concerned about 
its ability to rely on its security given in one jurisdiction where the insolvency 
proceedings are taking place in another jurisdiction. Indeed, a principal concern, 
for example, of a bank or other lender will be its ability to enforce its security in one 
jurisdiction where a borrower is in insolvency proceedings in another jurisdiction.
Under the Insolvency Regulation, the basic principle in Article 7 is that the law of 
the place where the proceedings are opened governs (inter alia), the assets which 
form part of the insolvency estate; the effect of the insolvency on current contracts; 
the effects of the insolvency on proceedings brought by creditors; and rules relating 
to voidness, voidability of legal acts detrimental to the general body of creditors. 
Further, a judgment opening insolvency proceedings will have the same effects 
(without further formality) in other Member States as under law of the State of the 
opening of the proceedings (Article 20). So, for example, a stay on creditor action 
imposed under the law of the State of the opening of the proceedings will have 
automatic effect in all other Member States.
In the case of security rights, these basic principles are, however, subject to the 
carve-out in Article 8.1:
Applicable Law and Carve Outs: Cross-Border Security and Rights in rem
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“The opening of insolvency proceedings shall not affect the rights in 
rem of creditors or third parties in respect of tangible or intangible, 
moveable or immoveable assets – both specific assets and collections 
of indefinite assets as a whole which change from time to time – 
belonging to the debtor which are situated within the territory of 
another Member State at the time of the opening of proceedings.”
The underlying policy behind this carve-out is to protect trade in the Member State 
where the assets are located and legal certainty with regard to rights over those 
assets.1 As the Virgos-Schmit report states: “Rights in rem have a very important 
function with regard to credit and the mobilization of wealth.”
2 Rights in rem
The first question which immediately arises is as to scope of the carve out in 
Article 8: in particular, what is meant by “rights in rem” for these purposes? In the 
text of the Regulation, such rights are said to include in particular:2
• a right to dispose of assets or have them disposed of and to obtain satisfaction 
from the proceeds of or income from those assets, in particular by virtue of a 
lien or mortgage
• an exclusive right to have a claim met, in particular a right guaranteed by a lien 
in respect of the claim or by assignment of the claim by way of guarantee
• a right to demand assets from and/or to require restitution by anyone having 
possession or use of them contrary to the person entitled; and
• a right in rem to the beneficial use of assets.
Based on this, certain initial observations can be made. First, rights in rem are 
capable of extending to rights in respect of specific assets and collections of 
indefinite assets, so can include, for example, a floating charge under English 
law. Secondly, rights in rem encompass a right of a secured creditor to appoint 
a receiver (or similar) to dispose of assets (“the right to dispose of assets or have 
them disposed of …”). Thirdly, rights in rem include both security rights but also 
other rights in rem such as the rights of a beneficiary under a trust (“a right in rem 
to the beneficial use of assets”).
1 Virgos-Schmit Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, Council of the European Union, Brussels, 
3 May 1996, 6500/96, para 97.
2 Article 8.2.
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But, aside from this, there is no definition of a “right in rem”. This was a deliberate 
decision in order to allow the law of the state where the relevant assets are located 
to decide.3 Accordingly, the question of characterisation (i.e. of how a particular 
right held by a creditor is to be characterised) must be decided under the national 
law which applies under normal conflict of law rules – normally the lex rei sitae.
3 Location of Assets
This in turn then raises the question of how the location of an asset which is the 
subject of a security right is to be determined. Moreover, Article 8 applies only 
where the asset is situated within the territory of an MS other than the one where 
the insolvency proceedings are commenced. As to this, Article 2(g) of the previous 
version of the Regulation provided that:
• tangible property was located in the Member State where the property 
was situated;
• registered rights and property were located in the Member State under whose 
authority the register was kept; and
• claims were located in the Member State where the third party required to 
meet the claim has its centre of main interests (COMI).
This, however, raised a number of questions as to the position in respect of other 
types of assets – for example, as to shares in a company or cash in a bank account, 
particularly where the bank account was held with a branch located in one Member 
State of a bank which had its COMI in a different Member State.
The revisions to the Regulation have now addressed a number of these points. 
Accordingly, the new Article 2(9) introduces further definitions of where assets 
are located for:
• registered shares in companies (located in the Member State within the territory 
of which the company having issued the shares has its registered office);
• book-entry securities (located in the Member State in which the register or 
account in which the entries are made is maintained);
• cash held in bank accounts (the Member State indicated in the account’s 
IBAN, or, for cash held in accounts with a credit institution which does not 
have an IBAN, the Member State in which the credit institution holding the 
3 Virgos-Schmit report para. 100.
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account has its central administration or, where the account is held with a 
branch, agency or other establishment, the Member State in which the branch, 
agency or other establishment is located); and
• patents, copyright and related rights (the Member State within the territory of 
which the owner of such rights has its habitual residence or registered office).
There are, however, some remaining issues which are unresolved. For example, 
are the definitions in Article 2(9) exhaustive? And what happens if an asset falls 
within more than one definition? To illustrate with an example: assume Company 
A has its COMI in England and assets including shares in and receivables owed by 
French and German subsidiaries. It has granted Lender B full (fixed and floating) 
English law security over all its assets. Company A becomes insolvent and goes 
into administration as main proceedings in England. Lender B wishes to enforce its 
security by appointing a receiver over the shares and receivables for the purposes 
of concluding a sale.
Lender B could enforce its security in England, but only after lifting the statutory 
stay on enforcement. The statutory stay would also automatically apply in France 
and Germany; therefore any ability to enforce would depend on Article 8 applying. 
In this context, the question of whether there is an Article 8 right in rem probably 
depends on the characterisation of the relevant right under law where the asset 
is located (lex situs). In the case of shares, they are located in the Member State 
where company which issued shares has its registered office (Article 2(9)(i)); and 
in the case of receivables, they are located where the third party required to meet 
the claim has its COMI (Article 2(9)(viii)).
Therefore, the question of whether the security confers an Article 8 right in rem is 
probably determined by French and German law. If it does, then Article 8 should 
allow Lender B to enforce such rights as it has under its security. The question of 
the nature and extent of the rights of the lender are then determined by the lex situs. 
Moreover, since the appointment of a receiver does not fall under the Regulation, 
its recognition in France and Germany is determined by normal rules of private 
international law.
A different example would be where Company A has its COMI in France and 
assets in France, England and New York. Lender B has security over the New 
York assets pursuant to New York law security and security over the English 
assets pursuant to English law security. Company A goes into main proceedings in 
France. Lender B wishes to enforce its security in New York and England. In this 
scenario, Article 8 will not apply to the security in New York as the Insolvency 
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Regulation only binds Member States. Enforcement in New York will be a matter 
of New York law, and may depend on whether the French insolvency is recognised 
there (e.g. under Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code). If the French insolvency is 
recognised, and a stay therefore arises, Article 8 will not assist Lender B.
On the other hand, Lender B should be able to enforce his security in England 
provided that: the rights conferred over the assets are rights in rem for the purposes 
of Article 5 as a matter of English law as the lex situs; the security is valid as a 
matter of English law; and the proposed method of enforcement is allowed under 
English law. The answer would, however, obviously be different if secondary 
proceedings were commenced in England.
4 “Shall not affect”
A further question raised by Article 8 concerns the meaning of “shall not affect”. In 
other words, what is meant when it said that the “opening of insolvency proceedings 
shall not affect the rights in rem of creditors or third parties.” The expression “shall 
not affect” is not defined in the Regulation. However, it seems clear that it at least 
means that the ability to enforce a right in rem should not affected by an insolvency 
in another Member State. In addition, the basis, validity and extent of the right 
should normally be determined by the lex situs.4 On the other hand, Article 8 will 
not prevent the vesting of title to asset over which security is held in the insolvency 
officeholder.5 Perhaps the most difficult question is whether Article 8 also protects 
the underlying secured debt as well as the security right itself.
Take an example, where Company A, which is incorporated in the Netherlands, is 
a borrower under an English law syndicated facility agreement. The agreement is 
secured by English law and Luxembourg law security over assets in Luxembourg. 
Company A concludes a scheme of arrangement in England in respect of the facility 
agreement which is supported by 75% of lenders, but there are dissentient creditors. 
A scheme of arrangement is not an insolvency proceeding for the purposes of the 
Regulation, so its effect on the Luxembourg assets would be a matter of normal 
Luxembourg law. But what if Company A went into administration in England (as 
main proceedings) before concluding a scheme?
In that case, the scheme should be recognised in other Member States under 
the Regulation (Article 32: “compositions approved by that court shall also be 
recognised with no further formality”). What about the effect of Article 8? The 
4 See Recital (25).
5 German Federal Court of Justice, 3 February 2011, V ZB 54/10.
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Luxembourg security rights would prima facie appear to be preserved by Article 
8. But the scheme may have been effective, as a matter of English law, to vary the 
underlying English law debt. Would Article 8 also protect the underlying debt right 
which is the subject of the security? This is one of a number of questions which 
will no doubt have to be worked out as the revised Regulation is put into practice.
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Chapter 6
Universal Effects of European Pre-Insolvency 
Proceedings: A Case Study
Francisco Garcimartin
I. Introduction: the XYZ SA Case
XYZ SA is a company incorporated in Spain whose Centre of Main Interests 
(“COMI”) is also in Spain. XYZ SA is the parent company of several subsidiaries 
located in other Member States of the European Union and third countries. Due 
to the financial difficulties suffered by the group, in January 2016, XYZ SA filed 
for protection under Article 5 bis of the Spanish Insolvency Act (“IA”) in order to 
be able to conduct negotiations with its creditors with the necessary guarantees. 
In April 2016, XYZ SA submitted a restructuring agreement containing an 
amendment of the terms and conditions of its financial obligations and a partial 
conversion of the debt to capital. The agreement was adopted by a qualified 
majority of creditors. This agreement obtained judicial approval in May 2016, in 
accordance with the Fourth Additional Provision of the same Act (“4AP”), and its 
effects were extended to dissenting creditors.
“Article 5 bis moratorium” and “4AP homologation” constitute the main tools of 
the Spanish legal framework on pre-insolvency (rectious, preventing-insolvency) 
proceedings. The former gives the debtor a “breathing space” period: it envisages 
the possibility of a stay of individual enforcement actions and the adjournment 
of insolvency proceedings for a period of four months. The latter foresees the 
possibility of a court sanctioning the restructuring plan in order to make it binding 
upon dissenting creditors and benefit from a special protection vis-à-vis claw-
back rules. The practical application of these two provisions has given rise to 
many legal issues. This chapter focuses on one of them: their world-wide effects, 
i.e. the effectiveness of those provisions for preventing individual enforcement 
proceedings by dissenting creditors abroad. In practice, this is key for the success 
of the plan since, in our example, XYZ SA has a very significant portion of its 
assets outside Spain. This analysis may be useful for other EU jurisdictions that 
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have introduced similar proceedings into their national laws as well as for a future 
EU instrument laying down harmonized rules on restructuring proceedings.1
The chapter is organized as follows. Section II offers an outline of the Spanish 
legal framework on pre-insolvency proceedings. Section III explains how this 
framework fits within the new European Insolvency Regulation2 and the 2014 
Commission’s Recommendation.3 Section IV describes the rules that govern 
the cross-border effectiveness of Article 5 bis and 4AP of the IA within the EU. 
Section V extends this analysis to third countries. And, finally, Section VI draws 
some conclusions.
II. Brief Outline of Spanish Pre-Insolvency Proceedings
The original text of the current Spanish IA was enacted in July 2003.4 This Act 
did not contain special rules on pre-insolvency restructuring proceedings. All 
restructuring arrangements must take place either under the general rules of 
contract law, i.e. on a consensual basis, or within formal insolvency proceedings, 
i.e. by means of an insolvency composition. There was no alternative between 
purely contractual workouts, which require unanimous consent, and formal 
insolvency proceedings. However, during the last few years, Spanish legislators 
have amended the IA in order to provide market participants with an appropriate 
pre-insolvency restructuring framework.5 This framework departs from the general 
rules of contract law since individual consent is replaced by collective consent, 
preventing hold-out strategies therefore, but without the need for opening formal 
insolvency proceedings. The two main elements of this new framework are 
contained in Article 5 bis and 4AP of the IA.
1. Article 5 bis of the IA: Moratorium
This provision was introduced in the Spanish Insolvency Act by Act 38/2011 of 10 
October 2011 and since then it has been amended on several occasions. The main 
purpose of this new article is to facilitate a financially-troubled company and its 
1 See Commission Recommendation of 12 March 2014 on a new approach to business and insolvency 
(“Recommendation”).
2 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on insolvency 
proceedings (“EIR Recast”).
3 See above note 1.
4 Ley 22/2003 of 9 July, O.J. (Boletin Oficial del Estado), 10 July 2003. The Law entered into force on 1 
September 2004.
5 See, in particular, Royal Decree-Law 3/2009 of 27 March 2009; Act 38/2011 of 10 October 2011; Royal Decree 
Law 6/2012 of 9 March 2012; Act 1/2013 of 14 May 2013; Royal Decree Law 14/2013 of 27 September 2013; 
Royal Decree Law 4/2014 of 7 March 2014; Royal Decree Law 11/2014 of 5 September 2014; or Royal Decree 
Law 1/2015 of 27 February 2015.
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directors with a four-month period to negotiate a refinancing agreement with its 
creditors with the objective of avoiding insolvency. This goal is promoted through 
three main benefits:
 (i) A stay of the distressed company’s duty to file for insolvency (and a safe 
harbour for its directors);6
 (ii) A stay applicable to all creditors prohibiting the filing of involuntary 
insolvency petitions; and
 (iii) A stay of certain individual enforcement actions, including by 
secured creditors.7
During the moratorium period, the debtor remains in full control of the company’s 
affairs, without any external restriction. The IA does not envisage the appointment 
of a supervisor or examiner. Furthermore, once the debtor has notified the court of 
the start of negotiations to reach a restructuring agreement, the benefits of Article 5 
bis of the IA apply automatically, i.e. by operation of law, and the affected creditors 
have no right to challenge it. In principle, the court clerk shall order publication on 
the public insolvency register of the court’s acknowledgement of the notification 
lodged by the debtor. However, the debtor may specifically request notification 
of the negotiations to be confidential, in which case the court’s acknowledgement 
shall not be issued (see Article 5 bis (3) of the IA). The moratorium is effective 
from when the debtor files the notice (Article 5 bis (4) of the IA).
The moratorium obtained under Article 5 bis of the IA functions as a single 
gateway to different restructuring proceedings, in particular an advance proposal 
of insolvency composition or a refinancing agreement that may be sanctioned 
under 4AP of the IA.
2. 4AP of the IA: Homologation
4AP of the IA provides for the possibility to obtain a court’s approval 
(“homologation”) of a restructuring agreement in order to:
6 Under Spanish law, a company must file for insolvency proceedings within two months from the time that the 
company becomes aware of its inability to pay its debts as they come due. Otherwise, the directors can be held 
personally liable if the company´s insolvent position was aggravated by the delay in filing for the insolvency 
proceedings (see Articles 5, 164-165, IA). However, according to Article 5 bis (2), IA, once the debtor has notified 
of the start of negotiations to reach a restructuring agreement: “the duty to request voluntarily the opening of the 
insolvency proceedings shall not be required.”
7 According to Article 5 bis (4), IA: “From the presentation of the communication, no judicial or extrajudicial 
foreclosure may be performed on assets or rights that may be necessary to continue the professional or corporate 
activity of the debtor…”
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(i) protect this agreement vis à vis claw-back rules; and
(ii) if need be, to bind dissenting creditors.
According to that provision, court-sanctioned restructuring agreements must be 
refinancing agreements that involve, at least, a significant increase in credit or the 
extinction or amendment of obligations. They must also be based on a viability 
plan that allows the debtor to continue his activities in the short to medium term. 
These kinds of agreements only affect debts held by financial creditors. Creditors 
owed non-financial debts can sign up voluntarily (public sector creditors cannot), 
but their debts are not counted to determine the necessary majorities and the effects 
of the refinancing agreement cannot be extended to them against their will (see 
4AP (1) I-V of the IA).
These agreements must be sanctioned by the court that would be competent to deal 
with the company’s insolvency proceedings i.e. the court within the territory of 
which the debtor’s COMI is located (4AP (5) of the IA). The main effects of the 
court’s approval are two:
(i) the refinancing agreement is protected from insolvency actions to set aside 
transactions as detrimental to creditors, and
(ii) the content of such agreement is extended to non-participating or dissenting 
creditors (4AP (3) and (13) of the IA).
For the court to make an order sanctioning an agreement, it has to fulfil a number 
of formal requirements and be signed by certain majorities. These majorities have 
to be proved by submitting a certificate from the company’s auditor together with 
the petition for court approval.
As per the majorities required by 4AP of the IA, for the sanctioned refinancing 
agreement to be protected from actions to set aside, 51% of financial creditors 
by value (excluding debts to specially related persons) must have signed the 
agreement. If it is also intended to impose the agreement on dissenting creditors, 
the required majorities vary depending on whether the financial debts concerned 
are secured or not, and on the effects that are intended to be imposed on those 
dissenting creditors.
If the plan includes a moratorium of up to 5 years on principal, interest or any other 
amount, or debt conversion to equity loans with the same term, then:
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- In order to extend the effects to unsecured debts and unsecured amounts of 
secured debts of non-participating or dissenting creditors, it must be signed by 
creditors representing at least 60% of the unsecured financial liabilities; and
- In order to extend the effects to secured amounts of secured debts of non-
participating or dissenting creditors, it must be signed by creditors representing 
at least 65% of the secured financial liabilities
If the plan lays down a moratorium of 5 to 10 years on principal, interest or any 
amount, write-downs, debt conversion to shares in debtor, conversion to equity 
loans of more than 5 years up to a maximum of 10 years, convertible bonds, 
subordinated loans, loans with capitalisable interest or other financial instruments of 
different ranking, maturity or characteristics than the original debt, or assignments 
of assets in payment of debts in whole or in part, then the above majorities rise to 
70% and 80% respectively.
Within fifteen days following the publication of the court homologation, non-
signing or dissenting creditors may challenge it, but on limited grounds: that 
the necessary majorities have not been achieved or that the agreement involves 
“disproportionate sacrifice” for them. This challenge does not stay the effects of 
the agreement. The challenge against the homologation must be resolved in thirty 
days, by the same court and without remedy of appeal.
III. New EU IR and the Commission’s Recommendation
Article 5 bis (moratorium) and 4AP of the IA (homologation) have been included 
in Annex A of the EIR Recast as two different proceedings, though in practice 
they usually constitute two stages of the same process, as in the XYZ SA example. 
The debtor files a notice under the former and, if an agreement is reached, he 
subsequently requests its homologation.
The moratorium laid down by Article 5 bis of the IA meets the definition of 
insolvency proceedings established by Article 1(1) of the EIR Recast. It is:
(i) a collective proceeding, since it potentially include a significant part of a 
debtor’s creditors (see Article 2(1) of the EIR Recast, defining collective 
proceedings as those which include all or a significant part of the debtor’s 
creditors, and Recital 14 of the EIR Recast, making clear that proceedings 
which involve only financial creditors qualify as collective proceedings);
(ii) based on laws relating to insolvency; and
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(iii) in which, for the purpose of rescue or reorganization, a “temporary stay of 
individual enforcement proceedings is granted …by operation of law in order 
to allow for negotiations between the debtor and his creditors” (see Article 
1(1)(c) of the EIR Recast). Accordingly, in Annex A of the EIR Recast, Spain 
has included: “Procedimientos de negociación pública para la consecución 
de acuerdos de refinanciación colectivos, acuerdos de refinanciación 
homologados y propuestas anticipadas de convenio” (Public proceedings 
aimed at the negotiation of a refinancing collective agreement or an advance 
proposal of insolvency composition). Since Article 5 bis of the IA allows the 
debtor to keep the negotiation confidential, Annex A only refers to “public” 
proceedings (“Procedimientos de negociación pública […]”). Otherwise, i.e. 
when the debtor chooses to keep the negotiation confidential, the EIR Recast 
will not apply.
Homologation proceedings governed by 4AP of the IA are also included in Annex 
A EIR Recast, as a separate proceeding, different from an Article 5 bis of the IA 
moratorium. Specifically, the Annex refers to “Procedimiento de homologación 
de acuerdos de refinanciación” (Court homologation of refinancing agreements). 
As said, in the baseline case, Article 5 bis and 4AP of the IA go together: i.e. the 
debtor notifies the court of negotiations to reach a restructuring agreement in order 
to obtain a moratorium, and once the agreement has been reached, he asks for its 
homologation. But theoretically either proceeding may stand alone: the debtor may 
request the homologation of a refinancing agreement without having first obtained 
a moratorium and vice versa. The debtor therefore may cherry pick between:
(i) a mere moratorium under Article 5 bis of the IA;
(ii) a mere homologation under 4AP of the IA; or
(iii) a combination of both.
Note, however, that a standalone homologation would only qualify as “insolvency 
proceedings” under the EIR Recast if it satisfied the condition laid down by Article 
1(1)(b) of the EIR Recast, i.e. that “the assets and affairs of a debtor are subject to 
control or supervision by a court.” The 4AP homologation may be subsumed neither 
under Article 1(1)(a) of the EIR Recast, since the debtor is not divested of its assets, 
nor under Article 1(1)(c) of the EIR Recast, since in a standalone homologation 
there is no stay. It is true that the issue of whether a mere homologation qualifies 
as insolvency proceedings under Article 1(1)(b) of the EIR Recast is theoretically 
debatable: the court only sanctions the agreement, and the challenge is limited to 
the achievement of the majorities and the proportionate nature of the dissenting 
creditors’ sacrifice. However, the conclusion of EU legislators is favourable to 
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that characterization insofar as it has been included in Annex A of the EIR Recast: 
from an EU law standpoint, a court’s approval of a restructuring plan in the terms 
explained above (i.e. a 4AP homologation) entails that “the assets and affairs of 
the debtor are subject to control or supervision by the court.” Therefore, once they 
have been included in Annex A of the EIR Recast, the issue is merely academic.8
Furthermore, the pre-insolvency framework designed by the Spanish IA 
fits relatively well within the 2014 Commission Recommendation. First, as 
explained, it provides a four-month period stay of individual enforcement 
actions and the adjournment of insolvency proceedings (see Articles 10 to 14 
of that Recommendation); and secondly, it envisages the possibility of a court’s 
approval of the restructuring plan in order to bind dissenting creditors (see Articles 
21-26 of the Recommendation). Note, however, that the Spanish pre-insolvency 
framework does not contain all the elements recommended by the Commission’s 
document, e.g. there is no possibility of renewing the moratorium (see Article 
13 of the Recommendation), or there is no reference to the liquidation value as a 
guarantee for creditors dragged along in the restructuring plan (see Article 22(c) 
of the Recommendation).
IV. Effectiveness within the EU
In the example put forward at the beginning of the chapter, XYZ SA had a 
significant number of its assets outside Spain; in particular, most of its subsidiaries 
were incorporated abroad, but also claims, securities and tangible assets were 
located outside Spain. Therefore, one of the key issues to guarantee the success of 
any restructuring plan in that case was to ensure:
(i) the cross-border effects of the stay granted under Article 5 bis of the IA; and
(ii) the recognition of the restructuring plan once it was sanctioned by the court 
under 4AP of the IA.9
Within the EU, the situation is in turn diverse under the original EIR10 and the EIR 
Recast. The latter includes both Article 5 bis moratorium and 4AP homologation 
proceedings in Annex A and, therefore, all Member States must recognize 
their effects.
8 Below note 13 and associated text.
9 To analyse the difficulties raised by this issue it may be useful to make a difference between EU Member States 
and third countries (infra Section V).
10 Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings.
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Example 1. If XYZ SA has entered into negotiations with its creditors 
to restructure its liabilities under Article 5 bis of the IA, the affected 
creditors will be prevented from initiating individual enforcement 
proceedings not only in Spain but also in other Member States, and no 
main insolvency proceedings may be opened in other Member States 
while the Spanish pre-insolvency proceedings are pending.
By the same token, a judgment sanctioning a restructuring plan or debt discharge 
will also be recognized and produce effects in the rest of the Member States in 
accordance with the EIR Recast.
Example 2. If XYZ SA has reached a refinancing agreement with 
its creditors to restructure its liabilities and such agreement has 
been sanctioned by a court, its effects must be recognized in other 
Member States and therefore dissenting creditors could not enforce 
their original claims either in Spain or in other Member States. In 
this case, and since the court’s approval entails the “closure” of the 
restructuring proceedings from a judicial standpoint, main insolvency 
proceedings might be subsequently opened in another Member State 
but if – and only if – there is a shift of the debtor’s COMI from Spain 
to that Member State.
Note, however, that a temporary moratorium granted in Spain (the debtor’s COMI 
jurisdiction) may not affect the rights in rem of creditors or third parties over assets 
located in other Member States (see Article 8 of the EIR Recast) and may only 
temporarily stay the opening of secondary proceedings in accordance with Article 
38(3) (for a maximum period of three months and provided that suitable measures 
to protect the interests of the local creditors are in place). Likewise, a restructuring 
plan, even if sanctioned by a court, may not affect the rights of secured creditors 
over assets located in other Member States.
Example 3. Even though XYZ SA has obtained a moratorium in 
Spain under Article 5 bis IA, any secured creditor may enforce 
his security interest insofar as the encumbered assets are located 
in another Member State, e.g. a pledge over registered shares of a 
subsidiary incorporated in The Netherlands will not be affected by 
the moratorium. And even if XYZ SA has obtained a court’s approval 
of the restructuring agreement, any secured creditor may enforce his 
original claim over the encumbered assets insofar as they are located 
in another Member State. In practice, this means that the restructuring 
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agreement will only affect the part of the debt which exceeds the 
value of the collateral.
The EIR Recast only applies to insolvency proceedings opened after 26 June 2017 
(see Article 84 of the EIR Recast). The date of opening of the proceedings is 
defined by a reference to the time at which the decision opening such proceedings 
becomes effective (Article 2(8) of the EIR Recast). Therefore:
(i) with regard to an Article 5 bis stay, this date should be, in principle, the time 
when the debtor’s notice is presented to the court (see Article 5 bis (4)) if the 
court’s acknowledgement of that notification becomes public; and
(ii) with regard to the 4AP homologation such date shall be, in principle, when the 
judgment is published (4AP(8) of the IA). If those acts take place after 26 June 
2017, they will benefit from the principle of mutual recognition guaranteed by 
the EIR Recast with the limits mentioned above.
Conversely, if the Article 5 bis moratorium and the 4AP homologation took place 
before 26 June 2017, as was the case in the original example, their cross-border 
effects would be governed by other EU instruments or by national rules. The 
question of whether hybrid or pre-insolvency proceedings fall within the scope 
of application of the Brussels I Regulation and/or Rome I Regulation has been 
discussed in depth among legal scholars, in particular with regard to the English 
Schemes of Arrangement.
In particular, as regards Spanish pre-insolvency proceedings, it is difficult to 
conclude that those EU instruments apply, since such proceedings are clearly 
based on a law relating to insolvency and the Spanish courts’ basis of jurisdiction 
is the location of the debtor’s COMI in Spain. In this case, it may be concluded 
that until the entry into force of the EIR Recast their recognition in other Member 
States is governed by national law, and this raises a problem equivalent to that 
raised by their recognition in third countries (infra).
V. Effectiveness in Third Countries
With regard to third countries, i.e. non EU Member States or Denmark, and 
where there is no bilateral agreement applicable, the recognition of Spanish pre-
insolvency proceedings is determined by the internal rules of the relevant country. 
This therefore requires a case by case analysis, and naturally the conclusion may 
be favourable or not to such recognition (infra (1)). However, even with regard 
to third countries which do not recognize Spanish pre-insolvency proceedings, 
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Spanish courts may unilaterally seek to make restructuring proceedings effective 
across borders (infra (2)).
1. EU Pre-Insolvency Proceedings and the UNCITRAL Model Law
The recognition of the effects of Spanish pre-insolvency proceedings, in particular 
a moratorium and/or a restructuring plan, by third countries’ courts depends 
entirely on their internal law. In practice, this entails additional legal costs in the 
restructuring process: the parties involved in this process usually need to assess the 
risk that dissenting creditors may jeopardize the restructuring plan by enforcing 
their claims over the debtor’s assets located in those countries. A country-by-
country analysis is in many cases unavoidable.
Example 4. If XYZ SA has assets in third countries, e.g. subsidiaries, 
IP rights or claims, which are essential for the continuation of the 
business, the restructuring plan may not succeed if a significant 
group of dissenting creditors enforce their claims over those assets. 
Therefore, in the context of the negotiations of the plan, it important 
to assess the likelihood that such a situation may arise, which in turn 
depends on whether the Spanish moratorium and the restructuring 
agreement will be recognized in those countries. The assessment of 
such risk entails a legal analysis of each individual jurisdiction.
It is true, however, that a significant number of countries outside the EU have 
incorporated the UNCITRAL Model Law into their internal system and, therefore, 
the legal framework is to a certain extent harmonized.11 The problem that 
immediately arises is whether the concept of “foreign (insolvency) proceedings” 
that could be recognized under that instrument encompasses “pre-insolvency 
proceedings” like those designed by Spanish legislators. Unfortunately, the answer 
is not clear.
The definition of foreign (insolvency) proceedings laid down by the UNCITRAL 
Model Law is the following:
“(a) “Foreign proceeding” means a collective judicial or administrative 
proceeding in a foreign State, including an interim proceeding, 
pursuant to a law relating to insolvency in which proceeding the 
assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision 
by a foreign court, for the purpose of reorganization or liquidation.”
11 See: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html.
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The definition of the UNCITRAL Model Law calls for the combination of five 
cumulative elements: they must be:
(i) collective;
(ii) opened in a foreign country;
(iii) based on a law relating to insolvency;
(iv) in which the debtor’s assets and affairs are subject to control or supervision; and
(v) for the purpose of liquidation or reorganization.
Of these five elements, in the context of pre-insolvency proceedings the most 
questionable is the fourth, i.e. the requisite that the assets and affairs of the debtor 
are subject to control or supervision by a foreign court: Do a moratorium (Article 5 
bis of the IA) and/or a court homologation (4AP of the IA) entail that the assets and 
affairs of the debtor are subject to control or supervision? The issue is debatable.
The Explanatory Notes accompanying the Model Law give very little information 
about the scope of that requirement:
“The Model Law specifies neither the level of control or supervision 
required to satisfy this aspect of the definition nor the time at which 
that control or supervision should arise. Although it is intended that 
the control or supervision required under subparagraph (a) should be 
formal in nature, it may be potential rather than actual. As noted in 
paragraph 71, a proceeding in which the debtor retains some measure 
of control over its assets, albeit under court supervision, such as a 
debtor-in-possession would satisfy this requirement. Control or 
supervision may be exercised not only directly by the court but also 
by an insolvency representative where, for example, the insolvency 
representative is subject to control or supervision by the court…”12
On the one hand, under Spanish pre-insolvency proceedings, the debtor is not 
subject to any kind of supervision over his activities, he remains in full control of 
the management of the business. He continues carrying out his ordinary course of 
business, but he may also conclude any kind of transaction even if it goes further 
than that, e.g. he can carry out a non-ordinary course of business sale, pledging 
assets, assume new financial obligations or dismiss a group of employees. No court 
authorization or sanction is needed to make or implement such decisions. But, on 
12 See: http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013-Guide-Enactment-e.pdf.
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the other hand, the moratorium implies that the debtor’s assets are shielded vis à vis 
individual actions and, in any event, the restructuring plan is subject to the court’s 
approval. Furthermore, dissenting creditors may challenge this homologation 
(supra). The homologation only becomes effective once it has been sanctioned 
by the court.
It is very telling that homologation proceedings have been included in Annex A of 
the EIR. This means that at least with regard to the 4AP of the IA homologation, 
the EU has understood it implies that the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject 
to control or supervision since they could only be subsumed under Article 1(1)(b) 
of the EIR Recast.13 Thus, from an EU standpoint, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that a mere moratorium does not qualify as “foreign (insolvency) proceedings” 
under the UNCITRAL Model Law, but a homologation does.
In any event, the issue of whether EU pre-insolvency proceedings will be recognized 
under the national law of third countries that have implemented the UNCITRAL 
Model Law will depend on their own understanding of this instrument.14 For legal 
certainty reasons, it would be helpful if UNCITRAL clarified the application of its 
Model Law to these types of proceedings.
2. Other Remedies: Extraterritorial Leverage
Even if the Spanish pre-insolvency proceedings were not to be recognized by third 
countries, the IA envisages certain tools for promoting a unilateral implementation 
of those proceedings. In particular, Article 218(1) of the IA:
“Article 218. 1 A creditor who, after main proceedings are opened in 
Spain, obtains a total or partial payment of his claim against the assets 
of the debtor located abroad, or by disposal or foreclosure upon these, 
must restore what he has obtained to the estate…”
This provision addresses the situation where main insolvency proceedings, with 
universal effects, have been opened in Spain and, nevertheless, an individual 
dissenting creditor enforces his claims against the assets of the debtor in a third 
country. Typically, because the third country courts do not recognize the universal 
reach of the Spanish proceedings. In such a case, the creditor may be obliged by 
13 A standalone 4AP homologation can be subsumed neither under Article 1(1)(a) (since the debtor is not divested) nor 
under Article 1(1)(c) (since once the agreement is reached, the moratorium elapses), but only under letter (b) which 
refers to proceedings where the “assets and affairs of a debtor are subject to control or supervision by a court.”
14 See, concluding that an homologation under 4AP, IA can be recognized in the US under Chapter 15 which 
incorporate the UNCITRAL Model Law concept of insolvency proceedings, US Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Delaware, Case No 16-10754, In re: Abengoa S.A et al.
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the Spanish courts to restitute what he has unduly obtained abroad. Furthermore, 
the Spanish judgment on restitution may be enforced in other Member States under 
the EIR Recast, since it “derives directly from the insolvency proceedings and is 
closely linked with them” (Article 6(1) of the EIR Recast).
Ex ante, this may work as an incentive to prevent dissenting creditors from seeking 
enforcement of their rights over debtors’ assets located in third countries that 
do not recognize Spanish insolvency proceedings. The threat of being obliged 
to restitute what they have obtained discourages such behaviour. Additionally, 
Article 218 of the IA may also be the basis of an anti-suit injunction. Furthermore, 
as argued elsewhere,15 this provision is based on the general principle of unjust 
enrichment (Articles 1895-1896 of the Spanish Civil Code) and thus also applies 
to pre-insolvency proceedings.
Example 5. XYZ SA has obtained a court’s approval of the 
restructuring agreement under 4AP of the IA. Let us imagine that a 
dissenting creditor (DC) seeks enforcement of his claim in Country A 
where XYZ SA has assets since such country does not recognize the 
Spanish homologation. In that case, and in accordance with Article 
218 of the IA, such creditor may be obliged by the Spanish courts 
to restitute to the debtor the amounts he may have collected abroad. 
Furthermore, that judgment may be enforced in other Member 
States under the EIR Recast. If DC has assets in Spain or in other 
EU Member States, the threat of restitution may be sufficient to 
prevent him from enforcing his claim over the XYZ’s assets located 
in Country A. Naturally, if DC has no assets in Europe or in other 
country that may recognize the Spanish judgment on restitution, the 
threat is futile.
If the EU eventually establishes a Directive on restructuring proceedings, 
the inclusion of an equivalent provision is something that may be worthy of 
consideration, since it will strengthen the universal effects of those proceedings. 
Other alternatives, such as those used in the Bank Resolution framework16 requiring 
debtors to include a contractual clause that gives effects to the restructuring 
proceedings are impracticable.
15 See F. Garcimartin, “Alcance extraterritorial del concurso español”, available at: http://almacendederecho.org/
alcance-extraterritorial-del-concurso-espanol/.
16 See, e.g. Article 55, Directive 2014/59/EU of 15 May 2014, establishing a framework for the recovery and 
resolution of credit institutions and investment firms.
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VI. Conclusion: The Need for a World-wide Instrument
By way of conclusion:
(i) EU Member States have progressively introduced national proceedings that 
allow debtors to restructure at an early stage with the objective of avoiding 
insolvency. Articles 5 bis and 4AP of the IA are good examples of this trend. 
Furthermore, EU legislators will probably establish a Directive harmonizing 
all EU national restructuring proceedings in the short term.
(ii) The cross-border effectiveness of the measures adopted under those 
proceedings, e.g. a moratorium or a restructuring agreement, may be a key 
element to guarantee their success when the debtor has assets abroad.
(iii) Within the EU, the EIR Recast ensures such effectiveness as regards 
those national restructuring proceedings that are included in Annex A of 
the Regulation.
(iv) With regard to third countries, the question is more uncertain since it 
depends on the national law of the relevant country. There is no international 
convention that ensures the recognition of the EU restructuring proceedings 
outside the EU.17
(v) Even in those countries that have adopted the UNCITRAL Model law on 
cross-border insolvency the issue is not clear, since it is debatable whether 
and to what extent certain EU restructuring proceedings qualify as “foreign 
(insolvency) proceedings” under that instrument. A clarification by 
UNCITRAL will be helpful.
(vi) In any event, Member States may resort to unilateral mechanisms to promote 
a “voluntary” acceptance by dissenting creditors of the restructuring 
proceedings carried out in their courts.
(vii) Article 218 of the Spanish Insolvency Act may serve as a model for those 
mechanisms. To reduce the risks of lack of cooperation by third countries, 
an equivalent provision should be incorporated in any future EU instrument 
on restructuring.
17 For UNCITRAL’s work, see: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V16/010/38/PDF/V1601038.
pdf?OpenElement.
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Chapter 7
Pre-Insolvency Procedures: A United 
Kingdom and South African Perspective
Alexandra Kastrinou and Lézelle Jacobs
Introduction
In light of the longstanding economic crisis the need for corporate rescue culture 
has been evolving in Europe and across the rest of the world. Great emphasis has 
been placed on rescue at an early stage and it appears that more and more rescue is 
attempted at a pre-insolvency stage, so as to enhance the likelihood of a successful 
reorganisation.1 The aim of this chapter is to consider the pre-insolvency procedures 
available in the United Kingdom and South Africa. In particular the chapter 
provides an overview of the CVA procedure and the Schemes of Arrangement 
in the United Kingdom as well as the Business Rescue and the Compromise 
procedures in South Africa. In conclusion, the chapter aims to provide an overview 
of the approach taken in both jurisdictions towards less formal restructurings by 
“key players” in insolvency, such as insolvency practitioners and secured creditors 
as well as the courts.
The Advantages of Early-Stage Intervention
Although various formal and informal steps may be taken in order to give effect to 
a successful rescue, it is submitted that a traumatised company will often benefit 
from intervention before it gets to the stage of actual insolvency. In fact, it has been 
noted that most rescues are achieved through informal or less formal rescue, that 
is, rescue without recourse to the formal insolvency proceedings.2 Less formal, 
pre-insolvency rescue mechanisms have a variety of advantages for the ailing 
company. From a director’s and also a shareholder’s perspective, engaging in less 
formal rescue is preferable as it prevents any adverse publicity in relation to the 
company’s financial troubles and hence protects its goodwill and reputation.3 It 
could be argued that, by pursuing less formal rescue, the company can effectively 
1 See S. Frisby, Report to the Insolvency Service: Insolvency Outcomes (June 2006) (Insolvency Service, London).
2 Idem.
3 V. Finch, Corporate Insolvency Law: Perspectives and Principles (2nd ed) (2009, CUP, Cambridge), at 278.
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avoid the stigma which is attached to corporate failure and that the realisable value 
of its assets can be protected.4 Moreover, one could argue that less formal rescue is 
not as costly as formal insolvency proceedings, since the involvement of the court 
is very limited. In addition, since there is little court involvement in pre-insolvency 
rescue, one could argue that the process is more flexible.
Furthermore, as opposed to completely informal reorganisation,5 a semi-formal 
reorganisation under the Company Voluntary Arrangement (“CVA”) in the United 
Kingdom could prove more effective, as far as consent is concerned, since an 
approval in excess of 75% in value would suffice. Arguably the fact that there 
is no need to obtain the consent of all the creditors under a CVA avoids the 
flaws and challenges of informal rescue,6 as obtaining consent from dissenting 
creditors could prove to be a time-consuming and expensive course of action.7 In 
the South African context it also worth noting that regardless of who initiates the 
rescue proceedings, the business rescue will only continue if the creditors accepts 
the business rescue plan. Of course there is no need for a unanimous vote of 
acceptance and the Companies Act 71 of 2008 therefore provides that the plan will 
be accepted if it was supported by the holders of more than 75% of the creditors’ 
voting interest,8 and the votes in support of the plan included at least 50% of the 
independent creditors’ voting interest that were voted.9 The South African business 
rescue proceedings thus also bind a dissenting minority.
It could be argued that early intervention is a key for successful corporate rescue. 
Accordingly, the insolvency law regimes of both the United Kingdom and South 
Africa make provision for early intervention proceedings. These proceedings 
are being increasingly used before the technical moment of insolvency and are 
“colonizing” the area formerly occupied by formal insolvency procedures. For 
instance, in the United Kingdom procedures are in place, which are designed to 
encourage an early stage intervention by the existing management, such as the 
Scheme of Arrangement, which is one of the oldest rescue devices in the world 
4 Ibid., at 251-252.
5 Where a reorganisation process is of a contractual nature, hence there is great reliance on a consensus being 
achieved with the creditors.
6 J. Payne, “Debt Restructuring in English Law: Lessons from the United States and the Need for Reform” (2014) 
130 Law Quarterly Review 282, at 287.
7 It could be said that a formal procedure, such as the Company Voluntary Arrangement in the United Kingdom, 
could prove more effective, as far as consent is concerned, since an approval in excess of 75% in value would 
suffice. A Part 26, Companies Act 2006 scheme of arrangement could also be used for solvent entities, which 
would have the same effect.
8 Section 152(2)(a), Companies Act 71 of 2008.
9 Ibid., section 152(2)(b). An independent creditor is described in section 128(1)(g) as a person who is a creditor of 
the company, including an employee of the company who is a creditor in terms of section 144(2) and who is not 
related to the company, a director or the practitioner.
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and the CVA procedure, which was introduced following the recommendations 
of the Cork Report.10 In South Africa, directors are also encouraged to initiate 
business rescue proceedings as soon as possible; in order to assist the board of 
directors from allegations of abuse of process the Act widened the definition 
of “financial distress” by introducing a six month time period. The new mixed 
management displacement model in South Africa also encourages directors to 
initiate proceedings sooner.11
Pre-Insolvency Proceedings in the United Kingdom
The Development of a Corporate Rescue Culture in the United Kingdom
A financially ailing company may have resort to a range of mechanisms in the 
United Kingdom, such as for instance, informal workouts, a CVA, a scheme of 
arrangement or administration. Arguably, the presence of such a wide range of 
reorganisation proceedings demonstrates the significance attached to business 
recovery in this jurisdiction. However, it was not until relatively recently that the 
United Kingdom established its sophisticated corporate rescue culture.
Prior to the enactment of the Insolvency Act 1986 (“IA 86”), there were only two 
formal possible procedures designed to keep “alive” a traumatised business, the 
administrative receivership procedure or a scheme of arrangement. Nonetheless, the 
application of these to procedures was not without problems, as the administrative 
receivership procedure was conditional upon the exercise of the right of a floating 
charge holder to appoint an administrative receiver; in addition, the use of a 
scheme of arrangement as a corporate rescue tool was limited, primarily because 
the procedure was too:
“procedurally cumbersome and failed to safeguard sufficient and 
effective protection for the company.”12
10 Report of the Insolvency Law Review Committee, Insolvency Law and Practice (Cmnd 8558) (1982, HMSO, 
London) (“Cork Report”).
11 Sections 137(2)(a)-(c) and 140(1)(a), Companies Act 71 of 2008. Under Business Rescue, the company’s 
management is displaced by an independent third party known as the Business Rescue Practitioner. Even 
though the management is displaced the directors are not removed from office and stay on in order to assist the 
Practitioner in his duties, this is done under the supervision of the practitioner.
12 R. Parry, “United Kingdom: Administrative Receiverships and Administrations” in K. Gromek Broc and R. Parry, 
Corporate Rescue in Europe: An Overview of Recent Developments from Selected Countries in Europe (2004, 
Kluwer Law International, London), at 265.
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In 1985 by means of a text, later re-enacted as the IA 86,13 two additional 
procedures were introduced as alternative means for corporate rescue, namely the 
administration procedure and the CVA. The innovative reforms introduced by the 
IA 86, originally had their roots in the 1982 report of the Cork Committee,14 which 
recognised the need to strengthen the United Kingdom’s corporate rescue regime. 
The Cork Report stated that a:
“good, modern system of insolvency law should provide a means for 
preserving viable commercial enterprises capable of making a useful 
contribution to the economic life of the country.”15
It should be noted, however, that, although the CVA appeared to be a promising 
“debtor in possession” reorganisation tool, it was not fully embraced by 
practitioners. Later, nevertheless, the Enterprise Act 2002 together with the 
Insolvency Act 2000 contributed significantly to the development of a corporate 
rescue culture in the United Kingdom. The Insolvency Act 2000 introduced key 
reforms to the CVA procedure, so that the CVA now constitutes an important part 
of the current trend in shifting the ethos of the United Kingdom’s insolvency law 
towards effective corporate rescue.
An Overview of the CVA Procedure
The CVA was designed primarily with the aim of promoting corporate rescue. 
The objective of the CVA is to facilitate the rehabilitation of a financially troubled 
company by enabling it to reach a contractual compromise with its creditors. The 
CVA may be used as a stand-alone procedure or it may be combined with another 
procedure, such as administration. In other words, the procedure may be initiated 
either by the company’s directors or by an administrator. Although the CVA may 
be effectively used as an exit route from administration, strictly speaking, it is not a 
formal insolvency procedure, as it is not necessary for the company to be insolvent 
or show that it is unable to pay its debts in order to enter into a CVA.
Where the CVA is initiated as a freestanding procedure, the existing management 
of a company is able to take early action by drafting a re-organisation proposal and 
presenting it to the company’s creditors. The directors16 are also entrusted with 
the implementation of the proposal under the supervision of a licenced insolvency 
13 The Insolvency Act 1985 was consolidated with the winding up provisions from the Companies Act 1985 as the 
Insolvency Act 1986.
14 Above note 10.
15 Finch, note 3 above, at 246.
16 It should be noted that although the CVA is described largely as a “Debtor in Possession” regime, in practice the 
directors heavily rely on the insolvency practitioner to both draft and execute the proposal.
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practitioner, known as the “nominee” prior to approval of the proposal and as the 
“supervisor” after approval.17
The formation of the proposal is a key stage of the reorganisation process. 
The directors form the proposal,18 which, inter alia, states the reasons why the 
company’s directors believe that a CVA is desirable; the company’s assets and their 
value; details of assets charged in favour of creditors; the nature and the amount 
of the company’s liabilities; the duration of the CVA; the dates of distributions to 
creditors; the identity and the remuneration of the insolvency practitioner of the 
proposed nominee/supervisor.19
The steps that directors must take in forming and implementing a CVA proposal 
depend on whether or not the protection of a moratorium is sought.20 Arguably, 
one of the most significant reforms the CVA has been subject to is the introduction 
of provisions enabling a moratorium to be obtained while the CVA is being 
proposed.21 However, notwithstanding the introduction of a reformed CVA, 
it could be said that the impact of the procedure has been limited. An obvious 
contributing factor to the limited use of the CVA could arguably be the fact that 
a moratorium is only available to “small companies”.22 However, since large 
companies can still benefit from a moratorium (if one is necessary) by simply 
entering into administration proceedings, the lack of it under the CVA has not 
been identified as a major flaw by insolvency practitioners. In addition, it could be 
argued that the use of the CVA has been relatively limited, due to the fact that the 
procedure has been overshadowed by the streamlined administration procedure.23
The Role of the Nominee 
The nominee has a very important role to serve, as he must establish whether or not 
the company is able to implement a CVA proposal. Accordingly, the nominee must 
present a report to the court stating whether in his opinion meetings of the company 
17 It is important to note that the insolvency practitioner must remain independent from the outset and throughout 
the implementation of the CVA process. See Statement of Insolvency Practice 3, at paragraph 3.2.
18 Section 1(1), IA 1986.
19 See rule 1.3. (1)-(8), Insolvency Rules 1986.
20 Where directors intend to apply for a moratorium the procedure which must be followed is stated in section 2, 
IA 1986, supplemented by the Part 1 Chapter 2, Insolvency Rules 1986. Where a moratorium is not required, the 
procedure is outlined in Schedule A1, IA 1986.
21 R. Parry, Corporate Rescue (2008, Sweet & Maxwell, London), at 136, paragraph 10-09.
22 See section 382(3), Companies Act 2006, which states that a company qualifies as small in relation to a subsequent 
financial year, if it satisfies at least two of the following “qualifying conditions”: (a) its turnover does not exceed 
GBP 6.5 million; (b) its balance sheet total is not more than GBP 3.26 million; (c) it has no more than 50 employees.
23 Parry, above note 21, at 136, paragraph 10-09.
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and its creditors should consider the proposal.24 In order to be able to assess the 
company’s suitability and to prepare his report, the nominee must receive a copy 
of the proposal from the directors,25 a statement of the company’s affairs,26 as well 
as any other information he requires.27
The nominee shall summon meetings of the company and its creditors28 in order to 
either approve (with or without modifications)29 or reject the proposed CVA. After 
the conclusion of either meeting the chairman of the meeting shall report the result 
of the meeting to the court, and, immediately after reporting to the court, shall give 
notice of the result of the meeting to such persons as may be prescribed.30
With regard to the approval of the proposal, it is important to note that as opposed 
to a scheme of arrangement, the CVA treats all creditors as one single class.31 All 
creditors who receive notice of a creditors’ meeting can vote on a CVA draft.32 In 
order for the CVA to become effective, it needs to be approved by the requisite 
majority at the meeting.33 The CVA is treated as a statutory contract,34 which 
binds every person who was eligible to vote at the meeting, regardless of whether 
they were present or not and whether they voted in favour or not of the proposed 
arrangement.35 Upon approval of the CVA, the nominee becomes the supervisor.36
An important disadvantage of the CVA procedure is its vulnerability to claims of 
unfair prejudice to the interest of a creditor or member under the approved CVA. In 
addition the CVA is vulnerable to challenge on grounds of material irregularities. 
Such claims may be initiated by any person, who would be eligible to vote at the 
meeting, or any person who would have been entitled to vote had they had notice 
of the meeting. In any case no challenge can be made after a period of 28 days:
24 Section 2(2), IA 1986.
25 Ibid., section 2(3); rule 1.4. (1)-(2), Insolvency Rules 1986.
26 Rule 1.5, Insolvency Rules 1986.
27 Ibid., rule 1.6.
28 Schedule A1, paragraph 29, IA 1986.
29 Ibid., paragraph 31.
30 Ibid., paragraph 30(3).
31 See I. Fletcher, “UK Corporate Rescue Culture: Recent Developments – Changes To Administrative Receivership, 
Administration and Company Voluntary Arrangements- The Insolvency Act 2000, The White Paper and The 
Enterprise Act 2002” (2004) 5 European Business Organisation Law Review 119, at 127.
32 Persons who are not entitled to vote at the meeting, ae not bound by the CVA. See section 5(2), IA 1986.
33 Rule 1.19, Insolvency Rules 1986: more than three quarters in value of the creditors voting on the resolution must 
vote in favour of the arrangement.
34 Johnson v Davies [1999] Ch 117, at 129H-130A.
35 Schedule A1, paragraph 37, IA 1986.
36 Ibid., paragraph 39(2).
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(a) beginning with the first day on which the Chairman’s report required has been 
made to the court; or
(b) in the case of a person who was not given notice of the creditors’ meeting, 
after the end of the period of 28 days beginning with the day on which he 
became aware that the meeting had taken place.37
Schemes of Arrangement
A scheme of arrangement is one of the oldest restructuring procedures available 
in the United Kingdom.38 However, strictly speaking a scheme is not an exclusive 
corporate rescue instrument, as it was primarily designed to be used by solvent 
companies. Accordingly, as the scheme is a creature of company law,39 when 
compared to CVAs, it is not as stigmatised. Similarly to the CVA, a scheme 
enables a financially ailing company to reach a compromise with its creditors. 
However, in contrast to the CVA, the popularity of the scheme, as a rescue device 
has been steadily rising over the last few decades40 and practitioners have favoured 
the use of schemes in a number of high profile debt restructuring cases.41
The scheme is a compromise between the company and its creditors, or between the 
company and its members. Similarly to the CVA, the company’s directors remain 
in office and are responsible for the drafting and the execution of the restructuring 
plan. The process of implementing a scheme involves three distinct stages:
(a) formulation of the proposal and an application to the court;
(b) a creditors’ meeting for approval of the scheme; and
(c) a “sanction hearing” before the court.
As part of stage one, the board directors shall form the restructuring plan,42 which 
is then proposed on behalf of the company to its members and creditors. Once a 
compromise/arrangement has been proposed, the company by sending preliminary 
37 Ibid., paragraph 38(3).
38 It dates back to the Joint Stock Companies (Arrangement) Act 1870.
39 The statutory regime relating to schemes is set out in Part 26, Companies Act 2006.
40 Parry, above note 21, at 233. See also Finch, above note 3, at 486, where it is argued that the revived popularity 
of schemes of arrangement may be due to the courts “constructive attitude, to facilitate the implementation of 
schemes by means of assessing junior creditors’ ‘real economic interests.”
41 Such as Crest Nicholson plc, McCarthy & Stone plc, Wind Hellas Telecommunications SA and European 
Directories Group.
42 Although the appointment of a qualified insolvency practitioner is not necessary, typically directors seek the 
advice of restructuring experts at this early stage.
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circulars43 shall inform its creditors or members about the objectives of the scheme 
as well as the relevant meetings (if more than one) the company aims to call. The 
company must also select the classes in which the creditors or members affected by 
the scheme should be placed and accordingly notify them. The division of classes 
depends on how similar44 the rights of the members of each class are. However, it 
is not necessary that their rights are exactly the same.45 Finally, stage one involves 
an application being made to the court, which will have to decide whether or not 
to make a “meetings order”.46
Stage two involves a meeting of creditors or members who will decide whether to 
approve the scheme. However, it is required that, prior to the meeting, sufficient 
information must be circulated so as to enable the creditors to reach an informed 
decision.47 As mentioned above the approval of a scheme of arrangement involves 
a complex voting structure under which, for voting purposes, creditors are divided 
into classes and it is required that a reorganization arrangement be approved by a 
majority vote of all classes of creditors.48
In comparing the complex approval process of a scheme to the much simpler 
process of a CVA, it could be argued that restructuring by means of a CVA should 
be preferable. Nevertheless, the simplicity aspect of the CVA is outweighed by 
the fact that, once an arrangement becomes binding under the scheme, it binds all 
creditors (including dissenting creditors), whereas an agreement reached under the 
CVA is only binding upon creditors who were eligible to vote, or who would have 
been eligible to vote, if they had notice of a creditors’ meeting. In addition, it is 
important to note that, under a scheme of arrangement, it is not necessary to consult 
any class of creditors who have no real economic interest in the company, hence 
43 However, compliance with this requirement may be waived by the court in exceptional cases. See for instance 
Marconi Corp Plc v Marconi Plc [2003] EWHC 663.
44 The interests of creditors in each class should not be so dissimilar so as to make it impossible for them to consult 
together with a view to their common interest. See Sovereign Life Assurance Co v Dodd [1982] 2 QB 573, at 583; 
Re BTR Plc [1999] 2 BCLC 575.
45 Re Osiris Insurance Ltd [1999] 2 BCLC 182.
46 At the meetings hearing the court will consider whether or not the company has appropriately identified the 
classes, which will have to consider the scheme. See Re Hawk Insurance Co Ltd [2002] BCC 300.
47 See section 897, Companies Act 2006.
48 Ibid., section 899, which states: “If a majority in number representing 75% in value of the creditors or class of 
creditors or members or class of members (as the case may be), present and voting either in person or by proxy at 
the meeting summoned under section 896, agree a compromise or arrangement, the court may, on an application 
under this section, sanction the compromise or arrangement.” However, see also C. Maunder, “Bondholder 
Schemes of Arrangement: Playing the Numbers Game” (2003) 16(10) Insolvency Intelligence 73, at 76, where 
it is argued that if the majority in number requirement was removed, schemes of arrangement would be more 
flexible and attractive restructuring tools.
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their votes on the scheme may be disregarded.49 This is a significant advantage 
of a scheme as it provides greater finality than a CVA, which is vulnerable to 
challenges on grounds on unfair prejudice.50
Stage three involves a “sanction hearing”, where the court will consider whether 
or not to sanction the scheme.51 Once the scheme has obtained the required level of 
approval, it must be sanctioned by the court and the court’s order takes effect once 
a copy of it is delivered to the Registrar of Companies.52 It should be noted that 
the sanctioning of the scheme is not a simple rubber-stamping exercise. Instead, 
the court may not sanction a scheme even where it has received the approval of 
creditors,53 as it must be satisfied that the classes were fairly represented by the 
parties who attended the meeting,54 and that the terms of the scheme are fair.55 
In addition, the court has discretion to refuse to sanction a scheme, unless it is 
convinced that all the procedural requirements have been complied with.56 It is 
argued that the requirement that a scheme of arrangement has to be approved by 
the court is a significant advantage of the procedure, because, once the arrangement 
has been court-approved, it cannot be challenged by the company’s creditors or 
its members. It could be argued that this might be one of the primary reasons 
why such schemes seem to be more popular than the CVA, as a CVA may be 
challenged on the grounds of unfair prejudice.57
Pre-Insolvency Proceedings in South Africa
A very large premium has been placed on retaining jobs and businesses in South 
Africa,58 and as an emerging market economy an efficient rescue system is of 
the utmost importance. South Africa’s Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the “Act”) 
heralded a new era of corporate rescue for financially distressed corporations by 
replacing the largely unsuccessful Judicial Management Procedure.59 Chapter 6 of 
49 See Re Tea Corp. [1904] 1 Ch 12. See also Re My Travel Group Plc [2004] EWHC 2741; [2005] 1 WLR 2365, 
where the basis of valuation of entitlements caused some contention. See also Parry, above note 22, at 236; Finch, 
above note 3, at 486.
50 Parry, above note 21, at 233.
51 Ibid., at 236.
52 Section 899 (1), (4), Companies Act 2006.
53 Payne, above note 6, at 292.
54 Parry, above note 21, at 238.
55 Ibid., at 239-247.
56 Alabama, New Orleans, Texas and Pacific Junction Rly Co [1891] 1 Ch 213, at 245.
57 Parry, above note 22, at 233.
58 D. Burdette, “Some Initial Thoughts on the Development of a Modern and Effective Business Rescue Model for 
South Africa (Part 1)” (2004) 16 SA Mercantile Law Journal 241, at 241.
59 Idem. See also E. Snyman-van Deventer and L. Jacobs, “Corporate Rescue: The South African Business Rescue 
Plan Examined” (2014) 2 Nottingham Insolvency and Business Law e-Journal 103, at 103.
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the Act dealing with Business Rescue and Compromises also replaces the section 
on compromises and arrangements contained in the previous Companies Act of 
1973.60 Thus the Act currently provides for two pre-insolvency proceedings: the 
Business Rescue procedure and the Compromise with creditors.
Both the mechanisms contained in Chapter 6 provide a debtor in financial distress 
with access to corporate reorganisation in order to try and circumvent insolvency. 
The Business Rescue provisions can be regarded as a more traditional type of 
procedure that can be likened to the Administration procedure under the English 
Enterprise Act.61 Under Business Rescue, the company’s management is displaced 
by an independent third party known as the Business Rescue Practitioner. Even 
though the management is displaced, the directors are not removed from office 
and stay on in order to assist the Practitioner in his duties, this is done under 
the supervision of the practitioner.62 The Compromise provisions provide for an 
alternative option with less involvement from the court and practitioners, in this 
sense it is reminiscent of the US Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession in that the debtor 
is able to stay in control of its affairs, although it is a simpler provision than the 
Chapter 11 procedure.63 This mechanism provides for a more flexible framework 
and can even be utilised by companies that are not experiencing financial distress.
Although the new corporate rescue procedures in South Africa are more informal 
than under the previous Act, the procedures that are currently available to 
distressed companies are still more formal than informal in nature since it is highly 
regulated by legislation. Informal creditor workouts are rarely heard of nor are they 
documented.64 The Chapter 6 mechanisms are less formal since the involvement 
of the courts have been limited whilst the involvement of other stakeholders have 
been broadened. A discussion on the development of a rescue culture as well as an 
overview of the two reorganisation options will now follow.
The Development of a Rescue Culture in South Africa
South Africa is still struggling with a liquidation culture despite the fact that South 
Africa now has modern rescue provisions to aid failing debtors. The process of 
moving towards a rescue culture is happening very slowly. This liquidation culture 
60 Companies Act 61 of 1973.
61 H. Klopper and R. Bradstreet, “Averting Liquidations with Business Rescue: Does a section 155 Compromise 
Place the Bar too high?” (2014) Stellenbosch Law Review 549, at 550.
62 Sections 137(2)(a)-(c), 140 (1)(a), Companies Act 71 of 2008.
63 Klopper and Bradstreet, above note 61, at 553.
64 N. Harvey (ed), Turnaround Management and Corporate Renewal. A South African Perspective, (2011, Wits 
University Press, Johannesburg), at 134.
101
emanates from South Africa’s prevailing creditor-friendly approach to insolvency 
matters.65 It is, however, of importance to mention that even though the shift is 
happening at a very slow pace, it is indeed happening. In recent years, since the 
inception of the Companies Act of 2008, there has been more emphasis on the 
protection of the interests of all the relevant stakeholders. It has even been stated by 
the court that Business Rescue is to be preferred to the liquidation of the company 
and that the old mind-set of the creditor being almost entitled to a winding-up order 
as of a right was inappropriate.66
One of the biggest hurdles to overcome in creating a rescue culture in South 
Africa is the larger creditors, e.g. the Banks who are to a large degree very 
reluctant to participate in, or even support the rescue proceedings because of the 
aforementioned reasoning. And although creditors still play an overwhelming role 
in the outcome of reorganisation procedures,67 there seems to be a shift to a more 
inclusive approach to the rescue of a company albeit at a very slow pace.
Business Rescue
According to section 7 of the Act, one of the main purposes thereof is to provide for 
the efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed companies, in a manner 
that balances the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders.68 The Act provides 
for proceedings to facilitate the rehabilitation of a company that is financially 
distressed by providing for: the temporary supervision of the company, and of 
the management of its affairs, business and property; a temporary moratorium 
on the rights of claimants against the company or in respect of property in its 
possession; and the development and implementation, if approved, of a plan to 
rescue the company.69
The first topic to discuss in this regard pertains to the concept of imminent 
insolvency in a South African context. When will a company be regarded as being 
in financial distress? It is a well-known fact that time is of the essence in corporate 
reorganisations. Section 128 of the Act states that a company will be deemed to 
be financially distressed if it appears to be reasonably unlikely that the company 
65 See Burdette, above note 58, at 244; Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 
386 Ltd 2012(2) SA 423 (WCC); Oakdene Square Properties (Pty) Ltd v Farm Bothasfontein (Kyalami) (Pty) 
Ltd 2012(3) SA 273 (GSJ), at 276. “By law the creditor of an ailing company had a right ex debito justitiae (as of 
right) to liquidate the company.”
66 Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 386 Ltd 2012 2 SA 423 (WCC).
67 A. Loubser, “The Role of Shareholders during Corporate Rescue Proceedings: Always On the Outside Looking 
In?” (2008) 20 SA Mercantile Law Journal 372, at 379.
68 Section 7(k), Companies Act 71 of 2008.
69 Ibid., section 128(1)(b)(i)-(iii).
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will be able to pay all of its debts as they become due and payable within the 
immediately ensuing six months,70 or if it appears to be reasonably likely that the 
company will become insolvent within the immediately ensuing six months.71 The 
adding of the six month time period was to encourage the early commencement of 
Business Rescue which in turn maximises the chance of a successful rescue. The 
formulation of the concept of financial distress in the Act also refers to commercial 
and factual insolvency at a future date implying that Business Rescue should not 
be utilised by companies that are already insolvent. South African courts agree 
with this and have at numerous occasions denied applications for the initiation of 
Business rescue where the companies are insolvent and not in financial distress.72
The initiation of the procedure can happen either voluntarily by way of a company 
resolution or by application to the High Court by an affected person. An affected 
person is defined in the Act as a shareholder or creditor of the company, any 
registered trade union representing employees of the company and any employees 
of the company not represented by a trade union.73
The commencement standard that applies depends on the party that initiates the 
rescue process, providing for different requirements for when the debtor initiates 
to when an affected person applies to court for an order placing the company 
under Business Rescue. This is a positive development,74 as it also allows for 
different evidential burdens taking the circumstances and information position 
of the different role players into account. The new requirements for initiating 
Business Rescue are seen as an improvement to the requirements under the 
previous Companies Act of 1973. Some believe that the evidential burden imposed 
by the previous Act was unrealistic, outdated and excessive, and resulted in 
rescuable companies being denied a lifeline. Others argue that the courts wrongly 
70 Ibid., section 128(1)(f)(i). Referring to the so called cash flow test for insolvency.
71 Ibid., section 128(1)(f)(ii). Referring to the so called balance sheet test for insolvency.
72 Gormley v West City Precinct Properties (Pty) Ltd (Unreported case). “It must either be unlikely that the debts 
can be repaid within 6 months or that the company will go insolvent within the ensuing 6 months. In this case the 
company is presently insolvent and cannot pay its debts unless a moratorium of 3-5 years is granted. The facts of 
this matter does not bring West City’s financial situation within the definition of ‘financially distressed’.” See also 
Wellman v Marcelle Props 193 2012 JDR 0408 (GSJ), at 12. “In my view, Business Rescue proceedings are not 
for the terminally ill close corporation.”; Southern Palace Investments 265 (Pty) Ltd v Midnight Storm Investments 
386 Ltd 2012 2 SA 423 (WCC); African Banking Corporation of Botswana v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers 
(228/2014) [2015] ZASCA 69: “Suffice it to say that the company was clearly hopelessly insolvent and effectively 
dormant in that it had not traded for years and had no business contacts in place.”
73 Section 128(1)(a)(i)-(iii), Companies Act 71 of 2008.
74 Under the 1973 Companies Act, only one set of requirements was applicable regardless of who was initiating the 
rescue procedure.
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interpreted judicial management as an extraordinary remedy, only to be granted in 
exceptional circumstances.75
Under the Business Rescue model a company may voluntarily initiate rescue 
proceedings and place the company under supervision, by taking a resolution, if 
the board has reasonable grounds to firstly, believe that the company is financially 
distressed and secondly, that there appears to be a reasonable prospect of rescuing 
the company.76 An affected person, on the other hand, may apply to court to make 
an order placing the company under supervision and commencing business rescue 
proceedings, if the court is satisfied that the company is financially distressed; 
the company has failed to make an employment-related payment arising from a 
regulatory or contractual obligation or if it is otherwise just and equitable to do so 
for financial reasons, and there is a reasonable prospect for rescuing the company.77
The court’s involvement has therefor been limited at the commencement of the 
proceedings. The debtor is fully aware of its own financial situation, and would 
be the most appropriate judge to decide when to make use of rescue provisions.78 
A rescue mechanism that relies heavily on the involvement of the court is 
expensive and therefor contradictory to the aim of helping the company in dire 
financial straits.
The most problematic requirement for South African courts to date has been the 
need for a reasonable prospect of rescue to exist.79 This is mainly due to the fact 
that the meaning of “successful rescue” is a contentious issue and will depend on 
the viewpoint from which it is regarded and also because there is no way in which 
to determine the viability of the debtor company. According to the Act a successful 
rescue could include returning the company to solvency or alternatively bringing 
about a better return for the company’s creditors and shareholders than would 
result from the immediate liquidation of the company.80
After the commencement of the proceedings, the appointment of the Business 
Rescue Practitioner should take place. If the company initiates the proceedings 
the Practitioner will be appointed by the board of the company.81 If, however, the 
procedure is initiated by an affected person the applicant to court would nominate 
75 See Burdette, above note 58, at 248-249.
76 Section 129(1), Companies Act 71 of 2008.
77 Ibid., section 131(4) (a) (i)-(iii).
78 D. Burdette, “Some initial thoughts on the Development of a Modern and Effective Business Rescue Model for 
South Africa (Part 2)” (2004) 16 SA Mercantile Law Journal 409, at 410.
79 M. Pretorius, Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) Status Quo Report (2015), at 5.
80 Section 128(1)(b)(iii), Companies Act 71 of 2008.
81 Ibid., section 129(3)(b).
Pre-Insolvency Procedures: A United Kingdom and South African Perspective
104 Reimagining Rescue
a practitioner and the court will appoint an interim Practitioner, subject to the 
ratification by the creditors.82 The Practitioner is a key role player in the rescue 
procedure and the duty to rescue the company falls on his shoulders. It is for this 
reason that the Practitioner should be suitably qualified and experienced in order 
to perform all that is expected of him.
According to the 2008 Companies Act, a Practitioner should be a member of 
the law, accounting or business management profession.83 The regulations to the 
act furthermore stipulate that a practitioner should have experience in “business 
turnaround practice”.84 The 2008 Act places more emphasis on the experience of 
the business rescue practitioner than its predecessor. Practitioners are therefore 
divided into three categories: senior practitioners, experienced practitioners and 
junior practitioners. For large and state-owned companies only senior practitioners 
may be appointed. For medium companies senior and experienced practitioners 
may be appointed, but not junior practitioners; etc.85
This clearly indicates that the legislature wanted to make sure that only the most 
experienced practitioners are appointed in the larger and more difficult rescue 
situations in order to optimise the chances of a successful rescue of the company. 
Apart from being suitably qualified and experienced, the Practitioner also needs 
to be of good character and integrity,86 and be independent and objective.87 The 
duties of the Practitioner include taking control of the management of the debtor 
company, undertaking an investigation into the financial affairs of the company 
and the drafting and implementation, if approved, of a business rescue plan. In 
order to assist the Practitioner in performing these duties, the Act affords him 
with a wide array of powers including the power to obtain post-commencement 
financing and suspending certain contracts or parts thereof.88
The drafting, acceptance and implementation of a business rescue plan are among 
the most important aspects of a modern rescue model.89 The business rescue plan is 
one of the greatest improvements in respect of the South African rescue model. By 
having to propose, accept and implement a business rescue plan, the restructuring 
82 Ibid., section 131(5).
83 Ibid., section 138(1)(a).
84 Regulation 127, Regulations to the Companies Act 71 of 2008.
85 Ibid., regulation 127(2)(c)(i)-(iii).
86 Ibid., regulation 126(4)(a).
87 Section 138(1)(e), Companies Act 71 of 2008.
88 Ibid., sections 135-136.
89 P. Kloppers, “Judicial Management – A Corporate Rescue Mechanism in Need of Reform?” (1999) 10 
Stellenbosch Law Review 417, at 427. See also Snyman-van Deventer and Jacobs, above note 59, at 103.
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of the debtor could occur much sooner, with the added benefit that certainty with 
regard to the outcome of the rescue is created for all parties concerned.90 The 
business rescue plan will be considered at a meeting of affected persons and 
voted upon by the company’s creditors. The shareholders will only be allowed 
to vote if the plan alters the rights attached to their shares. At this meeting, the 
Rescue Practitioner must present the proposed rescue plan to the creditors and 
shareholders to afford them the opportunity to consider it.91 The practitioner must 
also use this opportunity to inform the meeting of whether he still believes that 
there is a reasonable prospect of the company being rescued.92
The creditors and shareholders may then discuss and raise arguments about the 
plan, as well as cast any vote on a motion regarding the amendment of the plan or 
the adjournment of the meeting to afford the practitioner time to revise the plan 
based on their recommendations.93 When a vote is called, the proposed business 
rescue plan will be approved if the plan received support from the holders of more 
than 75% of the creditors’ voting interests that were voted,94 and if the votes in 
support of the proposed plan included at least 50% of the independent creditors’ 
voting interests, if any, that were voted.95 A business rescue plan approved in the 
abovementioned ways is binding on the company, each of the creditors of the 
company, and each holder of company securities, whether or not that person was 
present at the meeting or voted in favour of the plan.96 This means that the vote 
will also bind the minority of dissenting creditors.
Another important aspect to consider regarding Business Rescue pertains to the 
automatic “stay” or moratorium that becomes effective upon commencement of 
the proceedings. The moratorium on claims from creditors provides the debtor 
company with some breathing room in order to try and facilitate the rescue 
procedure.97 For the duration of the Business Rescue proceedings, no legal 
proceeding against the company, or in relation to any of the company property, 
may be commenced or proceeded with in any forum, except with the written 
consent of the practitioner or with leave of the court and in accordance with any 
terms the court deems suitable.98
90 Burdette, above note 78, at 438.
91 Section 152(1)(a), Companies Act 71 of 2008.
92 Ibid., section 152(1)(b).
93 Ibid., section 152(1)(c), (d)(i)-(ii).
94 Ibid., section 152(2)(a).
95 Ibid., section 152(2)(b).
96 Ibid., section 152(4).
97 Burdette, above note 78, at 417.
98 Section 133(1)(a)-(b), Companies Act 71 of 2008.
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The termination of the Business Rescue proceedings can happen in a number of 
ways. In terms of section 132, the proceedings will come to an end if the court 
sets aside the company’s resolution to place the company under rescue,99 or if the 
court has converted the proceedings to liquidation proceedings.100 The Practitioner 
can also terminate the rescue by filing a notice of termination.101 In the event that 
the business rescue plan is rejected, the proceedings will also come to an end.102 
The proceedings will also come to an end when the Practitioner files a notice of 
substantial implementation of the plan.103
The Compromise Procedure
The alternative procedure provided for in the Act is the section 155 Compromise 
with creditors.104 In the case of a compromise with creditors, the debtor company 
will remain entirely in possession and no Practitioner will be appointed in 
order to assist the company. This type of procedure envisages some element of 
commercial give and take and accommodation on both sides. That is between the 
Company and its creditors. The board of a company may propose an arrangement 
or a compromise of its financial obligations to all of its creditors, or to all of the 
members of any class of its creditors, by delivering a proposal to every creditor 
and the Commission. The company must therefore develop their own plan for 
“rescue”. The prescribed contents of the plan for a compromise are similar to 
those of the business rescue plan.105 The proposal will then be voted upon by all 
the creditors or the class of creditors and will only be adopted if supported by a 
majority in number, representing at least 75% in value of the creditors or class, as 
the case may be.106
The section 155 Compromise or arrangement under the Companies Act of 2008 
replaces the old section 311 procedure of the previous Act. Like the previous 
procedure, the section 155 Compromise also provides for the court to sanction 
a compromise that was reached between the company and the majority of its 
creditors.107 The wording of the Act does, however, create uncertainty regarding 
the need for the court to sanction the proposal: “the company may apply to court 
99 Ibid., section 132(2)(a)(i).
100 Ibid., section 132(2)(a)(ii).
101 Ibid., section 132(2)(b).
102 Ibid., section 132(2)(c)(i).
103 Ibid., section 132(2)(c)(ii).
104 Ibid., section 155.
105 Ibid., section 155(3).
106 Ibid., section 155(6).
107 Klopper and Bradstreet, above note 61, at 553.
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for an order approving the proposal”.108 The wording creates the impression that 
it is up to the company to decide whether or not to approach the court for an order 
approving the proposal or not.109 It does, however seem as though the purpose of 
the provision was for the company to guarantee that any dissenting creditors are 
in fact bound by the compromise. Where the creditors unanimously agree to the 
proposed plan no court sanction will be needed, since section 155(8)(c) provides 
that the order of court sanctioning a compromise is “final and binding” on all of 
the company’s creditors or all of the members of the relevant class of creditors.110
The section 155 Compromise is therefore still heavily reliant on creditor 
involvement despite this procedure being primarily debtor driven. It also has 
certain drawbacks making the process one that is rarely used. The Compromise 
does not afford the debtor company or other stakeholders with the same protection, 
for example a moratorium against claims and proceedings against the company, as 
the Business Rescue Procedure does. The procedure could therefore be improved 
upon by incorporating some form of moratorium or stay (as is afforded under 
Business Rescue). It could also be an expensive procedure if the debtor has to 
apply to court for an order sanctioning the proposal.
Conclusion
In the United Kingdom, the first step towards the establishment of a corporate 
rescue culture was made following the Cork Committee’s proposals by means of 
reforms, which led to the enactment of the Insolvency Act 1986. In addition, the 
Enterprise Act 2002 introduced revolutionary changes to the existing restructuring 
regime of the United Kingdom and importantly promoted a “second-chance 
culture” in a traditionally regarded “creditor-friendly” jurisdiction. Finally, it has 
been argued that the United Kingdom’s current insolvency laws, in particular its 
restructuring and business rescue regime, are performing well in comparison with 
their international peers.
On the other hand, corporate rescue in South Africa still has a long way to go in 
creating a rescue system that is truly reflective of a robust rescue culture. This is 
despite the fact that public opinion suggests support for the Chapter 6 provisions, 
which are even regarded as employment-preservation mechanisms. The buy-in of 
the larger creditors continues to be of paramount importance in moving towards 
the “second chance culture” that already exists in the United Kingdom. South 
108 Section 155(7)(a), Companies Act 71 of 2008.
109 Klopper and Bradstreet, above note 61, at 553-554.
110 Section 155(8)(c), Companies Act 71 of 2008.
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Africa has taken remarkable strides in transforming its corporate rescue sphere and 
the progress that it has made is laudable.
In conclusion, it could be argued that although key differences exist between 
the two jurisdictions, South Africa, albeit still in its toddler steps in establishing 
an effective corporate rescue, could benefit from keeping a close eye on the UK 
corporate rescue procedures and even consider whether it would be appropriate to 
incorporate similar procedures in its rescue regime.
109
Chapter 8
Groups of Companies and the “Recast” 
European Insolvency Regulation
Gerard McCormack
Introduction 
In its Europe 2020 strategy, the European Union refers to fostering economic 
recovery and sustainable growth.1 The objective is to create a situation with 
economic and social systems that are adaptable, resilient and fair; with sustainable 
economic activity and respect for human values. The 2020 strategy involves a 
European Commission Recommendation (and possible Directive) on a new 
approach to business failure and insolvency2 and also possible new harmonisation 
measures on the qualifications and conduct of insolvency practitioners and the 
avoidance of transactions that are antecedent to insolvency proceedings.3 An 
important part also involves recasting the Insolvency Regulation.4
The Recast Regulation was formally adopted by the European Parliament on 20 
May 2015 and was published in the Official Journal on 5 June 20155 with most of 
its provisions coming into force on 26 June 2017.6 The President of the European 
Council has said:
1 See Europe 2020 – A European Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth (2010).
2 See Commission Recommendation of 12 March 2014 – C(2014) 1500 final; Commission Communication A New 
European Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency COM (2012) 742.
3 See generally the European Parliament report Harmonisation of Insolvency Law at EU Level, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/empl/dv/empl_study_insolvencyproceedings_/
empl_study_insolvencyproceedings_en.pdf/.
4 See Press Release, New Rules to Promote Economic Recovery (4 December 2014), available at: www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/NewsWord/en/jha/146041.doc/. For the original European Commission recommendations for 
reform of the Regulation, see Proposal for a new Regulation COM (2012) 744; Report from the Commission 
on the application of Council Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 COM (2012) 743; Hess–Oberhammer–Pfeiffer 
External Evaluation of the Regulation commissioned by the European Commission – see JUST/2011/JCIV/
PR/0049/A4.
5 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of 5 June 2015 (OJ L 141) (“Recast Regulation”).
6 Articles 84 and 92, Recast Regulation.
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“The new legislation, through the protection of creditors and the 
survival of business, will contribute to the preservation of employment 
in these challenging times.”7
The recast does not alter the structure of the original Regulation though it does 
create a new set of provisions dealing with the co-ordination of insolvency 
proceedings affecting members of a group of companies. These set of provisions 
form the main focus of this chapter. First however, it will say something about the 
general philosophy and structure of the original Regulation which is preserved 
largely intact in the Recast.
General Philosophy and Structure
The Insolvency Regulation establishes uniform rules on jurisdiction and choice 
of law and gives the country where a debtor has its “centre of main interests”, 
or “COMI”, the exclusive authority to open main insolvency proceedings.8 The 
decision to open such proceedings must be given immediate, full and unqualified 
recognition throughout the EU.9 If a debtor has an “establishment” within a 
particular EU State, that State may open secondary insolvency proceedings in 
respect of the debtor.10 The effect of these secondary proceedings is however, 
limited to assets within the State.
The general rule established by the Regulation is that the law of the “opening” 
State governs the conduct and effect of the insolvency proceedings. The law 
applicable to the insolvency proceedings is, in general, the law of the State where 
the proceedings are opened, irrespective of whether these insolvency proceedings 
are main or secondary proceedings.11 Article 4 sets out a number of matters which 
are specifically referred to the law governing the opening of the proceedings. These 
matters cover both substantive and procedural issues and include the assets which 
form part of the estate; the powers of the liquidator; rules governing the lodging, 
verification and admission of claims; and the priority ranking of creditors. There 
7 Press Release, above note 4.
8 Article 3(1). On COMI, see the decisions of the European Court in Re Eurofood IFSC Ltd C-341/04 [2006] ECR 
I-03813; Interedil Case C-396/09 ECLI:EU:C:2011:671; Mediasucre Case C-191/10 OJ 2012 C39/3 cases.
9 Articles 16, 17 and 25, Regulation (original text); Articles 19, 20 and 32, Recast Regulation.
10 Article 3(2), Regulation. In the Interedil case, the European court suggested that the term “establishment” had to 
be interpreted “as requiring the presence of a structure consisting of a minimum level of organisation and a degree 
of stability necessary for the purpose of pursuing an economic activity.” See also Re Olympic Airlines Ltd [2015] 
UKSC 27.
11 For a detailed analysis of the Recast Regulation on which this chapter draws heavily, see G. McCormack, 
“Something old, something new – recasting the European Insolvency Regulation” (2016) 79 Modern Law Review 
121; L. Carballo Pineiro, “Towards the Reform of the European Insolvency Regulation: Codification rather than 
Modification” (2014) 2 Nederland Internationaal Privaatrecht 207.
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are however, a whole host of exceptions to the Article 4 general rule and these 
are enumerated in Articles 5-15. The Recast Regulation keeps the same basic 
framework effecting a number of changes by way of clarification, but retaining 
the fundamental structure. For some commentators this is a missed opportunity.12
The generally accepted view sees the European Insolvency Regulation as 
embracing a policy of “modified” universalism.13 The universalist approach 
suggests that there should be a single insolvency proceeding in respect of a debtor 
and this proceeding should apply to all the debtor’s assets on a worldwide basis and 
affecting the totality of the debtor’s legal relationships.14 Insofar as the Regulation 
embodies a universalist approach, this is tempered by the fact that secondary 
insolvency proceedings may be opened in respect of a debtor. These secondary 
proceedings are not simply mechanisms for the more convenient collection of 
assets and their remission to the liquidator in the principal proceedings. The 
secondary proceedings have their own law applying to them with independent 
distributional consequences.
The rival philosophy to “universalism” is “territorialism” and this suggests that 
separate insolvency proceedings may be opened wherever a debtor has assets and 
that, in general, “local” assets should be earmarked for “local” creditors.15 While 
Article 4 of the Regulation can be characterised in a universalist light, the breadth 
of the exceptions reflected in Articles 5-15 detract from this light. In the Recast 
Regulation, Articles 7-18 mirror, while not exactly replicating, Articles 4-15. 
Article 7 in the recast mirrors Article 4 in the original.
In terms of scope, the original Regulation was limited to collective insolvency 
proceedings involving the partial or total disinvestment of the debtor and the 
appointment of a liquidator (Article 1). The language of the recast is much 
12 See M. Veder, “The Future of the European Insolvency Regulation – Applicable Law, in particular Security 
Rights” (2011) 3 International Insolvency Law Review 289; J. Marshall, “The Future of the European Insolvency 
Regulation – Rights in rem” (2011) 3 International Insolvency Law Review 268.
13 See generally on the concept of “modified universalism”, the decision of the UK Privy Council in Cambridge 
Gas Transport Corporation v Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors (of Navigator Holdings Plc) [2007] 
1 AC 508 and the UK Supreme Court in Re HIH Casualty and General Insurance Ltd [2008] 1 WLR 852; G. 
McCormack, “Universalism in Insolvency Proceedings and the Common Law” (2012) 32 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 325.
14 As the US court remarked in In re Board of Directors of Multicanal SA (2004) 314 BR 486, at 521, the 
centralisation of insolvency proceedings “will frequently provide the optimal result for a debtor and its creditors 
alike by preventing certain creditors from gaining an advantage over others by virtue of differing judicial systems. 
A single primary proceeding also minimizes the time, expense and administrative burdens of managing full cases 
in multiple jurisdictions.”
15 For a defence of provisions that ring-fence assets for the benefit of “local” creditors, see the paper by the Singapore 
Chief Justice S-K. Chan, “Cross-Border Insolvency Issues affecting Singapore” (2011) 23 Singapore Academy of 
Law Journal 413, at 419.
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broader. Article 1 of the Recast Regulation states that it applies to public collective 
proceedings, which are based on a law relating to insolvency, and in which for the 
purpose of rescue, adjustment of debt, reorganisation or liquidation:
(a) the debtor is totally or partially divested of its assets with an IP appointed;
(b) the debtor’s assets and affairs are subject to control or supervision by a 
court; or
(c) there is a stay of individual enforcement proceedings against the debtor.
If proceedings are commenced where there is only a likelihood of insolvency, 
their purpose has to be to avoid the debtor’s insolvency or the cessation of its 
business activities. Notwithstanding, the broad qualifying language however, the 
Regulation still only applies to those insolvency proceedings listed in its Annex 
A and it is up to individual Member States to decide which proceedings should 
be listed. The UK scheme of arrangement is clearly not subject to the Regulation 
because it is not listed in Annex A.
In the original Regulation, liquidation was considered to be the paradigmatic 
insolvency procedure. Secondary proceedings commenced after main insolvency 
proceedings had been opened, could only be liquidation proceedings and secondary 
proceedings initiated before main insolvency proceedings had been opened had to 
be converted into liquidation proceedings at the request of the liquidator in the 
main proceedings.16 Now under the Recast Regulation, there is no requirement that 
secondary proceedings should be liquidation proceedings. The original Regulation 
referred to the person who took control of a debtor’s affairs after main insolvency 
proceedings had been opened as a liquidator even though that person might have 
the task of preparing a restructuring plan. On the other hand, the Recast Regulation 
opts for more neutral terminology and uses the expression insolvency practitioner 
(“IP”) throughout rather than liquidator.17
16 See Articles 3(3), 3(4) and 37, Regulation.
17 Article 2(5), Recast Regulation defines an “insolvency practitioner” (“IP”) as meaning “any person or body whose 
function …, is to: (i) verify and admit claims submitted in insolvency proceedings; (ii) represent the collective 
interest of the creditors; (iii) administer, either in full or in part, assets of which the debtor has been divested; (iv) 
liquidate the assets referred to in point (iii); or (v) supervise the administration of the debtor’s affairs.” These 
persons or bodies are listed in Annex B of the Recast Regulation.
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In the original Regulation, the focus was much very on the particular individual 
company and not on its possible status as a member of a group of companies.18 
In one sense, this focus was understandable for the Regulation is more a conflict-
of-laws instrument than a substantive law instrument. Provisions, for example, 
for the pooling of assets of related companies would trench on the fundamental 
principle of substantive company law, reaffirmed by the UK Supreme Court,19 
that a company is a legal entity, separate and distinct from its controlling 
shareholders.20 Nevertheless, the Regulation might have contained procedurally 
oriented provisions enabling the same IP to be appointed to different companies 
within the same corporate group and for proceedings involving related group 
companies to be administered from the same State.
The jurisprudence from the European court has also been generally unsympathetic 
to the notion of procedural consolidation of insolvency proceedings. In the 
Eurofood case,21 it was held that:
“where a company carries on its business in the territory of the 
Member State where its registered office is situated, the mere fact that 
its economic choices are or can be controlled by a parent company 
in another Member State is not enough to rebut the presumption laid 
down by the Regulation.”
In other words, the presumption applied that the COMI was the place of the 
registered office of the subsidiary. Moreover, in Mediasucre,22 the court rejected 
the proposition that a single COMI could automatically be inferred from the 
intermixing of the property of two related companies. The court said that this 
could be organised from two management and supervision centres in two different 
Member States.
The case law in some EU States has however embraced the concept of procedural 
consolidation more warmly. A French Court has said that:
18 See generally I. Mevorach, “The ‘Home Country’ of a Multinational Enterprise Group Facing Insolvency” (2008) 
57 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 427; “Centralising Insolvencies of Pan-European Corporate 
Groups: a Creditor’s Dream or Nightmare?” [2006] Journal of Business Law 468.
19 Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2012] 2 AC 415; VTB Capital plc v Nutritek International Corp [2013] 2 AC 237.
20 See however, Re BCCI (No 2) [1992] BCC 715, where it was held that pursuant to section 167, Insolvency Act 
1986, the court could approve a “pooling” agreement if the assets of insolvent companies were so confused that 
it was impossible to define the assets of each company.
21 Case C-341/04 [2006] ECR 1-03813.
22 Case C-191/10 [2012] All ER (EC) 239.
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“the analysis of the case law of the various Member States shows that 
courts adopt a pragmatic approach tending to allow streamlining of 
strongly integrated groups of companies.”23
In cases like Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd,24 this approach was effectively adopted in the 
UK with the court holding that all the members of a group of companies had a 
common UK COMI despite the fact that the companies had been incorporated in 
different countries.
The Recast Regulation does not preclude the possibility of procedural consolidation 
in appropriate cases. The European Commission in its initial proposals reaffirms: 
“the existing practice in relation to highly integrated groups of 
companies to determine that the centre of main interests of all 
members of the group is located in one and the same place and, 
consequently, to open proceedings only in a single jurisdiction.”25
The main thrust however, of the Recast Regulation in relation to groups is to 
extend the principles of cooperation that apply in the context of main and secondary 
proceedings to insolvency proceedings that involve different companies within the 
same group. IPs and courts are obliged to cooperate and the cooperation may take 
different forms depending on the circumstances of the case. IPs should exchange 
relevant information and cooperation by way of protocols is explicitly mentioned.26 
This reference acknowledges the practical importance of these instruments as well 
as further promotes their use. Courts can cooperate by the exchange of information; 
by coordinating the administration and supervision of the assets and affairs of the 
group companies as well as coordinating the conduct of hearings and the approval 
of protocols.27
The Recast gives an IP standing in relation to insolvency proceedings affecting 
another member of the same group with rights to be heard and to request a stay 
provided that a restructuring plan for some or all of the insolvent group members 
has been proposed and presents a reasonable chance of success.28 In the original 
Commission proposals, it was suggested that the IP with the biggest interest in a 
successful group restructuring could submit a coordinated restructuring plan even 
23 Re MPOTEC Gmbh [2006] BCC 681, at 687.
24 [2003] BCC 562.
25 See explanatory memorandum attached to the Commission proposals COM (2012) 744 final, at paragraph 3.1.5.
26 Articles 41(1) (main and secondary proceedings) and Article 56(1) (groups), Recast Regulation.
27 Ibid., Article 57. Co-operation however, must be appropriate to facilitate the effective administration of the 
proceedings; not be incompatible with the rules applicable to the respective courts nor entail any conflict of interest.
28 Ibid., Article 60(1).
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if the plan did not meet with the approval of the IPs of other group members.29 
But this gave rise to the possibility of procedural chaos with different IPs putting 
forward different restructuring plans. This possibility appears to have eliminated 
in the text that finally emerged. It is provided that IPs:
“should consider whether possibilities exist for restructuring 
group members which are subject to insolvency proceedings and, 
if so, coordinate with regard to the proposal and negotiation of a 
coordinated restructuring plan.”30
Nevertheless, working relationships between IPs will have to be good to ensure 
that the potentially valuable procedural tools provided by the Recast do not become 
instruments for conflict and increased transaction costs.
The same hope and prayer extends with added force to the second aspect of the 
provisions for groups of companies.31 These provisions were added to the original 
Commission proposals by the European Parliament32 and involve the possibility 
of opening group co-ordination proceedings that would sit alongside the separate 
insolvency proceedings opened in respect of individual companies within the 
group. The co-ordination proceedings would allow for the appointment of a 
co-ordinator who would partially act as a sort of “super-mediator” between the 
different IPs.33 The coordinator also has the task of proposing:
“a group coordination plan that identifies, describes and recommends a 
comprehensive set of measures appropriate to an integrated approach”
to resolving the insolvency of group members. The plan may contain proposals 
for the settlement of intra-group disputes or, more ambitiously, to re-establish the 
economic performance and financial soundness of the group or any part of it.34
The amicable settlement of intra-group disputes and disputes between IPs is 
undoubtedly beneficial and so too is restoring the financial soundness of a group 
of companies but it is questionable whether the new provisions will contribute in 
particular to the achievement of the latter end. They may in fact lead to further 
costs and delay.
29 COM (2012) 744 final, at paragraph 3.1.5.
30 Article 56(2(c), Recast Regulation.
31 Ibid., Chapter V Section 2.
32 See the Report from the European Parliament’s Committee on Legal Affairs on the proposed new Regulation 
(A7-0481/2013, 20.12.2013 – the “Lehne 2 report”), at 39-43 and 47-48.
33 Article 72(2)(b), Recast Regulation.
34 Ibid., Article 72(1)(b)(ii).
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Firstly, group co-ordination proceedings may be commenced in any State that 
is administering an insolvency in respect of a group member but where there are 
different co-ordination proceedings instituted in different States, other courts are 
required to decline jurisdiction in favour of the courts of the State that is first seised of 
the matter.35 This rule is however subject to Article 66 which allows for an agreement 
between at least two-thirds of IPs conferring exclusive jurisdiction on a particular 
court. Such exclusive jurisdiction agreements must be recognised and enforced.
Secondly, the IPs of individual companies within the group are not obliged to 
join the group proceedings. They may simply opt-out at the commencement 
stage.36 Thirdly, the group co-ordination plan is not binding on individual IPs, 
even on those who had opted-in, though the latter have a duty to consider the plan 
recommendations and to explain deviations from the plan to the coordinator.37 
Fourthly, to ensure proper implementation of the plan, there is a stay for up to 6 
months on separate insolvency proceedings affecting a group member38 and it has 
been suggested this this stay may act as a real deterrent for supporting any group 
restructuring proposal:
“Individual group companies could choose not to opt in, simply 
to avoid the stay applying, as the stay is expressed not to apply 
to those companies who have not agreed to support the group 
coordination proceedings.” 39
Finally, the costs regime in respect of group coordination proceedings may give 
rise to difficulties. These costs are to be met by participating companies but are 
only to be paid for at the end of the proceedings.40 This leads to the possibility 
that individual companies or IPs may dispute or delay payment when they have 
effectively opted out of the coordination proceedings after having opted in at the 
commencement stage.
Group coordination proceedings are laudable in intention.41 Nobody is obliged 
to participate and a would-be participant can even effectively opt out at a later 
stage. Moreover, before opening such proceedings a court needs to be satisfied that 
35 Ibid., Articles 61(1) and 62.
36 Ibid., Articles 64 and 65.
37 Ibid., Article 70.
38 Ibid., Article 72(2)(e).
39 See Clifford Chance briefing note, Final Text for the Amended EU Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings 
(December 2014) ,at 3.
40 On costs see Article 77, Recast Regulation.
41 For discussion of the cross-border insolvency of multinational enterprise groups at UNCITRAL level, see the 
Working Paper A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.128, available at: www.uncitral.org/.
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the proceedings are appropriate and that none of the creditors of the participating 
companies are financially disadvantaged. The voluntary nature of the regime 
however may mean however that they are unlikely to be much used in practice 
but they may have a use in the “big ticket” cases where there is a high degree of 
coordination among IPs at the outset.
Conclusion
The European Commission has said that:
“Europe is facing a severe economic and social crisis, the European 
Union is taking action to promote economic recovery, boost 
investment and safeguard employment. It is a high political priority 
to take measures to create sustainable growth and prosperity.”42
The Commission has also highlighted the importance of insolvency rules in 
supporting economic activity and recasting the Insolvency Regulation is part of 
a multi-pronged strategy in this regard. The Recast Regulation, or at least the 
rhetoric surrounding it, puts the emphasis very much on business restructuring 
rather than on liquidation but the Recast is not unduly presciptive. It extends 
recognition to a greater range of “pre-insolvency” procedures promoting the 
rescue of economically viable but distressed businesses but ultimately it is up to 
individual Member states to decide what should be included. There is no scope for 
second guessing the decision of individual States about what to include; either by 
the Commission or by other States.
The Recast Regulation retains the same basic structure as the original including 
the concepts of main and secondary insolvency proceedings with the secondary 
proceedings applying to local assets and qualifying the universality of the main 
proceedings. The Recast makes a number of changes to improve the practical 
operation of the Regulation and the coordination between main and secondary 
proceedings. A significant innovation is the new mechanism for coordination 
proceedings involving members of a group of companies. Nevertheless, 
individual members within a group of companies are not obliged to take part 
in the coordination proceedings and may opt out subsequently if the proposals 
emanating from the group coordinator are not to their liking. In the circumstances, 
it is questionable whether the new mechanism will be widely used in practice 
though it may have a role, for instance, in high value, high profile cases.
42 Communication, A new European approach to business failure and insolvency COM (2012) 742, at 2 citing 
President Barroso’s letter to EP President in the framework of the State of Union address on 12 September 2012.
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Chapter 9
Corporate Restructuring: The European 
Recommendation and the Spanish Model
Juana Pulgar Ezquerra
I. The Evolution of European Law towards Distressed 
Corporate Restructuring
For some time now, and to a large extent in relation to the widespread economic 
crisis suffered by European and North American markets since 2007, we have 
been witnessing a paradigm change in the continental European framework as 
regards the handling of corporate economic crises. A progressive move towards 
the model of the Anglo-American countries is occurring, particularly towards 
Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which has traditionally revolved 
around two basic ideas with effective practical results: firstly, restructuring as 
opposed to company liquidation, and secondly, fresh start mechanisms based 
on the North American concept of a second chance, which enables individual 
“honest” debtors to be relieved of unsettled liabilities within the framework of 
insolvency proceedings.1
That is probably why these are precisely the two concepts the Recommendation 
of the European Commission of 12 March 2014 and the European Insolvency 
Regulation (“EIR”)2 regarding a new approach to insolvency and company 
failure is based on, which could constitute a first step towards the construction of 
1 Until now and although the position may change as a result of the European Commission’s initiatives, insolvency 
law and policy within the EU remains fundamentally a matter for each state. As a result, insolvency proceedings 
that are entirely domestic are governed purely by national law. EU law is engaged only in cases with a cross-
border element.
2 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015, available at: http://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/DE/TXT/?uri-OJ%3AJOL_2015_141_R_0002.
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harmonized European Law in the area of restructuring companies,3 and to which, 
for the above-mentioned purpose, the member countries “should” adapt (soft law).4
When focussing on the regulation of business restructuring mechanisms, a 
progressive move can be observed from traditional Insolvency Law, where the 
priority is the creditor settlement, to restructuring Law for companies in crisis. As 
well as looking out for the interests of the creditors as regards settling their claims, 
this framework aims to protect other “interested parties” traditionally described 
as stakeholders (workers, investors), which is in some ways connected to the 
framework for corporate social liability, particularly in the case of large companies. 
In this framework corporate governance and restructuring are intertwined, 
since one of the key elements for successful restructuring is an effective policy 
framework that balances the interests of all stakeholders including shareholders, 
debtors, creditors, clients, workers and the government.
However, the idea of restructuring companies in crisis is not completely new in 
continental European regulation, since it has evolved from the generic idea of 
company conservation in large companies in crisis present in European reforms 
of the 1980s (French prevention from 1984, German co-management…) towards 
restructuring, which despite being most suited to application in large companies, 
can also be applied to small and medium sized enterprises.5
A distinction must be made between business conservation and restructuring 
although restructuring generally involves conservation, in a genus (conservation)/
species (restructuring) relationship. Indeed, in a first instance to conserve means 
not to liquidate, where the conservation, considered in isolation, does not involve 
a selective judgement of the companies that have to be conserved. This led to 
the traditional debate last century on economic judgements about conserving 
or liquidating distressed companies (illiquidity versus insolvency). However, 
this selective judgement is conceptually resolved in “business restructuring”, 
because only viable companies from a structural and operational viewpoint can be 
restructured, despite the existence of financial difficulties (high indebtedness, and 
financial leveraging).
3 See: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/commercial/insolvency/index_eu.htm. See also The Summary of 
Restructuring Insolvency Reforms in World Bank, “Business Reforms for Resolving Insolvency” 2014, available 
at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/reforms/overview/topic/resolving-insolvency.
4 See Cork Committee, Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982); London Approach 
to the Resolution of Financial Distress; INSOL International Statement of Principles for a Global Approach 
to Multi-Creditor Workouts (October 2000). See J. Armour and S. Deakin, “Norms in Private Insolvency 
Procedures: The London Approach to the Resolution of Financial Distress” (2001) 1 Journal of Corporate Law 
Studies 21.
5 See J. Pulgar Ezquerra, La reforma del Derecho Concursal español y comparado (1999, Civitas, Madrid).
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Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that viability cannot always be identified 
with an absence of insolvency. A company could well be insolvent and not be 
in a position to meet its obligations, but could recover this capacity if it were to 
reduce its financial expenditure, which could be achieved by means of a viability 
plan which, subsequent to a “standstill” agreement, would firstly, involve the 
restructuring of the debt (relaxing credit and/or deadline conditions), in addition 
to a disinvestment plan for activities that are not part of the “core” business, or 
are, and require costly maintenance. And secondly, would involve the financing of 
essential liquidity for business activity, and lastly, a reduction in company costs.6
In short, restructuring companies in distress may involve splitting a company, 
mergers, acquisitions or the reorganization of businesses within a company, but 
taking advantage of the goodwill, the intangible value of the company (the French 
fond du commerce or Italian avviamento) and above all, adapting the business 
organization to company needs, which change in the event of economic difficulties 
because of company transformations, mergers, splits, segregations or debt-to-equity 
swaps, all while ensuring jobs are maintained. That is why organisations must 
restructure with an appropriate governance plan in place to meet the challenges 
and benefit from the opportunities presented by an ever-changing environment. 
This once again demonstrates that corporate governance and restructuring are 
intertwined in this framework. Improving governance is viewed as one of the most 
important elements of a restructuring plan.
Even if they could be inserted into the framework of judicial insolvency proceedings 
(a good example of this is the 2011 German reform of the InsO, by virtue of 
the Gesetzes Zur Weiteren Erleichterung Der Sanierung Von Unternehmen or 
“ESUG”). These business restructuring processes are more effective if they are 
tackled at an early stage and extra-judicially by means of restructuring workouts 
between debtors and creditors given autonomy of will to prevent the costs in terms 
of time, money and reputations involved in judicial insolvency proceedings, as 
expressed in the above-mentioned European Recommendation of 12 March 2014. 
In fact, the fear of failure and the stigma attached to insolvency may tend to hinder 
entrepreneurs and also corporations entering into new businesses and markets, as 
they may see the financial and social costs of failure as outweighing the benefits 
of success.
An analysis will be made below of the factors leading to the success of 
“restructuring workouts”.
6 See J. Pulgar Ezquerra, Preconcursalidad y reestructuración de empresas (2nd ed) (2016, La Ley, Madrid).
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II. Key Factors in “Restructuring Workouts”
Restructuring is a long process requiring an appropriate governance plan in place 
on the one hand, and a supportive legal, regulatory and accounting environment, 
necessary for successful corporate restructuring, on the other. The success of any 
new restructuring regime will depend above all on the drafting of suitable laws and 
reforms, and also on the institutional and professional capacity to implement the 
legislation. In this framework:
- “Restructuring workouts” cannot be achieved if general categories of Private 
Law in the framework of the Law of Obligations and Contracts cannot be 
‘relaxed’ or ‘overcome’, in which obligations that are subsequently not met 
or could be breached originate, making restructuring necessary; where this 
enables a renegotiation of the conditions initially outlined in the contract 
(overcoming unanimity to achieve workouts and superseding the principle of 
privity of contracts).
- “Restructuring workouts” cannot be achieved if measures affecting the nature 
of the company are not adopted (company transformations, mergers, splits, 
debt-to-equity swaps), where it is necessary to configure a new framework 
for Insolvency Law/Company Law relations. This on occasions gives rise 
to or reopens debates on the framework of corporate governance as regards 
the function of the share capital, as well as the traditional sovereign role of 
the general meeting and the framework for shareholder-company relations, 
particularly the extent to which shareholders have to be involved in solving the 
economic problems of the company, and in this framework, on their potential 
duty of loyalty to the company, and limits to the distribution of profits to 
shareholders and the protection of creditors.
- It is necessary to introduce rules for the resolution of potential conflicts that 
could arise between minority and majority shareholders, and between the 
creditors, in order to resolve economic difficulties, in the framework of what 
has become known in economic terminology as “agency problems” between 
“corporate insiders” such as controlling shareholders and top managers, and 
‘outsiders’ such as minority shareholders or creditors.7 In this Framework it 
is important to ensure that all major stakeholders in the restructuring process 
feel engaged. It is even necessary to involve creditors holding in rem securities 
in the restructuring process, either voluntarily or through legal mechanisms 
7 See J. Armour et al., “Agency Problems and Legal Strategies” in R Kraakman et al. (eds),“The Anatomy of 
Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach” (2nd ed) (2009, OUP, Oxford), at 35-53; J. Armour 
et al., “Transactions with Creditors” in Kraakman et al. (eds), idem, at 115-151.
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to limit the potential of their privileged position enabling them to prevent 
restructuring, which could ensure the company and jobs are saved.
1. Superseding Traditional Categories in Private Law: Majorities, Relativity of 
Contracts and Potential Majority/Minority Abuses
In order to promote “restructuring workouts”, traditional requirements of 
unanimity, typical of extrajudicial agreements, must be superseded by majority 
rules, where the contents of the agreement can also be extended to dissident or 
non-participating creditors (“cramdown”). This may at first appear questionable 
given the contractual nature of the “workouts”, despite French doctrine accepting 
the introduction of majority rules in contracts some time ago.8 However, it entails 
a need to supersede the principle of privity of contracts.
Privity of contract (pacta sunt servanda) is a fundamental principle in the general 
theory of obligations and contracts, it means that contracts bind only the parties to 
them (res inter alios acta) and not third parties. They neither benefit nor prejudice 
third parties (nec prodest nec nocet). This makes it very difficult to overcome a 
key problem when negotiating a consensual solution to the debtor’s economic 
crisis, namely hold-out strategies, whereby certain creditors do not participate in 
the negotiations, in some instances due to disagreement as to how the value of the 
assets can be maximised, either through insolvency proceedings or a consensual 
negotiation, or even instances where a dissenting creditor tries to use their leverage 
to obtain an advantage.9
The problem of holdouts results from the information asymmetries that 
characterise consensual negotiations, where creditors who do not have access to 
enough information are unable to clearly assess whether the debtor’s offer is the 
best outcome, in terms of their own interests. This asymmetry is minimised in 
insolvency proceedings through the disclosure duties imposed on the parties (“fish 
bowl effect”). In circumstances where blocking by minority creditors amounts to 
an abuse and an antisocial use of law against good faith, legal sanctions exist under 
the various legal systems penalising such abuses (e.g. in Spanish law ex Article 7 
of the Spanish Civil Code, indemnification or damages, adoption of precautionary 
measures to curtail such abuses). However, invoking these remedies requires the 
debtor or another party to satisfy the court that the conduct is in fact abusive, 
resulting in delay, costs and uncertainty.
8 See E-E. Thaller, Des faillites en droit comparé (1887, A. Rousseau, Paris).
9 See ROE, MJ (2996).
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This shows why it is more effective to introduce a legal exception to the application 
of the principle of privity of contract. In this regard, legal systems in for example, 
the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain, have promoted consensual solutions to 
insolvency by acknowledging the right of the majority to modify contracts.10 Thus, 
if a workout has been reached between the debtor and a specified percentage of 
the creditors, the agreement will take effect and be binding for the creditors not 
in agreement, and this even affects secured creditors in some jurisdictions (e.g. 
schemes of arrangement in the United Kingdom).
Overcoming the principle of privity of contract requires, on one hand, sufficient 
notice to be provided in relation to all agreements so the non-participating or 
dissenting parties in the negotiations can challenge the agreement by means of the 
appropriate procedures. On the other hand, it is necessary to be able to neutralize 
potential creditor majority abuses against the dissenting or non-participating 
minority, by enabling those the agreement is imposed upon to contest it as a means 
of defence.
2. Moratorium and Automatic Stay of Execution
In order to achieve “restructuring workouts”, it is necessary to stop or suspend 
the initiation of execution, including in rem securities, against the assets of the 
debtor, at least as regards those required to continue business activities, during 
the negotiation of the agreement and during execution. The reason is to prevent 
debtors from liquidating their assets individually. To this end, the “standstill” 
negotiated between those involved in the agreement is not enough, since it only 
binds and obliges those involved, when it is necessary to employ a “legal automatic 
stay” during the negotiation and execution of the “restructuring workout”, which 
does not depend on the will of the creditors.
3. A New Framework for the Relationship between Insolvency Law and 
Company Law
3.1 Promoting Business Restructuring Measures in Pre-Insolvency and 
Insolvency Proceedings
A company in economic distress cannot be restructured if company restructuring 
measures are not undertaken (transformation, merger… capital increase and/or 
decrease, debt-to-equity swaps). The starting point has traditionally entailed a 
10 I have discussed these topics previously in J. Pulgar Ezquerra, “A Contractual Approach to Over-Indebtedness: 
rebus sic stantibus instead of Bankruptcy” in L. Nogler and U. Reifner (eds), Life Time Contracts: Social Long-
Term Contracts in Labour, Tenancy and Consumer Credit Law (2014, Eleven International Publishing, The 
Hague), at 531-550.
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radical separation of insolvency law and company law. Therefore, on the one hand, 
company measures were taken by the shareholders at general meetings, which on 
occasions led to potential conflicts of interest between majority shareholders, who 
were able to reach restructuring agreements at general meetings, and minority 
shareholders, whose goal could be to maximise their investment in the company. 
This made majority and minority abuses possible. On the other hand, Insolvency 
Law was traditionally restricted to the exclusive adoption of liability plans, devised 
to satisfy the creditors (discounts, moratoriums on settling claims).
New approaches to restructuring law for companies in distress are more company 
oriented, with the exception of classical paradigms of Company Law, which on 
the one hand, have an effect on the sovereign will of general meetings to adopt 
restructuring agreements, where questions are sometimes raised as to whether the 
management capacity of the company really should remain in the hands of this 
body or be transferred to the administrative body, and on the other hand affect 
a new framework of duties and liabilities of the company directors vis-à-vis the 
creditors. In this context, in some of the latest European reforms, the possibility 
of “promoting” or sometimes “forcing” the adoption of company restructuring 
measures has been introduced in the framework for “restructuring workouts” or 
“insolvency proceedings”, where non-compliance is “penalized” by excluding the 
shareholder from the company.
In my opinion, the paradigmatic example in this area is constituted by German 
Law, in the latest reform of the InsO in 2011, by virtue of the ESUG, in which, 
first shareholders are legally prohibited from obstructing the restructuring (Article 
245 of the InsO), and second in certain legal conditions the will of the shareholders 
at a general meeting is replaced by a judicial decision to agree on a company 
restructuring measure, albeit in a framework for insolvency proceedings.
3.2 The Introduction of Solvency Rules as a Limit to the Distribution of Profits
Moreover, there is one area above all others which can have a decisive impact on 
the possibility of successfully achieving restructuring workouts, in which conflicts 
of interest between shareholder majorities and minorities may arise, as well as 
between the right of creditors to settle their claims and the right of shareholders to 
participate in company profits. This area is the distribution of company profits and 
company revenue in the broadest sense (dividends and other similar operations, 
such as the purchase of own shares, financial assistance).
The interests of majority shareholders in restructuring the company, manifest in a 
decision to not distribute profits and to voluntarily provide reserves to ensure the 
Corporate Restructuring: The European Recommendation and the Spanish Model
126 Reimagining Rescue
solvency of the company, may therefore contrast with the interests of minority 
shareholders who are likely to pursue their slice of earnings, as a consequence of 
not feeling “involved” in the restructuring.11 A distribution of profits may give rise 
to the decapitalization of the own funds of the company to the detriment of the 
creditors, and could make the company insolvent in the widest sense of illiquidity, 
or asset imbalance, thereby thwarting the possibilities of restructuring to the 
detriment of the creditors, along with illiquidity (cash-flow test) and imbalance 
(balance sheet test).
The right of shareholders to participate in the profits of the exploitation of the 
corporate purpose, can on occasions contrast with the right of creditors to settle 
their claims. In this framework, the question one must ask is: Should the interests 
of creditors in settling their claims be taken into consideration in an area such 
as the distribution of profits, which is connected to the right of shareholders to 
participate in company earnings, in light of the fact that the above-mentioned 
distribution could impact on the solvency of the company?
The move towards law for restructuring distressed companies has therefore 
reopened the debate on the rules for and limits on the distribution of profits 
among shareholders in the widest sense in companies. This is to a large extent 
linked to the questioning of the functions traditionally assigned to share capital, 
in international forums such as the Report of the High Level Group of Company 
Law Experts on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe 
(2002) (“de Winter Report”), from the viewpoint of protecting creditors in terms 
of the figures for liabilities on the balance sheet of the company and the “principle 
of minimum correspondence” with the contributions of the shareholders, around 
which European Union directives in the field of Company Law are structured, 
particularly the Second Directive (consolidated text of EU Directive 2012/30 of 
the European Parliament and Council of 25 October 2012).
A contrast can therefore made between “systems governed by capital principles”, 
which have been traditional in continental Europe (Germany, Spain), and aim to 
prevent the distribution of profits from eating away at the capital, by placing limits 
on the distribution of this capital, essentially by taking into account the current 
economic situation of the company, and the traditional Anglo-American systems 
based on “solvency rules” or “solvency tests”, in which the economic situation 
of the company is not only considered at the present moment in time but also in 
the future, with a more efficient protection of the creditors, so the solvency of the 
11 See B. Cheffins, “Dividends as a Substitute for Corporate Law: The Separation of Ownership and Control in the 
United Kingdom” (2006) 63 Washington and Lee Law Review 1273.
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company is adopted as the limit on company distributions, where distributions 
cannot be made that place the company at risk of insolvency in the broadest sense 
at the present moment in time or in the near future, and therefore, not only identified 
as a potential imbalance (liabilities lower than assets), but also with illiquidity that 
prevents the company meeting its obligations on maturity.12
To be effective, these criteria for and limits on the distribution of dividends must be 
combined with a framework for the duties and liabilities of the company directors, 
not only vis-à-vis the shareholders, but also as regards the creditors, in which the 
latter take on the liability of the oversight of liquidity as an essential element in the 
execution of the distribution, as will be analysed below. This does not necessarily 
involve changes made to the distribution of company powers, between the general 
meeting and the company directors in for example the Spanish model; the general 
meeting remains the highest body of the company with decision-making power 
and charged with the management and representation of the company before the 
company directors, but rather that company directors just have to take on liability 
for the oversight of insolvency.
This is precisely the model employed in the European Union directive proposal 
on European single-member companies (Societas Unius Personae or “SUP”) of 
9 April 2014, which includes the “solvency test” and the corresponding liability 
regime for company directors as regards distributions made in situations of 
insolvency, or which may lead to insolvency.
3.3 The Appropriateness of Regulating a Framework for the Liability of 
Company Directors vis-à-vis the Creditors
Directors of companies in financial distress need to understand their duties in 
the corporate decision making process and how this may change. Directors must 
also know the extent of oversight they need to maintain over the management 
in such situations. The company therefore needs to review its existing corporate 
governance frameworks and practices. Traditionally, in the framework of North 
American and European Comparative Law, two models can be distinguished for 
defining the duties of the directors of companies in a present or imminent situation 
of company insolvency, and for the resulting framework for directors’ liability in 
situations of business crisis.
12 B. Pellens and T. Sellhorn, “Improving Creditor Protection through IFRS Reporting and Solvency Tests” in 
M. Lutter (ed), Legal Capital in Europe (2006, De Gruyter, Berlin); B. Manning, A Concise Textbook on Legal 
Capital (2nd ed) (1981, Foundation Press, New York).
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Firstly, the Anglo-American model, which sets up a trustee framework for 
the duties of company directors relative to the creditors when the company is 
insolvent, or close to becoming insolvent, depending on the particular regulatory 
framework, without the formal obligation to apply for the declaration of insolvency 
proceedings, and not accompanied by a legal duty for the company to apply for the 
declaration of insolvency proceedings in situations of insolvency.13
The establishment of these duties, which in this model have not been set up with 
the priority of maximizing the interests of the creditors, but rather as duties to 
ensure they can settle their claims, and are treated equally, and which involves 
the inclusion of other interests of “stakeholders” in the concept of company 
interest, over and above those of the shareholders, and particularly, the interest 
of creditors in settling their claims, is grounded in a jurisprudential area (North 
American model, based to a large extent on the so-called “trust fund doctrine”, i.e. 
during insolvency, company assets constitute a fund for creditors, as well as on 
the “insolvency exception”), and sometimes also in a legal reasoning (“wrongful 
trading”, regulated in section 214 of the English Insolvency Act).14
The underlying idea behind this is that, in any present or imminent insolvency 
situation (concepts that vary in accordance with different regulatory frameworks), 
it is the creditors and not the shareholders who are in reality taking on the risk of the 
continuation of the business activity, where it is understood that they are the ones 
who hold the “ultimate financial interest in the company”. The non-compliance 
of the company directors with these trustee duties gives rise to a liability that is 
not legally articulated, causing the exercise of a range of actions jurisprudentially 
(“derivate action” by the creditors; “direct action” by third parties).
This Anglo-American trustee model has the advantage of being flexible and 
providing creditors with a broad margin of protection, but entails an undesirable 
lack of legal security, because the duties are not configured legally. The moment 
in which the duties come into being is not specified, and the actions creditors could 
initiate in response to the activities of company directors are not regulated legally.
13 A. Brown, “Fiduciary Duties of Directors of Financially Troubled Companies: When and how do the Rules 
change?” in Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook (April 1991), at 1-2; R. Hartman, “Situation-Specific 
Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Directors: Enforceable Obligations or Toothless Ideals?” (1993) 50 Washington 
and Lee Law Review 1761.
14 See I. Fletcher, “La recuperación de empresas en crisis en el Reino Unido” in J. Pulgar Ezquerra (ed), Company 
Insolvency in European Law (Monograph Number 1) (2004, Revista de Derecho Concursal y Paraconcursal, 
Madrid); “Cuatro décadas de reforma del derecho de la insolvencia. La experiencia inglesa” (2008) 15 Revista de 
Derecho Concursal y Paraconcursal 49; The Law of Insolvency (2009, Sweet and Maxwell, London).
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In contrast, the model of continental Europe is characterised by the establishment of 
legal duties to apply for insolvency proceedings in situations of insolvency, which 
fall to the company director, and in relation to this, a precise legal framework for 
liability in company law and insolvency proceedings, connected to a large extent 
to the non-compliance of this legal duty, but not only to this. It is also connected to 
a broader framework related to the duty of care required of the company directors 
when carrying out their functions, which in the final analysis, connects with 
the “company interest”, a concept which could conceivably, while recognizing 
the differences, allow for the potential consideration of “trustee duties”, similar 
to those taken into account in the Anglo-American model, in these continental 
European Models.
In this framework the progressive introduction of a framework of company 
directors’ duties vis-à-vis the creditors is advisable in situations of present or 
imminent insolvency, as can be observed in a range of reforms undertaken in the 
European domain.
4. Incentivizing Fresh Money
Another aspect the European Commission Recommendation insists on as a key 
element for the promotion of “restructuring workouts” is the need to incentivize 
the financing of companies undergoing restructuring processes; commonly 
referred to as “fresh money”. Since the injection of this fresh money involves an 
increase in the credit risk derived from the fact that the company is immersed in a 
“restructuring workout”, which could have begun in a present or imminent situation 
of insolvency, the financing must be incentivized in three basic ways. Firstly, it 
must be easy for financiers to recover their credit in the event that insolvency 
proceedings are declared, if in the end, the “restructuring workout” is a failure.
To this end, it is advisable that on the one hand, the concept of fresh money not 
being subject to claw-back is re-established, and on the other, that the credit is 
declared an estate claim (pre-deductible), where its settlement is prioritized, and 
not therefore subject to classification in relation to the other creditors of the debt. 
Lastly, the pre-deductible nature of the estate claim must be maintained even in 
the event of internal financing, when the financing comes from shareholders as a 
loan, or in the event of intra-group financing.
III. The Inclusion of these Elements in the Spanish Model
The Spanish Insolvency Law 22/2003 of 9 July has been amended several times. 
The latest reform was undertaken by virtue of Law 25/2015. The latest reforms of 
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the Spanish insolvency act have promoted a contractual approach to insolvency, 
through out-of-court workouts as a first step or even as an alternative to bankruptcy 
(workouts instead of filing bankruptcy petitions which are still compulsory) 
(protected workouts) in order to preserve going-concern value.
In a first instance, the Spanish model was inspired by the Italian model of “Accordi 
di ristrutturazione”. However, subsequent to the latest insolvency reforms, 
workouts in the Spanish model have been inspired by the United Kingdom model 
(schemes of arrangement), towards which some of the most important refinancing 
agreements in Spain had “fled” (La Seda, Metrovacesa), as had also occurred with 
other companies (for example, Telecom, Rodenstock, Apcoa Parking Holdings, 
DTEK Finance etc.) (Germany until now has not had a legal framework for 
refinancing workouts in bankrupt businesses).
Subsequent to the Law being passed, the Spanish “refinancing agreement” 
model regulations can be said to contain some of the main elements the EC 
Recommendation of 12 March 2014 points to as necessary for the success of 
the workouts. The “unfinished business” of Spanish Law however, is still the 
establishment of effective exoneration mechanisms for unsettled liabilities for 
individual debtors.
1. Over-Indebtedness of Individuals
In the context of the current economic crisis, debtors who are natural persons have 
certain particularities in the Spanish model due to the specific origins and causes 
of their over-indebtedness. While in other jurisdictions the over-indebtedness of 
individuals is mostly related to illness or divorce, in Spain it is primarily caused 
by an over-commitment in home mortgages (beginning around 2007 with the 
real estate “credit boom”). Unexpected problems from lower incomes and higher 
expenditures are less important because the social welfare safety net in Spain is 
quite high.
That is why the principal focus for the government in Spain was at the beginning 
to protect home owners rather than consumers in a more general sense, as 
this is regulated for instance, in the French model. In this context the Spanish 
government using the leeway of the European Supreme Court Decision of 14 
March 2013 (affaire Aziz) have adopted legislative reforms which result in 
high costs especially for mortgage creditors (e.g. Royal Decree Law 6/2012; Act 
1/2013 concerning measures to further debt restructuring in mortgage loans and 
the rents of tenants). Afterwards, the law on enterprises and internationalisation 
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of September 2013 (Law 14/2013 of 27 September) has for the first time in Spain 
introduced a discharge for natural persons.
As a result, exoneration mechanisms do exist in a formal sense, but in contrast 
to the criteria recommended by the EU, which concern strict subjective access 
limits to these mechanisms and the maximum spectrum of debts exonerated, in the 
Spanish model, the access requirements are not overly strict (it is just necessary 
for the insolvency to be deemed wrongful, with no judgements concerning good 
faith) and the exonerated debts are very restricted (public credits, security claims, 
etc. are not exonerated…). The latest Spanish insolvency reform passed on 27 
February 2015 (Royal Decree Law 1/2015) continues in the same vein. It does, 
however, add judgements concerning debtor good faith as a requirement to benefit 
from discharge.
2. Refinancing Workouts in the Spanish Model: Legal Incentives
Refinancing agreements that have been used in the biggest enterprise insolvencies 
or pre-insolvencies in Spain (Martinsa Fadesa, Panrico, FCC, Construcciones y 
Contratas) constitute a pre-insolvency solution to crises of a contractual nature, 
centred on renegotiating conditions in which a contract was originally agreed. In 
the Spanish model, they are characterized by the particularity of not having been 
proceduralized, as has occurred traditionally with the French prevention since 1984 
(prévention et redressement judiciaire des entreprises en difficultés), the latest 
reform by virtue of Ordonnance 2014/326 of 12 March 2014 (portant réforme de 
la prévention des difficultés des entreprises et des procédures collectives), and of 
not having been judicialized.
Indeed, despite debtor and creditors being able to apply to the commercial court 
judge who would be competent in the event of the declaration of insolvency, 
for the judicial approval of the agreement, which enables the basic principles 
of Contractual Law to be overcome, for example in regard to the relativity of 
contracts, where the content of the agreement can be extended not only to those in 
acceptance, but also to dissident financial creditors or non-participants, including 
the holders of in rem securities with particular majorities and conditions, that does 
not mean these agreements are turned into procedures or judicialized, since the 
judge is undertaking an act of “voluntary jurisdiction” (DA 4ª LC 22/2003 updated 
by Law 17/2014).15
15 Pulgar Ezquerra, above note 6.
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However, the restructuring of company debt has not only been sought in pre-
insolvency proceedings, but also subsequent to the declaration of concurso de 
acreedores, in pursuit of fostering conservational solutions through agreement 
in this domain, and also translational settlements that enable the transmission 
of operational productive units. The Law 17/2014 about “Restructuring and 
refinancing commercial debts” (Ley de reestructuración y refinanciación de deuda 
empresarial) introduces legal incentives for protected refinancing workouts:
- Article 5 bis of the insolvency law protects directors of companies under debt 
renegotiations by extending their statutory time frame for filing bankruptcy. 
Thus protecting debt renegotiations even from enforcement actions as regards 
assets necessary for the continuance of business activity carried out by non-
participating creditors (automatic stay), which represents a similar protection 
as in the US Bankruptcy Code (Chapter 11).
- Claw-back protection.
- A privilege for fresh money (new credit for insolvent entities): new money 
provided under a protected refinancing workout within two years from the 
enactment of Royal Decree 4/2014, will be regarded as an estate claim in 
therefore having priority over all other claims except secured claims and the 
privilege is also enjoyed by fresh money injected by specially related persons, 
to the extent it is not made by means of a capital increase.
Alongside this change in the function of pre-insolvency workouts and insolvency 
proceedings, in recent insolvency reforms occurring in Spanish Law, shareholder-
creditor relationships and the duties of company directors as regards managing the 
economic crisis also appear to be evolving, especially when the dilemma faced by 
the company centres on whether to restructure or liquidate.
3. Incentivizing “Debt-to-Equity Swaps”: The Duties of Directors vis-à-vis 
Creditors and Shareholder Liability
In this context, the radical separation between Company Law, in which traditionally 
measures have been taken in Spanish Law related to restructuring, and Insolvency 
Law, aimed at satisfying the settlement claims of the creditors, seems to be on 
the wane given that company measures can also be adopted in pre-insolvency 
and insolvency proceedings. A restructuring measure typical of company law is 
therefore being fostered in pre-insolvency proceedings, which is the debt-to-equity 
swap, for which the board of directors is fully authorized to negotiate. Depending 
on the conditions, and above all, the type of swap agreed, this measure can weaken 
the position of the shareholders to the benefit of the creditors, thereby inverting the 
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traditional pre-eminence of the former over the latter in the adoption of company 
restructuring measures.
The reform included in Spanish Law in the Ley Concursal 22/2003 by virtue of 
Law 17/2014 makes it possible to somehow “impose” this debt-to-equity swap 
on the shareholders, when specific majorities are reached during the adoption of 
the judicially approved agreement, where they are sanctioned if they have refused 
this, with insolvency possibly deemed wrongful (negative incentive), rather than 
the replacement of the agreement of the meeting with a decision of the judge who 
approves the agreement. This declaration, as regulated by Article 172.bis.1 LC, 
would be forthcoming if there were no reasonable cause justifying the refusal, 
assuming the debt-to-equity swap has a legally reasonable cause when this has 
been stated in an independent expert’s report, and in these cases, establishing 
preferential subscription rights for former shareholders.
This calificación culpable (insolvency deemed wrongful) could entail the 
shareholders in question incurring in insolvency liabilities for the coverage of the 
net worth deficit, in other words, in relation to what the creditors do not settle, 
and equivalent to the insolvency liability that could be held by the directors, as 
regulated in Article 172.bis LC. Moreover, in relation to this debt-to-equity swap, 
the company directors are exonerated of liability when they recommend a debt-to-
equity swap based on a reasonable cause, in accordance with the contents of the 
independent expert’s report, even if it is subsequently rejected by the shareholders.
On the one hand, this has the effect of transferring some of the risk 
corresponding to the company director for the management activities of the 
company to the shareholders, and on the other, it has a questionable impact on 
constitutionally recognized principles such as private property and the freedom of 
business initiatives.
In my opinion, this appears to introduce the beginnings of pre-insolvency duties 
for the directors, not only relative to shareholders, but also relative to creditors 
in present or imminent situations of insolvency, since refinancing agreements 
can be reached in both economic situations. Indeed, “recommendations” made 
by the company director to the shareholders as regards the debt-to-equity swaps 
mentioned above, could weaken their position, but would however provide 
the creditors with “a way out”; a way of settling their claims which would not 
otherwise be available.
Spanish Law does therefore seem to be evolving in regard to the duties of the 
directors, from an initial model typical of Continental Europe, centred on the 
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legal duty to apply for insolvency as the means by which it appeared adequate 
protection was understood to be given to creditors, which provided a great deal 
of legal security but perhaps left little margin for the protection of creditors, to a 
model that is beginning to resemble Anglo-American models, centred on the pre-
insolvency duties of the directors relative to the creditors with the emphasis on the 
proposal of certain company law measures, and especially, debt-to-equity swaps.
However, the Spanish model, which regulates an insolvency liability of the 
company directors related to non-compliance with the duty of applying for 
insolvency, but does not include a “wrongful trading” rule, and which is also based 
on the introduction of negative incentives in order to make the shareholders opt for 
restructuring through debt-to-equity swaps, with no consideration of replacing the 
desires of shareholders at the general meeting with a judicial decision, seems to be 
less effective than other models such as German one.
Indeed, a rule equivalent to “wrongful trading” is regulated in German Law in the 
framework of the duties of company directors during the management of crises, 
which is based on the United Kingdom model. This means that legally, when 
the company director learns of or should have learnt of the fact that there are no 
reasonable prospects for the company to avoid insolvency, an application must 
have been made for the declaration of insolvency, and what is more, there is also 
an obligation to have taken:
“every step to minimize the potential loss to the company’s creditors 
which he ought to have taken.”
Moreover, following the passing of the reform of the German InsO by virtue 
of the ESUG Reform in 2012, as part of the insolvency proceedings there is a 
provision for the replacement of the will of the shareholders at a general meeting 
with a judicial decision, in order to adopt company agreements such as debt-to-
equity swaps, on which the company restructuring depends. This model enables 
agreements to be reached, and therefore, company restructuring, and neutralizes 
possible minority or majority abuses during votes and other company matters.
In contrast, the “threat” of calificación culpable (insolvency deemed wrongful) 
in the Spanish model, which could well not be carried through in the end, and by 
the same means, the possible liability of shareholders who unjustifiably refuse 
the debt-to-equity swap, prevents the agreement from being adopted, and results 
in insolvency proceedings being declared, making it difficult (or impossible) to 
restructure the company.
135
4. The Inexistence of “Solvency Rules” as a Limit to Dividend Distribution in the 
Spanish Model
Moreover, as regards limits on the distribution of profits, particularly as dividends, 
the Spanish model can be classified within the so-called and aforementioned 
“capital system”. Therefore in Article 273 of the Spanish Capital Company Law of 
2 July 2010, subsequently reformed on successive occasions (“LSC”), the limit on 
the distribution of profits is set, based on the traditional minimum correspondence 
principle between share capital versus assets. The distribution is therefore accepted 
whenever the value of the net assets is not, or as a result of the distribution does not 
fall, below the share capital, where profits posted directly to net assets cannot be 
distributed, and profits must be allocated to the compensation of losses that could 
potentially exist from previous financial years, which were the cause of the net 
assets value being lower than the figure for the share capital.
In the Spanish model, by virtue of Article 348 bis introduced in the LSC by Law 
25/2011, in order to avoid potential shareholder majority abuses of minorities as 
regards an unjustified and repeated refusal to distribute dividends to shareholders, 
these legal limits on the distribution of dividends are also accompanied by an 
obligation of the general meeting to agree, regarding unlisted companies, the 
distribution as a dividend of at least a third of the own profits resulting from the 
exploitation of the corporate purpose, which can legally be distributed; in other 
words, within the limits of Article 273 of the LSC, where in addition a right to 
individualized separation is conferred on shareholders who may have voted in 
favour of the above-mentioned distribution. However, this rule setting a legal 
minimum and obligatory distribution of profits, as one can imagine, has received 
harsh doctrinal criticisms in reference to the intertwining of company management 
policies and the principle of free business initiative. For this reason, and because 
of the current economic crisis, the application of this rule has been suspended until 
31 December 2016.
All of which could negatively affect the solvency of companies to the detriment 
of the creditors. Indeed, “solvency rules” or “solvency tests” are not envisaged 
in the Spanish model, which means legal dividend distributions could be made 
based on the share capital versus assets ratio included in Article 273 of the LSC, 
which could set the company on course for insolvency, since it is just necessary to 
reduce capital to set it alongside assets, in order to be able to distribute dividends 
while clearly leaving creditors unprotected, since there would be less capital for 
the payment of their credits.
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Precisely for this reason, although “solvency rules” or “solvency tests” are not 
legally included, the jurisprudence of the Spanish Supreme Court is progressively 
introducing these in relation to potential claw-back of the dividend distributions 
carried out during the two years prior to the insolvency declaration of the 
creditors, following the failure of a “workout”. Here, the Supreme Court makes 
a distinction between a “legal distribution” and a “dividend distribution, which 
despite being legal, is unjustifiable”, if it places the company, at the present time 
or in the imminent future, in a situation of insolvency, where this is understood 
to be illiquidity or imbalance, which makes it impossible for creditors to be 
satisfied, because during insolvency proceedings it is detrimental to the estate, 
and, in consequence, subject to claw-back if the distribution is carried out during 
the two years prior to the insolvency declaration (the time factor for claw-back in 
the Spanish model).16
5. The Transitory Regime for “Fresh Money”
The introduction of the privilege of “fresh money” in the Spanish model by Law 
38/2011 was not easy, especially because of the need to reconcile this with the 
protection of the employees, because in relation to a portion of their credits, 
these are also considered estate claims (pre-deductible). However, subsequent to 
the reform introduced by Law 17/2014, the legal regime varies in two different 
time periods:
- Up until 2016 → 100% of the new financing is pre-deductible including 
contributions made as loans from shareholders, where the administrators of 
the insolvency are granted powers to change the order of the payments of 
estate claims (pre-deductible).
- After 2016 → 50% of the new financing would be pre-deductible as estate 
claims, to prevent 100% exhausting the estate claims (pre-deductible), which 
also includes the credits of the employees, and 50% would be granted special 
privilege, which on many occasions would mean the financier would receive 
nothing, having already guaranteed (e.g. with in rem securities) their financing.
During this second period, contributions made as loans from shareholders and 
people related to the debtor are excluded. In addition to not enjoying the “fresh 
money” privilege, they would be considered subordinated credits (Article 92 of 
the LC 22/2003). The subordination of credits would operate by way of a penalty 
16 As in STS 24 July 2014 and 1 November 2014. Previously, outside the insolvency framework, STS 26 May 2005 
(nº 418/2005, Civil Courts, Section 1), where the refusal to distribute dividends was unjustified, because the 
illiquidity of the company could not be proven.
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because of the questionable presumption that, in cases in which shareholders 
have to provide the company with loans, it is because the business in under-
capitalized. The subordination of the credit in insolvency proceedings, would 
involve the postponement of collection, loss of voting rights, and the elimination 
of in rem securities.
These two time periods have probably been introduced in order to promote 
“injections of new money” in the current context of economic crisis. However, the 
lack of a stable and lasting “fresh money” regime, and the harsh “punishment” of 
shareholder financiers in contrast to the situations in other models of Comparative 
Law, for example in France and Italy, do not provide financiers with the stable 
regulatory framework they require, and introduce an undesirable element of 
“forum shopping” in the regulation, which is a disincentive for financiers in the 
framework of the Spanish model.
Furthermore, the new financing in the Spanish model would be protected from a 
potential claw-back, in the framework of protection granted by Article 71 bis LC 
to the refinancing agreement and the acts involved in its execution. In short, in the 
area of “restructuring workouts”, Spanish Law follows the recommendations of 
the European Commission.
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Chapter 10
Crossroads in EU Harmonization on 
Restructuring and Insolvency: Towards a 
Market-based System or One where  
“The Senior takes it all”?
Adrian Thery
I Why Harmonize?
The Recast European Insolvency Regulation of 2015 (“Recast EIR”) has meant 
new progress in relation to restructuring and insolvency. However, the Recast 
EIR is also reaching the limit of what it could regulate bearing in mind that its 
provisions are limited to international jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition and 
coordination of insolvency proceedings. In addition, it must accommodate systems 
that have a different conception of insolvency.
In fact, the Recast EIR is faced with two models that are difficult to reconcile, 
since they are based on practically opposing approaches. On the one hand lies the 
English model, in which restructuring is almost only possible in the framework of 
the pre-insolvency scenario (with its Scheme of Arrangement and its Company 
Voluntary Arrangement), and in which the formal insolvency proceedings are not 
debtor in possession and tend towards liquidation.1 On the other hand, we find the 
German model, in which the pre-insolvency is, at least conceptually, of relative 
importance, and within whose formal insolvency proceedings both liquidation 
and financial and operational restructuring are possible, more similarly to the US 
model, expressly providing for a cram-down in the strict sense. There is a wide 
array of different national systems between both models.
This duality of models that the EIR must encompass has led the Recast EIR to 
the minimum common denominator, to the limit it could cope without opting for 
either of them. This is shown in some points of the Recast EIR that might look 
somehow antithetical, although might end up being valuable in practice: such as the 
1 According to the 2008 Report of the UK Insolvency Service (Enterprise Act 2002 – Corporate Insolvency 
Provisions: Evaluation Report), only 2.4% of Administration procedures achieved a corporate rescue during the 
period 2001-2005.
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relaxation of secondary proceedings as liquidation proceedings; or the possibility 
that a sole insolvency practitioner may be appointed for insolvencies of several 
companies of the same group (although they may have opposing interests); or the 
institution of a coordinator of the insolvency proceedings of several companies 
of the same group, which must not have a conflict of interests (although there 
might be differing opinions at different levels of the group regarding whether to 
reorganize or to liquidate); or the possibility that the coordinator of the insolvency 
proceedings of group companies requests the stay of any of them (likely when it 
tends towards a piecemeal liquidation of the group which may be detrimental to a 
viable reorganization of the whole or to a package sale).
These new features may be partly due to the fact that, sometimes, formal insolvency 
proceedings such as English law proceedings, eminently creditor-friendly, may 
tend directly towards liquidation, without taking into account other interests in 
play, solely for the benefit of the most senior secured creditors. Be that as it may, 
it does not seem that the current European regulation can evolve much more now, 
unless by embarking on the harmonization of the substantive legislation of the 
Member States.
II. The Will to Harmonize
The EU seems to be aware now of the need for a greater degree of harmonization, 
which will be probably not achieved only by the regulatory competition derived 
from the current EIR, but through a substantive harmonization of domestic 
legislation. It was the European Parliament, which, back in 2012,2 after having 
received the baton from INSOL Europe in 2010,3 asked the European Commission 
to analyse the possible harmonization of certain aspects of the domestic regulation 
of restructuring and insolvency. Following a first study in 2012,4 in which the 
Commission saw merits in harmonization, the Commission issued non-binding 
legislation focused on pre-insolvency (the “2014 Recommendation”).5
2 European Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs, Report with recommendations to the Commission on 
insolvency proceedings in the context of EU company law (A7-0355/2011, 17 October 2011), and related 
resolution of the European Parliament of 15 November 2011 (2011/2006(INI)).
3 INSOL Europe (2010), Harmonization of Insolvency Law at EU level, European Parliament, Directorate General 
for Internal Policies, Policy Department C: Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, Legal Affairs, PE 419.633.
4 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the European Economic and Social Committee: A new European approach to business failure and insolvency 
(COM(2012) 724, 12 December 2012).
5 European Commission, Recommendation of 12 March 2014 on a new approach to business failure and insolvency, 
C(2014) 1500 final.
141
The 2014 Recommendation has meant progress. But beyond serving as a 
certain inspiration for some States, it has not been followed by many others. 
The regulatory competition derived from the EIR has already borne some fruit, 
but it hinders genuinely satisfactory solutions given the discrepancies between 
domestic legislation that still exist (and will continue to exist) in the absence of 
harmonization. The 2014 Recommendation already envisaged the commencement 
in September 2015 of an evaluation of the degree of observance of its content by 
the Member States, and:
“whether additional measures to consolidate and strengthen the 
approach reflected in this Recommendation should be proposed.”
Since then, the Commission seems to be aware of the priority need for harmonization 
in relation to restructuring and insolvency, especially due to the Green Paper 
“Building a Capital Markets Union” (“CMU”) of 2015 and the Feedback Statement 
containing the result of public consultation. The latter shows that stakeholders with 
such varied interests such as banks, pension funds, business associations, labour 
unions or research institutes supported substantive harmonization on restructuring 
and insolvency, and not only cross-border provisions. In summer 2015, the 
Commission commenced the selection of the group of experts who must assist 
it in the preparation of a potential legislative proposal containing the minimum 
standards for a harmonized restructuring and insolvency law in the EU.
III. Which Areas may be Harmonized?
In its 2010 Report, INSOL Europe already detected a series of areas in which it 
considered that harmonization could be desirable and feasible. These were mainly 
the following: a possible common test of insolvency as a requirement of a formal 
insolvency process; the formal aspects of lodging and dealing with claims in a 
formal insolvency; certain aspects of the manner in which reorganization plans 
are adopted and their contents; the rules regarding so-called detrimental acts and 
the interrelationship between contractual rights of termination and insolvency; and 
finally directors’ responsibilities. The 2014 Recommendation of the Commission 
has focused on the pre-insolvency (which is inextricably linked to insolvency).6
6 In the words of H. Eidenmüller and K. van Zwieten: “the Commission essentially approaches restructuring 
law in isolation – in stark contrast to the harmonization agenda sketched out by INSOL Europe and the 
European Parliament in 2010-2012, which encompassed various aspects of insolvency and restructuring law.” 
(H. Eidenmüller and K. van Zwieten, “Restructuring the European Business Enterprise: The EU Commission 
Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency”, September 2015, ECGI Working 
Paper Series in Law, Working Paper #301/2015).
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Hopefully, harmonization will ultimately go beyond the above areas. The 
Commission seems to be aware of this. When convening the above-mentioned 
Group of Experts, the Commission named such subjects merely by way of example. 
Thus, areas such as the following might also be envisaged for harmonization: 
the degree of debtor in possession or divestment of the debtor; the possible stay 
and its duration; the treatment of executory contracts and ipso facto clauses; and, 
especially, the features of the reorganization plan and, above all, the cram-down 
feature, whose mere existence and intensity may give rise to important differences 
when facilitating the restructuring of a debtor depending on the State where it is 
located, and consequently the discrimination between nationals of different States 
and their terms of access to credit.
IV. Restructuring and Insolvency Harmonization and Company 
Law Harmonization
Already in its 2010 Report, INSOL Europe warned that even the areas the 
harmonization of which it advocated:
“are affected by non-insolvency law considerations. Therefore, any 
further consideration of reform in an insolvency law context will 
have to take into account other important areas that are or may be 
the subject of European law amendment and reform such as general 
company law.”
Just like restructuring law cannot be viewed in isolation from insolvency law, 
restructuring and insolvency law cannot be viewed separately from general 
company law either.7 This is so especially when, as we will see, an important 
part of the new European reorganization process would have to focus on the 
“permeability of the capital structure”: the possibility of operating a cram-down in 
relation to junior stakeholders and, specifically, in relation to equity8 (provided that 
it is out-of-the-money and this has been resolved by a court with full guarantees on 
valuation). This is also so since the possibility exists that the new capital structure 
of a certain company (i.e. shareholder cram-down) might have to be approved, not 
by a court of the state in which that company was incorporated, but rather by a 
7 As has been denounced, for instance in Spain, by J. Pulgar Ezquerra, “Reestructuración empresarial y potenciación 
de los acuerdos homologados de refinanciación” (2015) 22 Revista de Derecho Concursal y Paraconcursal 67, 
the need exists to “overcome the traditional and radical divorce between insolvency law and company law.”
8 Furthermore, as has been rightly pointed out by T. Richter, “Reconciling the European Registered Capital Regime 
with Modern Corporate Reorganization Law: Experience from the Czech Insolvency Law Reform” (2009) 6 
European Company and Financial Law Review 358, the possibility of reorganizing the capital structure of a 
company through a plan crammed down on the existing shareholders is compatible with the Second Company 
Law Directive.
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court of the state of its Centre of Main Interests (or “COMI”), which does not need 
to coincide with the state of incorporation.
Those connections between restructuring and insolvency law and, namely, 
company law, make harmonization complex, but also justify why the principle 
of subsidiarity kicks in (there needs to be a homogeneous treatment of equity 
cram-down in order to allow any EU court to cram-down shareholders of a debtor 
company incorporated in different states). The impetus towards a Capital Markets 
Union and the necessity to deleverage private debt in the Eurozone also point to 
harmonization in this matter.9
V. Choice of Model for Harmonization: Restructuring Valuation and 
Capital Markets Union
Focus will now be put on the first dilemma (in which policy and technical issues are 
intimately linked) faced by substantial harmonization: which model to opt for, the 
English model or the German-US model? There are weighty reasons to seriously 
consider the German-US model as a reference, like the 2014 Recommendation 
of the Commission already did in several aspects (stay/moratorium, debtor in 
possession, cram-down, super-priority financing).
Dichotomy of the English Model
The English model is based on the following dichotomy: the formal insolvency 
proceeding is conceived, and is in practice, eminently geared towards liquidation; 
in order to carry out a reorganization (financial, since such legislation does not 
provide major tools for operational restructuring) it is necessary to achieve it in 
the course of a pre-insolvency procedure. This dichotomy (reorganization=pre-
insolvency/insolvency=liquidation) only works for very specific times of financial 
crisis, or it only works in countries with an eminently financial economy, i.e. 
an economy formed by holding companies that receive financing and in turn 
own foreign subsidiaries that are operationally restructured in their respective 
9 F. Bornhorst and M. Ruiz Arranz, “The Perils of Private Sector Deleveraging in the Eurozone” (2013), available 
at: http://voxeu.org/article/private-deleveraging-eurozone, who state: “The perils of private-sector deleveraging 
in the Eurozone,: “In the Eurozone, an accelerated clean-up of private and financial sector balance sheets can help 
avoid a protracted period of stagnation (see IMF, 2013). But delays and resistance to work out nonperforming 
loans in the banking system, and lengthy procedures for personal and corporate bankruptcies, increase uncertainty 
over the extent of the problem, and put further downward pressure on asset prices and firm performance. At the 
aggregate level, such feedback loops can trigger debt deflation dynamics. Therefore, in addition to providing a 
supportive macroeconomic environment, targeted policies to support the debt workout should be strengthened 
(see e.g., Laryea 2010 and Laeven and Lareya 2009).”
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countries.10 This explains why the scheme of arrangement is a close reference in 
this financial crisis, but also why the model in which it is inserted is insufficient in 
order to create a system in countries with different problems than those of the City.
It would appear that the scheme of arrangement is a sort of pilot project of the theory 
of “privatization of bankruptcy”: when coupled with pre-pack administration, the 
scheme is tantamount to share pledge enforcement. But this is so even in cases 
where such share pledge does not exist (if the debtor has never granted a pledge 
on his business, it is difficult to accept that it can be taken away from him and 
the rest of stakeholders on a forced sale basis, especially with relation to non-
sophisticated co-creditors). The connected valuation problem is further analysed 
below. Deregulation was at the origin of the current financial crisis and now 
threatens to propagate downstream into restructuring and insolvency; this is an 
additional justification for harmonization at EU level.
Similarity of the German Model
The German model is more similar to that of the majority of the rest of continental 
legislation. Crisis and regulatory competition through COMI have brought about 
the importation of scheme-like instruments by some systems, but they have been 
stopgap solutions born of the current crisis: the architecture of most continental 
systems does not follow the English Law dichotomy.
Financial and Operational Restructurings
A long-term stable regulation should serve, not only for financial restructuring, 
but also for operational restructuring. A model that does not provide the necessary 
legal tools to carry out operational restructuring at least at the same time (i.e. by 
virtue of a stay and adequate treatment of executory contracts) as the financial 
restructuring is a model that is particularly detrimental to equity, especially in 
order for companies to re-adapt to sudden market changes. In fact, it prevents 
shareholders from fully participating in the redistribution of post-restructuring 
value: if the operational restructuring is undertaken after the financial restructuring, 
the greater rents derived from the operational restructuring will only accrue to 
those who are still stakeholders after the financial restructuring (it being likely 
10 In an attempt to confine their scope to holding companies, UK Schemes of Arrangement usually also feature the 
so-called “release of third parties”. Those imply that the UK Court purports to release guarantees granted in favor 
of creditors by other group companies (usually foreign operating companies) different from the scheme holding 
company. Such a release entails that the scheme would extend its effects over companies that are not a party to the 
scheme process, and may also infringe legal principles present in many Member States (i.e. that the restructuring 
of the debt of a specific company cannot impair guarantees granted by a third party, unless the latter is included 
in the perimeter of the restructuring proceeding). For this and other reasons, schemes may face serious problems 
to be recognized and enforced both in Europe as well as in US Chapter 15 proceedings.
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that by then the pre-existing equity might have been wiped out). Focus and efforts 
are nowadays on financial restructuring, leaving operational restructuring under-
used, but that should not drive to understate its importance.11 Fresh money legal 
incentives would also contribute to finance and develop operational restructuring.
Balancing Interests within the System
An excessively creditor-friendly system, which does not maintain a certain balance 
between the rights of creditors and of the equity (like the “level playing field” 
under the US Chapter 11), will facilitate credit but will not induce investments and 
entrepreneurship.12 Entrepreneurs might look for more benevolent jurisdictions, 
especially in times in which the blend of debt and equity is increasingly more 
balanced, and in which R+D investments will make a difference.
The Importance of the Stay
The facet of the stay is important in order to provide the debtor with a breathing 
space to tackle restructuring. This is recognized by the 2014 Recommendation. The 
moratorium in the application of ipso facto clauses in relation to critical suppliers 
is also important, for the same purposes. Both are facets which are protected in 
Chapter 11, but these and similar concepts are nevertheless very restricted in the 
English Law model: the scheme of arrangement, main corporate rescue instrument 
in practice in the UK, lacks such a stay. The lack of a stay is also one of the reasons 
that lead UK to a system where “the Senior takes it all”.
Perhaps rather than allowing enforcement in case of debtor’s difficulties by 
creditors (whose business, in the case of banks, should be more focused in granting 
loans rather than recovering distressed claims, which in fact are usually sold at a 
discount), it might be more important to enable banks to get out of such distressed 
situations obtaining the highest possible price for their claims. Hedge funds are the 
natural purchasers of distressed claims of banks on the secondary market. Hedge 
funds are nowadays displacing banks in insolvency situations: where traditionally 
insolvency has been in Europe a place where banks were struggling to minimize 
11 T. Laryea, “Approaches to Corporate Debt Restructuring in the Wake of the Financial Crisis” International 
Monetary Fund Staff Discussion Note 10/02 (2010, IMF, Washington DC): “To be successful in securing the 
longer term viability of corporates, debt restructuring will often be accompanied by operational restructuring 
addressing the structure and efficiency of the firm’s business through closures and reorganization of 
productive capacity.”
12 S-H. Lee et al., “How do Bankruptcy Laws affect Entrepreneurship Development around the World?” (2011) 
26 Journal of Business Venturing 505: “we find that the less the downside risk involved in filing bankruptcy, 
the more new firms are founded. For policymakers, we suggest that making bankruptcy laws more entrepreneur-
friendly will positively affect entrepreneurship development by lowering exit barriers and entry barriers.”
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loss, now insolvency is becoming a “no banks land” where hedge funds are 
working to create value and maximize benefits.
This is not necessarily something negative. Hedge funds have naturally become 
nimble players in rescuing corporations.13 Because they are ultimately interested 
in the equity, they are also prone in deleveraging, keeping the business alive and 
appointing an efficient management.14 The greater the visibility of a hedge fund in 
relation to the convertibility of a claim into the debtor’s equity, the more a hedge 
fund will be willing to pay the bank for its distressed claim.15 Hence it is critical, 
as we will see later, to provide for the ability to carry out equity cram-down in 
reorganization frameworks (provided equity is effectively out-of-the-money).
Going back to the stay, ideally banks should not lend looking at the collateral and 
its enforceability, but rather considering their debtor’s efficiency and underlying 
business. Otherwise, when the banks are more focused on accepting a certain 
collateral rather than anything else, this creates the so-called “lazy banks” 
phenomenon,16 not accustomed to rely on the analysis of the underlying business 
of their debtors, nor therefore carrying out their function of efficiently assigning 
credit, i.e. distinguishing who deserves a loan in the light of the greater efficiency 
of his services, and not merely due to the effectiveness of his security (which 
may be unrelated to the merits of a certain enterprise, and also stimulate real 
estate business over all others). Still, of course, the fact that secured creditors may 
be affected by an optional stay or by a certain plan does not mean that secured 
creditors shall not be granted adequate protection.
One of the priorities of the 2015 Green Paper is to develop the bonds market 
in Europe. As is well known, the bonds market is much more developed in the 
13 In contrast, Banks recently have become heavily influenced in their decisions by financial and regulatory policy 
to push their distressed borrowers to sell assets rather than reorganize (see S. Woo, “Regulatory Bankruptcy: How 
Bank Regulation causes Fire Sales” (2011) 99 Georgetown Law Journal 1615). When dealing with debtors that 
are “too big to fail”, banks’ reluctance to reorganize by equitizing their claims naturally drives to banks keeping 
debtors overleveraged (the only alternative to equitizing, i.e. a plain write off, being even worse for the banks).
14 E. Hotchkiss and R. Mooradian, “Vulture Investors and the Market for Control of Distressed Firms” (1997) 43 
Journal of Financial Economics 401, show that the improvement in the debtor’s post-restructuring operating 
performance is greater when hedge funds take control of the restructured firm or sit on the board, suggesting that 
these investors contribute valuable governance to the debtor.
15 The visibility by managers concerning the possibility that creditors may be converted into new equity-holders 
in the event of a reorganization entails that the managers themselves avoid power struggles over control rights 
and manage the company refraining from siding with anything other than the business’ interests. In other words, 
visibility by the managers concerning the possibility of an equity cram-down may improve corporate governance. 
There is a direct relationship between the flourishing of the bonds market and the perception that corporate 
governance works properly: P. Coombes and M. Watson, “Three Surveys of Corporate Governance” (2000) 4 
McKinsey Quarterly (Special Edition) 74.
16 M. Manove et al., “Collateral versus Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks” (2001) 32(4) RAND Journal of 
Economics 726.
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US than in the UK, which is due, among other factors, to the US regulation of 
insolvency compared with that of the UK. Some sectors (like the European High 
Yield Association (“EHYA”)17 have been recommending to English authorities 
since 2008 the introduction of US model features in England. But English industry, 
firmly rooted in a bank-based model, has blocked those proposals. However, UK 
seems to begin to understand the merits of, and to coincide with, the US model 
(as recently shown by the introduction of a moratorium vis-à-vis the so-called 
“essential suppliers”, which reminds us of the US “critical vendors”, in the case of 
administration or company voluntary arrangement).18
Taking the UK as a reference for restructuring and insolvency might not be the 
best option when the UK itself is starting to look at the US for such purpose. UK 
law has in this field many great characteristics to learn from, although probably 
is suboptimal as holistic system for restructuring and insolvency: as seen, 
administration most frequently ends up in liquidation, pre-packs are severely 
17 Since 2009, the EHYA has been integrated into the Association for Financial Markets in Europe (“AFME”).
18 See the Insolvency (Protection of Essential Supplies) Order 2015.
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criticized,19 while the most efficient restructuring instrument in the UK is a 
company law institution. By contrast, the US Bankruptcy Code does not need 
major surgery and constitutes a consistent system, simply needing isolated tweaks 
every four decades.20
The Cram-down
As regards financial restructuring, the permeability of the capital structure, 
and consequently, the ability to cram-down equity is essential in most major 
19 Prepacks in UK have been severely criticized for not being transparent and competitive and due to the so-called 
“sweet-heart deals” between management and senior creditors. According to the “Pre-pack Empirical Review” 
previous to the “Graham Review” (based on sample analysis), approximately 63% of pre-packs took place with 
connected parties to the Oldco. In turn, the Sixth Report of the House of Commons Business and Enterprise Select 
Committee (HC198) suggests that only 1% of unsecured debt is paid in pre-packs. As laid out in this Report: “25. 
Public confidence in the insolvency regime is being and will be further damaged. Prompt, robust and effective 
action is needed to ensure that pre-pack administrations are transparent and free from abuse. Unsecured creditors 
tend to be kept in the dark and recover even less than they would in a normal administration. This causes particular 
outrage where the existing management buy back the business and continue to trade clear of the original debts. 
Pre-packs of this kind fuel understandable concerns about illegitimate, self-serving alliances between directors 
and insolvency practitioners. The interests of unsecured trade creditors must take a higher priority, especially 
in “phoenix” pre-pack administrations.” Criticism on UK pre-packs gave rise to the so-called “2014 Graham 
Review” and subsequently to a new draft of the Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (“SIP 16”), which has been 
received with skepticism. In fact, the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 has created a reserve 
power for the Government to make regulations in the future to prohibit pre-packs in case the voluntary measures 
arising from the Graham Report prove unsuccessful. One can doubt whether, for instance, the NRJ Nabisco 
transaction would have been closed for USD 25 billion if the management’s initial USD 17 billion “sweet-heart 
LBO” had been substantiated as an English pre-pack. At the end of the day, a distressed business sale protection 
of junior creditors resembles that of minority shareholders in takeovers (if minority shareholders protection takes 
place ex ante in a takeover, one wonders why it should take place ex post in a restructuring –and only if some 
impaired junior stakeholder, with asymmetrical information, takes the risk to file a challenge). It is questionable 
that a distressed business sale shall be carried with no open doors and real market contrast, unless such business 
is inevitably a “melting ice cube”: however, with certain exceptions, the “melting ice cube” may sometimes be 
a convenient excuse to carry out certain transactions or may be the result of inefficient management (see M. 
Harner, “The Melting Cube Fallacy”, available at: www.creditslip.org). Otherwise, the value preservation of the 
distressed business can be simply achieved through insolvency regulations on ipso facto clauses and executory 
contracts (so as to allow the business to maintain the critical contracts in force during a competitive sale process) 
and new money (so as to allow the business to resort to fresh financing should it need working capital during 
such competitive process). Once stabilization of distressed businesses is possible through such regulations, sale 
of distressed businesses would be normalized, and clients and suppliers would not perceive any particular risk or 
stigma. This would allow for usual M&A (as opposed to truncated) processes to take place, maximizing price and 
creditors recovery. In an article called “For some, Britain’s insolvency laws add to pain” (Reuters, 11 February 
2009), Nick O’Reilly, then president of R3, stated that: “It’s because the company is failing, or has failed, that 
creditors lose money -- not because the business was pre-packed and sold on. In fact, a pre-pack is often the only 
option available to save a business and jobs and avoid liquidation.” Nevertheless, when a business is economically 
viable on a standalone basis, it is difficult to appreciate why it would melt if regulation provides with the necessary 
toolkit to stabilize such business. In fact, the trend as regards section 363 sales in US points precisely in the 
direction of restricting to only properly justified cases the application of the “melting ice cube” theory, according 
to the Final Report and Recommendations released on 8 December 2014 by the American Bankruptcy Institute 
Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11.
20 See the Final Report and Recommendations released on 8 December 2014 by the American Bankruptcy Institute 
Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11: “For more than 35 years, the US Bankruptcy Code has served 
these purposes, and its innovative debtor in possession chapter 11 process, which allows a company to manage 
and direct its reorganization efforts, is emulated around the globe. As with any law or regulation, however, 
periodic review of US bankruptcy laws is necessary to ensure their continued efficacy and relevance.”
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reorganizations. Otherwise, holdouts may jeopardize the entire reorganization, 
due to the veto power of a stakeholder without economic interest. Does it make 
sense for restructuring law to be evolving in the direction of removing veto rights 
of individual stakeholders, while allowing the most junior creditors (equity) to 
maintain such veto rights in relation with debt for equity swaps? It is already 
commonplace21 and we will not dwell on it.22
For the equity to be impaired by a reorganization plan, it must be eligible to be 
included as a class,23 just like any other creditor who is in an unsteady situation like 
distress, which can easily slip into liquidation or upsetting the rights of preferential 
creditors. However, it is important to point out that the equitization of claims, 
given the probable dilution of the pre-existing equity, must be carried out with 
guarantees in order not to violate the right of ownership and not be expropriatory. 
Thus, equity wipe out shall comply with the rights to a fair trial and to effective 
remedy. In other words, it should be carried out with full Court supervision, not in 
proceedings with minimal judicial intervention and a mere sanction, incompatible 
with a serious valuation of the enterprise value (as has been criticized, for instance, 
in the UK pre-pack schemes).24
21 See R. de Weijs, “Harmonization of European Insolvency Law and the Need to tackle Two Common Problems: 
Common Pool and Anticommons”, Center for the Study of European Contract Law, Working Paper Series 
#2011-16. As explained by the AFME, when responding to the consultation of the Commission in relation to 
the 2014 Recommendation: “In recent times, parties have realized that making a restructuring dependent upon 
consents from stakeholders with no economic interest in an enterprise, properly valued, is not conducive to 
an efficient restructuring. However, practice has differed in the resolution of this issue. Our view is that the 
question of whether shareholder or junior creditor consents should be conditions to restructurings (which, if 
not met, would lead to formal insolvency proceedings) will become increasingly important as more complex 
capital structures predominate. The present position is that practice varies. This ad hoc approach leads to greater 
uncertainty concerning stakeholders’ rights and, ultimately, makes restructurings outside administration more 
difficult. This issue is too important to be left subject to the vagaries of each individual case. As a policy matter, 
we do not consider that creditors or shareholders with (on a proper valuation basis) no economic interest in the 
enterprise should be in a position where their “veto” forces full insolvency proceedings or delays otherwise viable 
restructurings. In other words, a judicially supervised process is required to allow a restructuring to proceed 
without the necessity of extracting consent from a class of creditors or shareholders with no economic interest.”
22 For instance, in Spain, the attempt to obtain an effect equivalent to the equity cram-down by other alternative 
legal means has been unsatisfactory. The introduction of a legal threat of potential liability for shareholders and 
directors in the case of unjustified rejection of a lender-led plan has proved insufficient to tackle the problem of 
hold-out of the equity that is out-of-the-money. By way of example, in the Pescanova case (with a debt exceeding 
EUR 3 billion and an ebitda of barely EUR 50 million), the shareholders assembled at a shareholders’ meeting 
(held after the approval of the reorganization plan by the bankruptcy court) agreed to modify the distribution of 
capital among stakeholders contained in the previously approved reorganization plan.
23 Impaired shareholders do compose a class under US Chapter 11, and also in Germany since the 2011 reform of 
the InsolvenzOrdnung (“InsO”) through the “Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen” 
(“ESUG”), which introduced important measures addressed at preventing shareholders to block restructurings 
of a debtor’s capital structure. On the contrary, in a “pre-pack scheme” in the UK, Oldco equity-holders to be 
crammed-down would not even be entitled to integrate in a class.
24 J. Taylor and N. Stewart, “UK: Cram-down of Junior Creditors using Schemes of Arrangement”, Chapter 18 
in H. Gibbon and Q. Carruthers (eds.), Corporate Restructuring: The Breaking Wave (2009, Thomson Reuters, 
London), at 103-106.
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An example of this is that the adequate framework for discussing in depth valuation 
and the appropriateness of such a serious measure as is the disenfranchisement 
of equity exists in the US (the country that wrote the book) within a fully-
fledged process like the Chapter 11 proceedings. The approach of the 2014 
Recommendation on this point has been shown to be delicate. In the words of 
Eidenmüller and van Zwieten:
“A third crucial deficit of the Commission’s RR lies in its minimalist 
approach to the role of the court in the restructuring process. The 
RR would like to have it all: a flexible and quick procedure with 
only minimal involvement of the competent court (see RR No. 7) 
and at the same time permit potentially massive curtailments of the 
claims of dissenting creditors with a minority protection standard that 
is not very clearly articulated (RR No. 22 (a) and (c)). This does not 
work: curtailments of creditor rights can only be justified if the legal 
standards for these curtailments are clearly defined and full court 
supervision and control are assured.” 25
Therefore, the so-called “hybrid procedures” do not ensure sufficient guarantees 
so as to be able to adopt drastic measures in relation to creditor rights, and less still 
in relation to the formal owners of the company. However, that does not hinder 
the possibility of judicial intervention being minimized on other aspects, if the use 
of any of the features available (for example, the stay or the new financing) is not 
required. Process features should work as modules, so that process complexity 
should not be fix, but variable depending on the specific features requested by the 
restructuring at hand (for instance, stay should not be automatic but optional, so 
that the process does not necessarily trigger ipso facto cross-default clauses, for 
instance, in other group companies).
One could think that success in out-of-court workouts may depend on the pre-
insolvency regulations themselves. However, pre-insolvency regulations will 
hardly provide for efficient cram-down mechanisms, since those should involve 
more than light court involvement. On the contrary, success in out-of-court 
workouts depends on the fall-back position that each of the constituencies would 
find itself in lack of acceptance of the restructuring proposal. Stakeholders are 
aware of being bargaining in the shadow of insolvency regulations. Pre-insolvency 
workouts do not necessarily require pre-insolvency instruments, but simply 
25 H. Eidenmüller and K. van Zwieten, “Restructuring the European Business Enterprise: The EU Commission 
Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency”, September 2015, ECGI Working 
Paper Series in Law, Working Paper #301/2015.
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visibility on all stakeholders’ relative positions in case of hold-out, and subsequent 
opening of collective proceedings like Chapter 11.26 Ignoring this will lead in 
the long run to transform current pre-insolvency instruments into fully fledged 
proceedings, when attempting to incorporate in the former the necessary cram-
down and operational restructuring features. It might therefore be more sensible 
to directly improve a Chapter 11-like instrument and, in particular, the ability for 
Courts to rapidly confirm pre-packaged and pre-negotiated reorganization plans.27
Reorganization Plans
Apart from the purely consensual extrajudicial workouts, a model should provide 
for two types of reorganization plan, in which the majority principle would apply 
(both “intra-class” or horizontally between claims of the same class, and “inter-
class” or vertically between the majority of impaired classes or at least one of 
them, as in the US, with absolute priority rule assuring the fairness of the plan):28
a) That reorganization plan to be approved by the Judge with the support of the 
relevant majority of each and every class of creditors: it is the perfect scenario, 
since it makes it unnecessary to consider valuation problems and also renders 
unnecessary the application of the absolute priority rule.
26 Y. Liu and C. Rosenberg, “Dealing with Private Debt Distress in the Wake of the European Financial Crisis: 
A Review of the Economics and Legal Toolbox” International Monetary Fund Working Paper 13/44 (2013, 
IMF, Washington DC): “Fast track court approval procedures refer to those under which the court expeditiously 
approves a debt restructuring plan negotiated between the debtor and its creditors in a consensual manner before 
the initiation of an insolvency proceeding. This technique draws upon the most significant advantage of a court-
approved restructuring plan—the ability to make the plan binding on dissenting creditors or cram down—while 
leveraging speedy out-of-court negotiation process. (…) Achieving effective out of court restructuring requires, 
however, a robust insolvency regime and adequate incentives for creditors and debtors to participate in the 
restructuring. As out of court restructuring takes place in the shadow of the formal insolvency regime, it is critical 
to have in place an effective insolvency law, which provides clear benchmarks to incentivize debtors and creditors 
to reach a restructuring agreement. In addition, a regulatory framework requiring financial institutions to write 
down the value of distressed debt should be put in place, tax disincentives for debt write-downs or transfer of a 
distressed loan to a third party should be removed.”
27 US prepackaged reorganization plans and UK pre-packs (or prepackaged administrations) are completely 
different animals. While US prepackaged plans are reorganization plans negotiated with creditors before Chapter 
11 and confirmed by court swiftly after the opening of the Chapter 11 proceedings, UK prepacks are business 
sales organized by an insolvency practitioner (“IP”) before the opening of the administration proceedings and 
executed by the IP upon his appointment immediately after the administration opening. UK prepack sales are 
typically made to connected parties of the debtor and with no creditors intervention whatsoever. UK pre-packs 
evoke bringing one’s son to hospital and finding out some hours later that all his organs have been donated with 
no consent from the parents, without doctors even attempting to operate surgery on him.
28 For a plan to be deemed «fair and equitable» it must abide with the «absolute priority rule», contained in 11 USC 
§1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) and 11 USC §1129(b)(2)(C)(ii). According to the absolute priority rule, a junior stakeholder 
that is subordinated to a senior stakeholder cannot receive any value under the Plan unless such senior stakeholder 
is also obtaining under the Plan nothing less –and nothing more– than the value of his allowed claims (relative 
subordination agreements are recognized within Chapter 11: 11 USC §510(a)). Absolute priority rule can be 
visualized like a series of piled champagne glasses, requiring that the glasses of the senior stakeholders that are on 
top get filled completely before allowing any value to cascade down to the glasses of lower-ranking stakeholders.
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b) That reorganization plan to be approved by the Judge although it does not have 
the support of the majority of each and every class (cram-down in the strict 
sense): applying the absolute priority rule in order to provide the backbone 
of the reorganization plan and guarantee that it is “fair and equitable” for 
a possible dissenting class, and thus ensure, not only that each receives at 
least what he would receive in a liquidation (the so-called “best interest of 
creditors” test,29 which plays out in an absolute or objective level taking as a 
reference the liquidation value), but even more: that no junior creditor receives 
anything until the senior creditors are not fully satisfied and, as a corollary, that 
no senior creditor receives anything more than the amount of its claims either 
(absolute priority rule hence plays out in a relative or subjective level taking 
as a reference the future enterprise value as a going-concern). It is important 
to note the different valuations that serve as a reference for the purpose of the 
best interest of creditors test (liquidation value) and for the purpose of the 
absolute priority rule or fairness test (future value). This second valuation shall 
determine which stakeholders are in-the-money and thus have a say on the 
reorganization plan: by challenging a possible breach of the corollary to the 
absolute priority rule (i.e. when a junior stakeholder considers that more senior 
creditors are getting a higher recovery than their allowed claims, because the 
equity being received by the latter would supposedly have a higher value than 
such claims). Valuation thus orders the post-emergence capital structure in 
case of cram-down. No major reorganization can be accomplished without 
cram-down features, and no cram-down can in turn be achieved without rules 
on valuation.30
The absence of rules on cram-down, valuation and absolute priority lead to 
unsatisfactory situations, like in the model of UK and other countries, in which:
(i) The disenfranchisement of equity is not carried out by virtue of an ad hoc 
proceeding, but rather by means of an artificial combination of a scheme of 
arrangement (addressed at rescuing a debtor) and a pre-pack administration 
29 The “best interest of creditors” test recalls the EU Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (“BRRD”) “no 
creditor worse off” principle. Equity wipe out is thus not a stranger to European law. In fact, importation of certain 
concepts from the BRRD could be analyzed, such as the general rule of non-suspensive effects of appeals (unless 
a bond is posted) and/or the limitation of remedies to loss compensation.
30 France and Italy have recently introduced certain instruments in order to wipe out equity but, paradoxically, with 
no regulation or guidance whatsoever in relation with valuation, with the risk of being deemed expropiatory. See 
S. Vermeille et al., “A Constitutional Review of the Draft Macron Law introducing Shareholder Eviction under 
French Law: The Revolution that didn’t happen” (March 2015), available at: revue-banque.fr.
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(addressed at liquidating a debtor):31 the so-called pre-pack scheme or 
transfer scheme. In other words, it consists of a liquidation of the debtor 
and a subsequent transfer of its assets and restructured debts to a Newco 
usually owned by the senior creditors, leaving the rest of the creditors and 
the shareholders behind. It is a traumatic solution, only valid for holding 
companies (or simple companies), which can transfer the enterprise as a whole 
without legal or operational obstacles.
(ii) The lack of cram-down in the UK gives rise to it being potentially disguised in 
practice through an artificial class formation (by including possible dissenters 
as a minority in a broader and sole class altogether with a majority of 
supporting creditors).32 The concept of “class of creditors” is a generic concept 
that English courts do not seem to manage to refine.33 This is perhaps why it 
is common to hear in the UK that “class formation is an art, not a science”. 
However, risk of gerrymandering is likely to constitute a serious disincentive 
for non-senior financiers.34
31 Although the City of London Law Society considers pre-pack, quite tellingly, as a cram-down mechanism, rather 
than a liquidation proceeding, in its 18 October 2010 response to the Insolvency Service consultation: “In relation 
to the restructuring proposals themselves, the Insolvency Service may wish to consider the existing cram-down 
mechanisms (such as a pre-packaged administration, the company voluntary arrangement or the scheme of 
arrangement) for binding dissenting creditors” (at paragraph 14).
32 One of the arguments used by UK courts to justify one sole class being formed consists in contending that the 
backdrop of insolvency and the prospect of non-recovery shall unite all the relevant creditors in one sole class. 
This is shown for instance in the recent judgment that sanctioned the Apcoa scheme (Apcoa [2014] EWHC 3849 
(Ch)): “Lastly, in considering the composition of classes, I have sought to stand back and assess more generally 
whether, in the round, and even if I am wrong in my judgment that on analysis there is no difference in the relevant 
rights so as to require application of the second limb of the test, there was sufficiently more to unite than divide all 
creditors within a single class so as to make further classes unnecessary (and see Telewest (No 1) at [40]). (…) It 
seemed and seems to me that the advantage of avoiding insolvency and being able to share in a larger cake would 
sufficiently outweigh the wish to have a larger share than others in a much smaller cake. (…) Accordingly, whilst 
I accept that the risk of imminent insolvency is not to be used as a solvent for all class differences, in this case in 
my judgment it would have caused reasonable Existing SFA Creditors to unite in a common cause.”
33 According to the classic UK definition, a “class of creditors” is to be formed by “those persons whose rights are 
not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their common interest”: 
Sovereign Life Assurance Company v Dodd [1982] 2 QB 573.
34 For instance, three out of five schemes of arrangement related with Spanish companies in the last few years 
featured one sole class of creditors (and, to date, two out of those five scheme companies did already end up in 
bankruptcy proceedings in Spain soon thereafter).
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(iii) No procedure, nor rules, relating to valuation35 exist in order to ascertain 
where the value breaks and who is in or out of the money,36 with the resulting 
uncertainties and potential for unfairness as a result of wrong class formation. 
Few existing precedents in UK37 seem to show that English Courts would 
stick to liquidation value for such purposes. And even if they were to admit 
going-concern value, they would be reluctant to admit valuation of enterprise 
value for a higher value than the so-called “value today” (or liquidation or 
fire-sale value), which is a depressed value – thus allowing a model where 
we could say that “the senior takes it all” (i.e. the equity post-restructuring is 
not taken over by the fulcrum,38 but by the senior class).39 Senior taking it all 
implies that absolute priority rule (and its corollary) is not respected, and that 
valuation is meaningless. It also implies confusion between the best interest of 
creditors test (conceived to protect creditors against abusive plans that would 
entail lower recoveries than liquidation itself) and the absolute priority rule 
or the fairness test (conceived to rightly allocate enterprise value amongst 
35 Taylor and Stewart, above note 24, at 23.
36 The AFME explained in its letter to the Commission of 25 March 2014 in relation to the 2014 Recommendation: 
“Dramatically different allocations of value arise if a liquidation basis of valuation is used as opposed to various 
alternative “going concern” bases. There is currently no consistent method or platform for resolving stakeholders’ 
disputes as to the basis of valuation, short of a company entering formal insolvency proceeding. Hence, somewhat 
crudely, the dynamic that emerges is that often stakeholders are in effect given a choice – accept a particular basis 
of valuation (and it may be a liquidation valuation, which ignores going concern surplus arising from a successful 
restructuring) or see the enterprise go into an administration or liquidation proceeding. Ideally, a consistent and 
harmonized framework should be created for fast judicial resolution of valuation disputes in restructurings.”
37 See the Re Tea Corporation [1904] 1 Ch 12; My Travel [2004] EWHC 2741 (Ch); [2004] EWCA Civ 1734; IMO 
Car Wash [2009] EWHC 2114 (Ch).
38 Unless a different agreement is reached through the Plan, the stakeholders who should naturally be entitled to 
equitize their claims are the so-called “fulcrum security” in the US: i.e., only the most senior class of creditors that 
are not fully repaid according to the Plan – in other words, the most senior class in which “the value breaks” (not 
necessarily, nor usually, the most senior class at the top of the waterfall in absolute terms), because such class is 
only partially covered by enterprise value. The logic of not allocating the new equity in a different manner than 
to the fulcrum security (unless an agreement exists amongst the creditor’s classes) resides in the fact that the 
best candidates to efficiently manage the debtor company are not the creditors whose recovery is assured (senior 
creditors already repaid in full), nor creditors whose recovery expectations are close to nil due to them being 
“out-of-the-money”: on the contrary, those who would best manage the company are those creditors that still have 
a certain probability that enterprise value overflows in their benefit, but only if the company is efficiently managed.
39 Hence losing the opportunity to have a really incentivized fulcrum very efficiently managing corporations 
post-restructuring as the only alternative to maximize value of the main consideration obtained through the 
reorganization: the equity (as opposed to the UK scenario in which it is the senior class –and not the class where 
the value breaks- who gets the equity).
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stakeholders following absolute priority rule).40 This scenario is opposed 
to the US, where absolute priority rule applies and where reasonable fair-
market value or “future value” would be considered, in benefit of more junior 
stakeholders and richer financing structures. Valuation guidance provides a 
reference to distressed investors as to the level of the fulcrum security in order 
to buy into the debt, but also provides certainty to entrepreneurs as to their 
possible entitlements in case of distress. Proper valuation is also a guarantee 
for pre-existing lenders against their post-restructuring interests being diluted 
in excess by new money providers.
40 This in turn justifies why valuation for both tests (best interest and fairness) shall be a different valuation. Indeed, 
if the main purpose of the reorganization plan is to make a company viable and prevent the loss of value derived 
from liquidation, then: why should the value to be reallocated amongst stakeholders (through the plan and the 
absolute priority rule) be liquidation value and not future value? In other words: does it make sense that the greater 
value derived from avoiding liquidation (going concern surplus) shall solely benefit senior creditors, just because 
those would be the only ones to be covered by liquidation value in a no longer existing case of liquidation? As 
explained by M. Crystal and R. Mokal, “The Valuation of Distressed Companies: A Conceptual Framework” (in 
two parts) (2006) 3 International Corporate Rescue 63 and 123: “The primary question is: what is the current 
value of the company’s assets? If the company in question is promulgating a scheme of arrangement which 
amounts to a restructuring of its liabilities, it follows, as explained in Section II of this article, that it considers 
that the value of its business contains a going concern surplus, but that a simple market sale would not capture 
the entirety of this surplus. The value of the company’s assets and undertaking would therefore be maximised by, 
in effect, ‘selling’ them to its existing investors in consideration for a restructuring of the company’s liabilities to 
them. This is what the scheme of arrangement is meant to accomplish. It follows that in order to determine which 
of the company’s current investors retain a real economic interest in the company as things currently stand, the 
value to be determined is the existing going concern value of the company’s business, which, after all, is the value 
the proposed scheme is intended to both preserve and apportion. Assuming that the alternative to the proposed 
reorganisation would be a liquidation, it is difficult to see the rationale of determining the rights of any of the 
parties by assuming the very outcome that the scheme of arrangement is intended to avoid, namely, a liquidation 
of the business and resulting dissipation of the going concern surplus.”
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In other words, the UK has somehow opted for a “Forced Sale” or “Texas Shootout” 
model,41 as opposed to the US’ “Appraisal” model.42 The less information is 
offered to stakeholders before plan voting, the closer their position will be to the 
Texas Shootout model.
The prejudice to junior stakeholders derived from not using a future going-concern 
valuation is escalated by the fact of hybrid-proceedings (such as scheme of 
arrangement) can be initiated (and the plan shall be proposed) only by the debtor. 
This increases the risk of majority senior creditors teaming up with the debtor/
equity (due to its exclusive locus), in detriment of junior creditors and absolute 
priority rule. This is one reason for certain continental companies’ restructuring 
tourism to London.
The UK scheme of arrangement lacks regulation not only on valuation, but also 
on two features such as “third party releases” and –when coupled with a pre-
pack– cram-down stricto sensu. UK scheme seems thus to be embarked in a “race 
to the bottom”, with the resulting uncertainties for stakeholders and especially for 
non-bank financiers that EU is in parallel seeking to attract. Only the extraordinary 
41 D. Baird and D. Bernstein, “Absolute Priority, Valuation Uncertainty, and the Reorganization Bargain” (2005) 
115 Yale Law Journal 1930; (2006) U Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 259: “The junior 
investor would have the option to buy out the senior investor for the amount of the senior investor’s claim. If the 
junior investor thought the business worth less than what the senior investor was owed, it would not exercise the 
option, and the senior investor would end up with the entire business as the absolute priority rule requires. If the 
junior investor believed the business worth more than what the senior creditor was owed, it would have to pay the 
secured creditor in full, again vindicating the absolute priority rule. (…) Whether such a mechanism best serves 
the interests of the parties, however, is not clear. It relies on the junior investor possessing sufficient capital. The 
junior investor may find it impossible to borrow the full amount from a third party because the third party does 
not know as much about the business and will therefore lend only a fraction of the business’s value. The private 
information problem that makes a sale of the business unattractive also makes it difficult for the junior investor 
to borrow the funds needed to buy out the senior investor. (…) In short, there are likely to be practical difficulties 
in the corporate reorganization context with requiring junior investors to buy out senior investors, and a more 
practical valuation mechanism is needed.” This “Texas Shootout” approach was actually verbalized in the IMO 
Car Wash judgment, which sanctioned a scheme that had to argue why the mezzanine was out of the money (IMO 
Car Wash [2009] EWHC 2114 (Ch)): “The Mezzanine Lenders have a safeguard in the form of clause 12 of the 
Intercreditor Agreement. If they really thought that the debts were being sold at an undervalue, or at a price which 
gave the Senior Lenders a good prospect of a benefit in the future which was unfair to the Mezzanine Lenders 
(because it deprived them of that benefit) then they could buy out the Senior Lenders and do the restructuring 
themselves, with the benefits which they claim to flow from the restructuring to the Senior Lenders. They have 
chosen not to do so. They do not seem to want to run the risk.”
42 Idem: “Modern Chapter 11 is the equivalent of a provision in a joint venture agreement that calls for the 
appointment of an appraiser and uses the number that the appraiser sets (or is expected to set) as the baseline 
against which to measure the rights of the parties. Sophisticated parties often bargain to adopt such mechanisms. 
A “put” mechanism based on an appraisal is particularly useful when a partner wants to terminate a joint venture, 
but does not have the liquidity to buy the other partner out, the sine qua non of the dissolution mechanism that uses 
the I-pick-you-choose “Texas Shootout” approach. Like any other valuation mechanism, however, an appraisal 
mechanism comes with its own costs. In particular, in the reorganization context, any valuation mechanism that 
does not involve a transaction that monetizes the senior investor’s position (through a sale of the business or a 
buyout of the position) creates option value in the position of the junior investor. This will be priced into any deal 
the parties strike, which avoids the need to complete the valuation.”
157
quality of UK judges seems to be preventing the UK model to create more negative 
effects on junior financing.
Credit rationing these days does not appear to be due to an absence of liquidity in 
the age of quantitative easing, but rather to the lack of entrepreneurs and of worthy 
projects for lenders. Sophisticated entrepreneurs are likely to choose in the future 
the region where they invest taking into account what would be the valuation of 
their business in case of distress, especially if high R&D investments are expected 
and markets keep turning upside-down overnight, as seems to be the new normal.
Permeability of the Capital Structure
Finally, the permeability of the capital structure, which is implied by the possibility 
of operating equity cram-down, also has other important collateral advantages. 
Indeed, the risk of dilution of the equity operates as a check and balance so that 
debtors will not commence abusive reorganization processes (i.e. for the purpose 
of obtaining illegitimate transfers of value at the expense of other stakeholders, 
who could turn the situation around).43 In fact, if in the absence of consensus 
the equity runs the risk of being diluted in the reorganization process itself, the 
debtor will think twice before commencing a frivolous process that is not strictly 
necessary in order to restructure the company. This is especially true in the EU, 
where separation between equity and management is less clean-cut than in the US.
Such risk of dilution also allows indirectly for three important objectives to be 
achieved. First, it saves the complexities and costs arising from excessive judicial 
control (direct or delegated) over the debtor in order to rule out the possibility 
that the commencement of the reorganization process may have had an abusive 
purpose: in a scenario in which the process may involve the wipe-out of the equity, 
that type of abuses is not to be expected. Secondly, for the same reason, it relaxes 
the need for –and the difficulties inherent in– defining the eligibility prerequisite 
in order to have the reorganization process commenced: it is not necessary to 
demand a situation of insolvency, nor even financial difficulties with a likelihood 
of insolvency – so that one manages to thereby get rid of the stigma otherwise 
associated with the commencement of the process, and also induces debtors 
resorting to it at early stages. Thirdly, the fact that the debtor has commenced 
the reorganization process, risking the possibility of the equity being displaced 
43 If the valuation is low, the equity could be displaced and thus end up being cut out of the reorganization process 
commenced by it. If, on the other hand, the valuation turns out to be high, the protection provided by the absolute 
priority rule should prevent the imposition of a Reorganization Plan that is too onerous for the stakeholders.
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as a result of it, shows the reasonableness of maintaining a system of debtor in 
possession, or with minimal intervention.44
The Problem of SMEs
A sophisticated model for reorganization plans with the cram-down feature might 
only make sense for large and complex corporations, where liquidation entails a 
considerable loss of value due to the inefficiencies associated with the transfer 
of their business as a going-concern: operational, contractual, tax, administrative 
difficulties, etc.45 Reorganization can both allow to avoid formal liquidation of 
the corporate structure and the possible inherent loss of value, as well as prevent 
the sale of the business to a third party at the bottom of the market. Otherwise, for 
SME’s, a simpler process more geared towards an efficient plain vanilla liquidation 
through business transfers might be contemplated: where the small entrepreneur 
really adds a particular personal value or knowledge to the business, he would 
get higher credit than other bidders and outbid them at the auction, recuperate the 
business free and clear,46 and enhance creditors’ recovery.
Where creditors are able to participate at the auction (as opposed to in the UK pre-
pack) the phoenix phenomenon is far from being censurable, but rather a legitimate 
deleveraging mechanism. Besides, the manageable size of SMEs avoids in the 
SME scenario the problem posed by the “Texas Shootout”. Finally, in case the 
entrepreneur is not the winner at the auction of his business, where the entrepreneur 
really adds value to the business he is likely to be offered equity in (or other market 
consideration by) the acquirer Newco for maintaining the entrepreneur’s services. 
This system allows for the entrepreneur to be offered the equity his services 
deserve on a case-by-case market basis (otherwise he might as well team up with 
any other financier), instead of allocating a fix and rigid “prescribed part” to the 
entrepreneur that might not fit nor be fair in every given situation.
44 Especially if the debtor’s period of exclusivity to propose a Reorganization Plan is limited or can be terminated 
for cause.
45 For this reason, the “going concern surplus” can be understood, not only as including the difference in value 
between piecemeal liquidation and going concern, but also as including the possible additional difference in value 
between the business kept as a going concern through a sale and the business kept as a going concern within the 
same original debtor entity.
46 The insolvency regulation of some States, like Spain, prevents entrepreneurs to bid for their own businesses at 
the auction in case of liquidation, in detriment of such entrepreneurs (whom are excluded from the market) and of 
creditors themselves (whose auction is deprived of the bidder most likely to offer the higher price for the business, 
thus prejudicing creditors’ recovery).
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Valuation
Cram-down is a powerful and necessary restructuring tool. However, it must 
come along, on one hand, proper valuation guarantees so as to determine which 
classes are in or out-of-the-money – and, for fairness tests purposes, valuation 
should be performed on a future going-concern basis. On the other hand, features 
like stay/moratorium (on enforcements, involuntary insolvency and/or ipso facto 
clauses), DIP financing and adequate regulation on executory contracts are not 
only crucial parts of the restructuring toolkit by their own right: these features also 
play an important role as checks and balances of cram-down of junior stakeholders. 
Indeed, where these features do not exist, businesses cannot be stabilized and 
seemingly justified outcomes are therefore seen as lesser evils: hasty pre-packs 
and schemes of arrangement based on forced sales valuations. But, of course, if 
businesses can be stabilized in the first place there is no need to resort to hasty 
procedures and valuations.
However, as advanced before, there is also a lesson to be learned from the UK 
swiftness in restructuring. While swiftness cannot be a policy on its own, court 
intervention can be more efficient if it is made variable depending on the necessary 
toolkit necessary for each case at hand. Therefore, for instance:
a) Stay/moratorium is optional for the debtor, i.e. it can be coupled with the 
proceedings depending on the needs of the restructuring, but does not kick-in 
automatically with the opening of the proceedings if not requested by the debtor.
b) DIP financing regime is available but also optional.
c) Appointment of an insolvency practitioner only takes place when the following 
circumstances concur:
(i) The reorganization plan is to impair creditors other than financial creditors 
(lenders and/or bondholders);
(i) In-depth operational restructuring is envisaged, i.e. rejection of executory 
contracts (in which case special eligibility requirements for the opening 
of the proceedings may apply, such as financial difficulties or qualified 
losses foreseen) or labour measures;
(iii) The debtor’s business produces operational losses; and/or
(iv) Section 363-type sales of relevant parts of the business are envisioned.
Finally, reorganization and liquidation paths should not be irrevocable: a sale of 
the business as a going concern should be revocable so as to allow a reorganization 
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plan route to be implemented in case the price of the sale is not deemed fair by 
creditors. Besides, a real market test being driven in parallel to a plan would also 
assist to obtain a more accurate valuation reorganization-wise. Also, if the bidders 
at the business auction know that the creditors can at any given moment rescue the 
asset through a reorganization plan, that would incentivize bidders not to skimp 
on their offers. In other words, ability for creditors to recapture a business from an 
auction and rescue it through a reorganization plan would convey to the third party 
bidders the impression that, even if the business has arrived to an auction stage, it 
is not necessarily a “lemon”.
VI. Concluding Remarks
The degree and tools of harmonization might depend on the response to the 
question consisting of which of the two current predominant models to opt for. 
The option for a model similar to US or Germany allows for it to be an objective 
element (enterprise valuation), which puts each stakeholder in his place. If equity is 
out-of-the-money, creditors are allowed to take control of the company, deleverage 
and rescue it, avoiding its liquidation when viable, and maximizing value and 
recovery. In exchange, entrepreneurs are comfortable that, in distress, they will 
kept as debtors in possession and have an opportunity to undertake an operational 
restructuring before or simultaneously the financial restructuring, optimizing 
valuation and also their position in the capital structure – which is not possible 
in a model of summary judicial intervention based on restructurings restricted to 
pre-insolvency and limited to balance sheet.
Alternative non-banking sources of financing would be propitiated by giving 
comfort to junior financiers (typically bonds) that, should the debtor face distress, 
enterprise valuation will not be a depressed value-today valuation, and that, as 
a result, it would not be only senior lenders who would capture all of the value. 
Finally, in case the difficulties are mainly financial, the collective proceedings 
would allow that, in lack of an arrangement between creditors and shareholders, 
valuation is the basis on which to recompose the capital structure – without affecting 
workers, clients nor suppliers, with which (unless operational restructuring is also 
necessary) business as usual could be maintained as counterparties of critical 
executory contracts, thus minimizing the proceedings’ stigma.
In short, cram-down and valuation are not only a relevant matter insolvency and 
restructuring-wise. In order to promote a capital markets union so as to overcome 
the risks and flaws of the current EU bank-based system, it might be wise not to 
embrace a model where, in case of distress, “the senior takes it all”.
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Chapter 11
Pre-Insolvency Arrangements:  
The Belgian Experience
Melissa Vanmeenen
I Introduction
Pre-insolvency arrangements come in different shapes and colours and the rescue 
approach varies widely between jurisdictions. However all these mechanism 
have in common that they strive to save the business from failure. During the last 
decade the attention for pre-insolvency mechanisms is intensively growing both 
on the national and the European level. Remarkably the business rescue culture 
has recently taken another turn towards European harmonisation. The European 
Parliament kicked off the harmonisation trend with its Resolution of 15 November 
2011 with recommendations to the Commission on insolvency proceedings in the 
context of EU company law.1 The Commission answered this call and outlined the 
importance of efficient business rescue mechanisms for the European market on 
several occasions.
A new landmark in the harmonisation development was the Commission’s 
Recommendation on a new approach to business failure and insolvency (2014).2 
The (non-binding) EC Recommendation 2014 encouraged the Member States 
to implement efficient reorganisation procedures based on the same common 
features. One of the objectives of the EC Recommendation 2014 is to ensure that 
viable enterprises in financial difficulties, wherever they are located in the Union, 
have access to national insolvency frameworks which enable them to restructure 
1 European Parliament Resolution of 15 November 2011 with recommendations to the Commission on insolvency 
proceedings in the context of EU company law (OJ 2013, C153E/01). This resolution builds upon previous 
studies on harmonization: “Harmonisation of Insolvency Law at EU level” (April 2010), available at: http://www.
europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/supporting-analyses-search.html#studies and the following in-depth analyses 
building upon this report.
2 Commission Recommendation of 12 March 2014 on a new approach to business failure and insolvency, 
2014/135/EU (OJ 2014, L74/65) (“EC Recommendation 2014”). See for commentary on the Recommendation: 
K. van Zwieten, “Restructuring law: Recommendations form the European Commission” (2014) EBRD Law in 
Transition 2; S. Madaus, “The EU Recommendation on Business Rescue – Only Another Statement or a Cause for 
Legislative Action Across Europe?” (2014) 27(6) Insolvency Intelligence 81; H. Eidenmüller and K. van Zwieten, 
“Restructuring the European Business Enterprise: The EU Commission Recommendation on a New Approach 
to Business Failure and Insolvency”, ECGI Law Working Paper No 301/2015 – Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No 52/2015, available at: ssrn.com.
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at an early stage with a view to preventing their insolvency.3 In other words the 
implementation of pre-insolvency restructuring tools is a must.
The Member States were invited to implement these principles by 14 March 2015. 
Six months later the Commission published an evaluation report concluding that the 
main elements of the EC Recommendation 2014 are implemented in different ways 
in the Member States.4 Several Member States considered that they already largely 
complied with the EC Recommendation 2014.5 Moreover a significant number of 
Member States, who did not comply, cherry picked from the EC Recommendation 
2014 or stayed inert. The EC Recommendation 2014 did not succeed in having the 
desired impact to facilitate the rescue of businesses in financial difficulty. However 
the Commission is determined to enhance the business rescue tools in the EU.6 
To obtain this goal, the Commission announced a new legislative proposal on 
insolvency by the end of 2016.7 One can anticipate that this new initiative will be 
of a more binding nature. No doubt this new instrument will be a new milestone in 
the harmonisation movement.
Harmonisation of business rescue mechanisms requires a good insight in the 
existing tools to determine the most effective way forward. This chapter intends 
to contribute to this exercise by discussing three topics. The first part will examine 
the concept of pre-insolvency arrangements. Secondly the Belgian pre-insolvency 
arrangements will be briefly discussed. The chapter will conclude with some 
thoughts on the effectiveness of business rescue tools in Belgium. To avoid 
any misunderstanding, it is important to clarify that this chapter only considers 
corporate rescue mechanisms. In Belgium, corporate rescue tools apply both to 
companies and individual entrepreneurs (natural persons).
3 The Recommendation also aims at giving honest bankrupt entrepreneurs a second chance across the Union. This 
objective will not be discussed in this chapter.
4 Evaluation of the implementation of the Commission Recommendation of 12.3.2014 on a new approach to 
business failure and insolvency (30 September 2015), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/civil/files/
evaluation_recommendation_final.pdf.
5 For a detailed analysis of the compatibility of the Belgian legislation, see M. Vanmeenen, “In de ban van 
continuïteit” (2015) 6 Tijdschrift voor Belgisch Handelsrecht 526.
6 See e.g. “Action Plan on Building a Capital Markets Union” COM (2015) 468 final (30 September 2015) 
(Insolvency at 24-25); Commission’s Communication “Upgrading the Single Market: more opportunities for 
people and business” COM (2015) 550 final (28 October 2015) (Insolvency at 6); Commission Communication 
“Towards the completion of the Banking Union” COM (2015) 587 final (24 November 2015) (Insolvency at 10).
7 In order to prepare this new legislation, the Commission sought feedback through different channels. In December 
2015, the Commission set up an Expert Group consisting of 22 independent (non-governmental) experts, who will 
assist the Commission in the preparation of a legislative proposal. The Commission also sought input from the 
broadest public possible though its “Public consultation on an effective insolvency framework within the EU”, 
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/eusurvey/runner/InsolvencyJUSTA1 (closed 14 June 2016). The Commission 
will also take into account the result of the new “Study on a new approach to business failure and insolvency. 
Comparative legal analysis of the Member States’ relevant provisions and practices”, prepared by the Leeds 
University, (Tender No. JUST/2014/JCOO/PR/CIVI/0075) (not yet published).
163
II The Concept of Pre-Insolvency Arrangements
To define the concept of pre-insolvency arrangements is a difficult exercise. Before 
one can tackle this question, a clear understanding of the notion “insolvency” 
is prerequisite. However insolvency is an ambiguous notion with different 
interpretations. Insolvency goes back to the Latin verb “in-solvere”, which means 
“not able to pay”. To simplify the delineation, a distinction between insolvency 
sensu stricto and insolvency sensu latu is helpful. 
Insolvency sensu stricto addresses the state of being insolvent entailing the 
compulsory opening a collective procedure during which the assets of the debtor 
are sold off and his creditors are paid out of the proceeds of the assets The opening 
of such a collective insolvency procedure traditionally requires an “insolvency test”. 
Various insolvency tests exist in different countries. Some of these insolvency test 
focus primarily on illiquidity (e.g. the cessation of payment test or the cash flow test), 
other insolvency tests compare the value of the debtor’s liabilities to the value of his 
assets (e.g. balance sheet test; over-indebtness test). Sometimes different approached 
are combined to determine the insolvency. Insolvency sensu latu regards a situation 
of (financial) difficulties bringing about a potential risk of insolvency for the debtor. 
Pre-insolvency arrangements undoubtedly fit this last category, such arrangements 
are initiated in view to avoid a formal insolvency sensu stricto.
The same view is taken in the INSOL Study on a new approach to business 
failure and insolvency,8 published in May 2014. This study identifies a number 
of problems to formulate a uniform and/or shared definition of “pre-insolvency 
proceedings” due to the differences and divergences in the domestic laws of the 
Member States. However the following general description is proposed:
“Pre-insolvency proceedings are proceedings opened because the 
debtor is in financial difficulties but without any prior insolvency 
test, they involve the applicability of special rules of insolvency law.”
The comparative study distinguishes between confidential and public pre-
insolvency proceedings. Pre-insolvency proceedings differ from full insolvency 
proceedings, which are opened after the insolvency test has been carried out and 
the court has determined that the debtor is insolvent. At the European (regulatory) 
level, the concept of insolvency is often used but deliberately never defined.9
8 Study on a new approach to business failure and insolvency – Comparative legal analysis of the Member States’ 
relevant provisions and practices (Tender No. JUST/2012/JCIV/CT/0194/A4), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/civil/files/insol_europe_report_2014_en.pdf.
9 The need for such a common definition of insolvency at EU level is questioned in the recent Public consultation 
of the Commission, above note 6, in questions 2.7 and 2.7.1.
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The first instrument to be examined is the European Insolvency Regulation 
(“EIR”). Neither the Original EIR10 nor the Recast EIR11 include a definition 
of insolvency. Depending on the context, insolvency refers to insolvency sensu 
stricto or insolvency sensu latu. However the importance and the impact of 
the insolvency concept increases in the Recast EIR due to its broader scope of 
application. The new Article 1 of the Recast EIR explicitly encompasses hybrid 
and pre-insolvency proceedings striving to avoid the debtor’s insolvency or the 
cessation of the debtor’s business activities.
While the Original EIR focusses mainly on traditional insolvency proceedings (so 
called full insolvency proceedings), the Recast EIR considers the widest possible 
spectrum of insolvency proceedings.12 Nevertheless the question whether a debtor 
is insolvent, is always left to the national level. Member States decide exclusively 
whether a national procedure should be considered as an insolvency proceeding 
in the context of the EIR. These proceedings are listed in the Annex to the EIR. 
Both type of insolvency (proceedings) sensu stricto and sensu latu are included 
in the Annex. The second example is the previous mentioned Recommendation. 
Again no definition of the notion of insolvency in this instrument, but the term is 
popping up regularly. A key element within the Recommendation is the prevention 
of insolvency (sensu stricto). A debtor should be viable but a likelihood of 
insolvency (in the strict sense) is required. The objectives of the EIR obviously 
relate to insolvency sensu latu, but the notion of insolvency sensu stricto plays an 
important role to determine its scope of application.
Defining insolvency on a European level remains a hazardous mission, because it 
touches upon the heart of national insolvency laws. Which insolvency test should 
be considered the best one to determine a state of insolvency sensu stricto? Is there 
actually a way to determine the best insolvency test? Which moment in time could 
be considered as an acceptable starting point to turn to pre-insolvency mechanisms 
(insolvency sensu latu)? Under which conditions a potential pre-insolvency 
mechanism should be turned into full insolvency proceedings? These questions 
are hard to resolve and at present the answers are to be found at national level 
only. This brings us to the Belgian level. Belgian corporate insolvency legislation 
is twofold: the Bankruptcy Act of 8 August 199713 and the Business Continuity Act 
10 Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 (OJ 2000 L160/1) (“Original EIR”).
11 Regulation (EU) No. 2015/848 of 20 May 2015 (OJ 2015 L141/19) (“Recast EIR”).
12 Please note the fact that it is prerequisite for the application of the Recast EIR that a proceeding is based on laws 
relating to insolvency (in a broad sense).
13 Loi sur faillites – Faillissementswet (Belgian State Gazette, 28 October 1997), entered into force on 1 January 
1998, 23 amended versions, updated official text available in Dutch, French and German at: http://www.ejustice.
just.fgov.be/wet/wet.htm.
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of 31 January 2009 (“BCA”).14 These acts do not include a definition of the general 
concept of insolvency. Again we note the use of ‘insolvency’ in various situations.
An insolvent debtor (sensu stricto) is an enterprise (natural person or legal person) 
who is not able to pay his outstanding debts (“cessation of payment”) AND does not 
get credit from his bank and/or suppliers anymore (‘lack of credit’). Such a debtor 
is considered to be in a “state of bankruptcy”. Upon fulfilment of both conditions, 
bankruptcy proceedings should be opened. Bankruptcy proceedings are initiated 
either by the debtor, by a creditor or by the public prosecutor.15 Debtors are obliged 
to apply for bankruptcy proceedings within 30 days after cessation of payment16 
or else they might be penalised. Bankruptcy proceedings consist of a traditional 
piecemeal liquidation under the supervision of an insolvency practitioner.
Parallel to the bankruptcy proceedings, Belgian legislation offers other corporate 
insolvency proceedings. These proceedings focus on reorganisation of businesses 
in distress and consequently classify as insolvency instruments sensu latu. These 
reorganisation mechanisms will be further discussed in the next chapter. In view 
of our research on the concept of insolvency, it is interesting to focus on and 
compare the entry criteria. Belgian reorganisation mechanisms can be divided 
in two categories: informal and formal reorganisation mechanisms. Only for the 
second group entry criteria apply. A formal judicial reorganisation proceeding 
can be opened if the debtor faces an imminent or potential continuity threat.17 Not 
the potential insolvency (sensu stricto), but the continuation of the business is the 
key threshold to access this procedure. Moreover this procedure is also explicitly 
accessible to debtors who fulfil the above mentioned bankruptcy criteria.18
In other words, debtors who are insolvent (sensu stricto) can opt for a reorganisation 
procedure instead of a bankruptcy procedure. This approach illustrates the 
determination of the Belgian legislator to save as much businesses as possible 
by introducing a legal preponderance of the pre-insolvency arrangements over 
the bankruptcy proceedings. This brings us to a striking conclusion: the concept 
of insolvency is at first glance irrelevant for Belgian reorganisation mechanisms. 
The principle objective is the continuity of the business activity. More over the 
reorganisation mechanisms are also available for insolvent debtors. Of course 
14 Loi rélative à la continuité des enterprises/Wet betreffende de continuïteit van de ondernemingen (Belgian State 
Gazette, 9 February 2009), entered into force on 1 April 2009, 6 amended versions, updated official text available 
in Dutch, French and German from the same website mentioned above note 13.
15 Article 6, Bankruptcy Act.
16 Ibid., Article 9.
17 Article 16, BCA.
18 Ibid., Article 23.
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in the end prevention of insolvency will be the ultimate result, when the debtor 
succeeds to rescue his business (activity) by way of a reorganisation mechanism.
The preceding brief observations do not reveal a clear answer to the delineation 
question regarding pre-insolvency arrangements. The pre-insolvency period is 
vague, depends on the angle taken and is determined by national parameters. 
To solve this issue and to confine potential misunderstanding of this paper, the 
following working hypothesis is put forward. Pre-insolvency arrangements should 
be understood as all mechanisms available to the debtor to prevent a (potential) 
piecemeal liquidation procedure.19
III Pre-Insolvency Arrangements in Belgium
The table below offers a bird eye view of the corporate insolvency proceedings 
available in Belgium. The first two columns encompass reorganisation tools, 
while the third column considers the traditional liquidation procedure. Taking into 
account the working hypothesis explained above, the latter will not be further 
discussed in this chapter. This part focusses on the Belgian reorganisation tools 
which could be considered as pre-insolvency arrangements. As stated above, two 
different tracks of reorganisation mechanisms are distinguished: the informal 
reorganisation (first column) and the formal reorganisation (second column). Both 
ways of reorganisation are handled exclusively by the Commercial Courts.
Table 9.1. Map of Belgian Procedures
PRE-INSOLVENCY ARRANGEMENTS LIQUIDATION
Informal 
reorganisation/ 
Out-of-court
No procedure 
No stay
Formal reorganisation 
Judicial reorganisation procedure
Court supervised procedure 
Moratorium period – general stay for all creditors 
Debtor in possession
Bankruptcy
Court supervised 
procedure 
Liquidator
Amicable 
agreement 
Art 15, BCA
Amicable 
agreement 
Art 43, BCA
Collective 
agreement 
Arts 44-58, BCA 
Reorganisation 
plan 
Simple vote by 
creditors 
Court confirmation
Transfer of 
business under 
court supervision 
(going concern) 
Arts 59-70/1, BCA
Bankruptcy 
procedure 
Bankruptcy Act
Business 
mediator 
Art 13, BCA
Annex A, EIR Annex A, EIR EC 
Recommendation 
2014
Annex A, EIR Annex A, EIR
19 Companies or natural persons with a commercial business activity.
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Informal Reorganisation Track
The informal reorganisation track offers different possibilities depending on the 
situation of the debtor: the appointment of a business mediator,20 the appointment 
of an interim administrator21 and the informal amicable settlement.22 All of the 
mechanisms are confidential and low cost recue tools.
The informal amicable agreement is the principal reorganisation mechanism and is 
mainly governed by contract law. A debtor can negotiate an amicable agreement 
with at least two creditors. The settlement only involves creditors who take part in 
the negotiations and voluntarily agree to be bound by the settlement. The parties 
to this amicable agreement are free to determine its content. There is no strict legal 
framework that should be taken into account. It is possible to file the settlement 
at the commercial court. In that case the amicable agreement will not be reviewed 
or approved by the court, the agreement remains strictly confidential. There is no 
obligation to file the amicable agreement, however such filing offers a considerable 
advantage: payments executed in good faith under the settlement will be protected 
against avoidance actions23 in future bankruptcy proceedings. It is important to 
note the difference between an informal amicable settlement (Article 15 of the 
BCA) and a formal amicable settlement in the BCA (Article 43 of the BCA). The 
basic features are the same, but the first option:
(1) does not entail a moratorium for the creditors;
(2) is not a formal and public procedure involving court supervision; and
(3) remains confidential at all times.
A business mediator is appointed by the Commercial Court at the sole request of 
the debtor.24 No other parties may request such an appointment. The main task of 
a business mediator is to facilitate the reorganisation of the business. A business 
mediator will analyse the problems of the debtor and will suggest solutions 
to rescue the business. Commonly the mediator will assist the debtor with the 
negotiation of an informal amicable agreement. It is important to know that a 
business mediator is not an administrator, the debtor remains in full control of 
his business.
20 Article 13, BCA.
21 Ibid., Article 14.
22 Ibid., Article 15.
23 Payments, which are envisaged in Articles 17, 2° and 18, Bankruptcy Act.
24 Article 13; BCA.
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Before the opening of a formal judicial reorganisation proceeding, an interim 
administrator may by appointed by the president of the Commercial Court at the 
request of any interested party in accordance with Article 14 of the BCA. This 
appointment serves as a protective measure in case of gross mismanagement of 
the debtor or its corporate bodies threatening the continuity of the business. The 
tasks and powers of an interim administrator are determined by the court taking 
into account the specific facts of the case.
All three of the informal mechanisms discussed above should be considered as pre-
insolvency arrangements. These mechanisms can be used by the debtor to avoid 
a formal bankruptcy procedure. However none of these mechanisms are included 
in the EIR, neither do they correspond with the basic features proposed by the EC 
Recommendation 2014. This situation could be partially explained by the informal 
and therefore confidential nature of the mechanisms.
To conclude this brief overview of informal reorganisation tools in Belgium, a 
concise observation on a specific court-driven prevention tool, the so-called 
commercial investigation procedure,25 is indispensable. This technique consists 
of Commercial Court judges monitoring the financial situation of troubled 
businesses and inviting them to appear in court if their difficulties appear to be 
heading towards bankruptcy. By doing so, the court seeks to prevent undertakings 
from becoming insolvent by encouraging reorganisation at early signs of trouble. 
Although this mechanism’s purpose is bankruptcy prevention, we hesitate to 
classify the commercial investigation procedure as a pre-insolvency arrangement. 
These court activities should rather be considered as a supporting measure to 
promote the actual pre-insolvency arrangements discussed above. For the same 
reason the commercial investigation procedure is left out in the table above.
Formal Reorganisation Track
The judicial reorganisation procedure constitutes the formal reorganisation track 
under the BCA. As a rule this public procedure is initiated at the request of the 
debtor.26 The judicial reorganisation entails a general moratorium granted by the 
court to protect the debtor from his creditors by suspending their rights.27 The 
25 Enquête commerciale – Handelsonderzoek, see Articles 5-12, BCA. For a detailed analysis, please refer to 
M. Vanmeenen, “Corporate Rescue in Belgium”, in M. Veder and P. Omar (eds), Teaching and Research in 
International Insolvency Law: Challenges and Opportunities (2015, INSOL Europe Academic Forum and 
NACIIL, Nottingham), at 84-87.
26 Article 59, BCA, stating that, exceptionally, the procedure can be introduced by a creditor or the public prosecutor.
27 Ibid., Articles 30-34. The stay of individual enforcement actions is also binding upon secured and preferential 
creditors, see Recommendation 10, EC Recommendation 2014. The need for such a general moratorium is 
questioned in the recent Public consultation of the Commission, above note 6, in questions 2.9-2.9.2.
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moratorium is granted for a maximum initial period of 6 months,28 with unlimited 
possibilities for renewal up to 12 months.29 Commonly the debtor remains in 
possession and is trusted to conduct his business without any court intervention. 
Exceptionally, in fraudulent cases, the debtor or its directors can be divested and 
replaced by an administrator.30 This debtor-in-possession regime fits both the EC 
Recommendation 201431 and the Recast EIR.32
During the moratorium period the debtor will start a reorganisation exercise. The 
judicial reorganisation procedure offers three restructuring options: an amicable 
agreement, a collective agreement or a transfer of business under court supervision. 
An amicable agreement33 consists of a (contractual) settlement between the 
debtor and at least two creditors. These creditors need to agree with the proposed 
restructuring measures, e.g. deferral of payments, debt reductions, etc. The debtor 
determines which measures he considers to be appropriate and to whom he will 
propose them. However a creditor will only be bound by these measures, if he 
accepts them explicitly. Exceptionally the court can impose a payment deferral 
without the consent of the creditor. Once agreed upon, the amicable agreement will 
be presented to and acknowledged by the court34 and the judicial reorganisation 
procedure will end.
The second option, the collective agreement,35 is by far the most popular 
reorganisation tool. The debtor will prepare a reorganisation plan which is 
submitted to a vote of all creditors involved in the plan. The reorganisation plan 
can propose restructuring measures such as instalment periods, debt reductions 
(principal claim and interest), debt-equity conversion, a restricted right to set off 
claims, transfer of business, etc. The time limit of all proposed measures is set 
at five years maximum. As a rule all creditors should recover at least 15% of 
28 Ibid., Article 24. Please note that the moratorium granted by the court, may vary from case to case.
29 Ibid., Article 38. In exceptional circumstances the moratorium can be extended up to 18 or 24 months (see Articles 
38 and 60, BCA).
30 Ibid., Article 28.
31 See Recital (17) and Recommendation 6(b), EC Recommendation 2014.
32 See Article 1, Recast EIR.
33 Article 43, BCA. Please note the difference between the formal amicable settlement with moratorium and the 
previously discussed informal settlement without moratorium (Article 15, BCA).
34 The settlement should not be approved by the court. However the judicial acknowledgment does offer an 
advantage: payments conducted in the course of the amicable settlement will be protected against claw back 
actions in subsequent bankruptcy proceedings.
35 Articles 44-58, BCA.
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their claim.36 The reorganisation plan will be binding on all creditors,37 when it is 
approved by a majority38 of creditors and ratified by the court.39
The transfer of business under court supervision40 is the third reorganisation option. 
In such a case the court will order the transfer of all or part of the business activity, 
either with or without the debtors’ consent. Once the court decides to initiate 
the transfer, the debtor is no longer in charge of the reorganisation process. The 
transfer is prepared and effectuated by the court representative, who will search 
the relevant market for the best offers. Once a reasonable offer for the business 
activities has been selected, the court will hear the various stakeholders, including 
the creditors, and will approve, where appropriate subject to conditions, or reject 
the sale. Following the completion of the sale of the business, the proceeds of the 
sale are distributed by the court representative among the creditors taking into 
account any existing security interests. This distribution process is very similar to 
a distribution in a bankruptcy.
The transfer of business under the BCA is therefore perceived as an alternative 
to bankruptcy. Preserving (going concern) value and employment are considered 
to be the main (expected) benefits of the transfer procedure vis-à-vis a traditional 
bankruptcy procedure. It should be emphasized that the transfer of business under 
court supervision is different from a prepack regime: the transfer is initiated by a 
court decision, the implementation is supervised by the court and finally the court 
decides if, by whom and at which price the business activity is transferred.
Finally the qualification of the formal judicial reorganisation procedure as a pre-
insolvency arrangement requires some concluding observations. The interaction 
between the application criteria of the judicial reorganisation procedure and the 
working hypothesis stated above instigates a potential paradox. The judicial 
reorganisation procedure should be considered as a pre-insolvency arrangement 
because it is accessible to businesses that suffer an imminent or potential continuity 
threat. However the fact that this procedure is also available for insolvent debtors 
36 Ibid., Article 49/1. The minimum recovery rate of 15% was only recently introduced by the Act of 27 May 
2013, which aims to reduce abuses by debtors. Compare to Recital (19) and Recommendation 22(c), EC 
Recommendation 2014.
37 Ibid., Article 57. This is in line with Recommendations 25-26, EC Recommendation 2014.
38 Ibid., Article 54. The reorganisation plan is accepted, when it is approved by more than half of the creditors 
present at the vote, together representing more than half of the principal amount of the claims involved Please 
note that claims of creditors who are not present or represented at the vote, are not taken into account for the 
calculation of the majority.
39 Ibid., Article 55. The court can only reject a reorganisation plan if the debtor did not respect the formal 
requirements of the BCA or if the plan violates rules of public order.
40 Ibid., Articles 59-70/1.
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(being in a state of bankruptcy), might bring some doubts with regard to the PRE-
insolvency requirement.41 Nevertheless the Belgian approach strives to preserve 
business activity and therefore still dovetails with the main objective to prevent 
a piece meal liquidation. Consequently the qualification of a pre-insolvency 
arrangement should be endorsed.
The judicial reorganisation procedure also fits in with the new European business 
rescue model. The three restructuring options provided for in the judicial 
reorganisation procedure are all included in the Annex A of the Recast EIR.42 This 
brings about a European wide recognition of these three restructuring options. As 
regards the scope of the EC Recommendation 2014, only the collective agreement 
option corresponds more or less to the framework proposed.43 On the contrary 
the amicable agreement and the transfer of business are not addressed in the EC 
Recommendation 2014.
IV Effective Business Rescue in Belgium?
The previous part attested the comprehensive legal framework to rescue businesses 
in Belgium. However does this framework also bring about effective business 
rescue? As regards the informal reorganisation mechanisms the question remains 
unsure. There are no statistics available due to the confidential character of these 
mechanisms. However several judges state that to their knowledge the informal 
tools are not regularly used. In contrast elaborated statistic evidence is available to 
evaluate the success of the formal judicial reorganisation.44
41 Recitals (1) and (16) and Recommendations 1, 6(a) and 11(b), EC Recommendation 2014 require firmly 
that restructuring mechanisms should only be available for viable debtors. For a critical evaluation and some 
alternatives, see Eidenmüller and van Zwieten, above note 2, at 29-30.
42 Please note that the Original EIR was not applicable to the amicable agreement within a judicial reorganisation 
procedure because this option was not included in Annex A.
43 See Recital (19) and Recommendations 6(d) and 15-26, EC Recommendation 2014. For a detailed analysis of 
the compatibility of the BCA with the EC Recommendation 2014, please refer to Vanmeenen, above note 24, at 
77-91.
44 Yearly statistics and a detailed analysis are available at: www.graydon.be. The most recent analysis can be found 
in “Gezondheidsbarometer van de Belgische ondernemingen – Baromètre de la santé des entreprises belges, 
31/21/2015” (28 June 2016).
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Table 9.2. Statistics of Procedures
BANKRUPTCY JUDICIAL REORGANISATION (BCA)
Total 
Number
Total 
Number
Amicable 
Agreement
Collective 
Agreement
Transfer of 
Business
2009 9,504 633(from 1 Apr) 82 341 15
2010 9,939 1,253 249 688 40
2011 10,519 1,389 281 847 68
2012 11,062 1,438 304 1,029 94
2013 12,306 1,460 216 1,073 109
2014 11,294 1,117 135 814 125
2015 10,601 877 101 658 100
Source: Graydon Belgium
These statistic data demonstrate a number of trends. First finding is the large 
discrepancy between the yearly number of bankruptcies and the yearly number of 
judicial reorganisation procedures. Although the Belgian legislator strongly focusses 
on reorganisation, bankruptcy proceedings significantly outweigh reorganisation 
proceedings. Second trend is the decrease of the number of judicial reorganisation 
proceedings in the last two years. This evolution is caused by an amendment of 
the BCA in 2013,45 which tightened certain procedural aspects, making it far more 
difficult for a debtor to file for a judicial reorganisation procedure.46
Thirdly, a clear shift from the amicable agreement to the transfer of business under 
court supervision becomes gradually visible over the years. As discussed above, 
the transfer of business is considered as an alternative to bankruptcy proceedings. 
Finally, a fourth finding should be added to the figures shown in the table. Statistic 
data demonstrate that after a six year period, 75 to 80% of all BCA-undertakings 
end up in bankruptcy anyway. This leads to the conclusion that, at least for now, 
the bankruptcy prevention ratio of the BCA is significantly low.
Hence do we need different procedures or legislation to enhance business 
rescue? I am not convinced we do. Currently the Belgian legislator is working 
on a codification of the insolvency legislation.47 The first results of this initiative 
will presumably be published in the beginning of 2017. It is anticipated that 
the new legislation will not bring about fundamental changes for the business 
rescue regime. In my opinion, fine tuning legislation might be useful, but if we 
45 Act of 27 May 2013 (Belgian State Gazette, 22 July 2013), entered into force on 1 August 2013.
46 For example a higher filing fee (from EUR 60 to 1,000); compulsory filing of financial documents prepared with 
the assistance of an external accountant or auditor to ensure that the data provided are reliable. For a comment on 
the impact of the 2013 amendment, refer to Vanmeenen, above note 24, at 87-91.
47 The Bankruptcy Act and the BCA will be inserted in the new Economic Law Code.
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want to enhance business rescue, we should be working on a change of mindset 
of businessmen rather than changing the legislation. Only expedient and early 
recourse to reorganisation tools will do the trick. Such a change of mindset is a 
major challenge in the whole of Europe.
However, and this is just as important as changing the mindset, in many (minor) 
cases a timely and swift liquidation is still the best way forward. So paradoxical 
re-imagining rescue is also pushing businesses into liquidation as soon as possible 
before debts have increased tremendously. A responsible liquidation policy of 
course needs to be accompanied with flanking measures on second change. After a 
swift liquidation remaining debts should be discharged within a reasonable period 
of time to offer honest businessmen an effective fresh start. In this respect the EC 
Recommendation 2014 upholds a maximum period of three years.48 As regards 
the Belgian situation, there are some changes to be made. Potentially the Belgian 
legislator could look into this issue while preparing his new code.
48 See Recommendations 30-33, EC Recommendation 2014.
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Chapter 12
Reimagining Rescue:  
The View from the United States
G. Ray Warner
Keynote Address
I am very honored to be here. I would like to thank Professor David Burdette 
and Professor Michael Veder for inviting me to Nottingham. I also would like to 
thank INSOL Europe for hosting this event. I look forward to a stimulating and 
informative conference. My non-bankruptcy colleagues at St. John’s University in 
New York think that Nottingham is the perfect place for an insolvency conference. 
You should see the emails. The Robin Hood statue that really made me feel at 
home. Just like us, he helped the poor address the problem of insolvency. And, he 
had a rather novel approach to the problem. So this is not the first time that a group 
has gathered in Nottingham to reimagine rescue.
It is an exciting time to be involved in insolvency law in Europe. Things are 
changing here, and they are evolving very quickly. Less than 4 years ago in 2011, 
the European Parliament adopted its Resolution on Insolvency Proceedings in 
the Context of EU Company Law. Four months later, the European Commission 
issued its Communication to the European Parliament on the Single Market Act II, 
with business rescue as its Key Action Item 7. Then the European Commission’s 
Recommendation on a New Approach to Business Failure and Insolvency was 
issued in final form only a little more than a year ago. And then, only a month 
ago on 20 May, the final version of the revised EU Regulation on Insolvency 
Proceedings was issued and the final printed version became available only two 
weeks before this conference.
David asked me to start us off with a few thoughts about the EU Insolvency Project 
from the United States’ perspective. My first thought is that we are jealous. You 
are having all of the fun. There is almost no legislative insolvency action going on 
in the US. Indeed considering the current dysfunctional state of our Congress, you 
probably do not want it to look at our insolvency laws. As academics, we are left 
to study, then study, then study some more.
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So what is the US view of what is happening in Europe? While I can’t speak for 
everyone in the United States, I think I can sum up our main view in a word. That 
word is “competition”. For a long time we were the only option if you wanted 
to reorganize a global business. Chapter 11 was the option – and frankly it was 
a pretty good process. It was open and transparent. It provided a very flexible 
process that could be adapted to almost any situation. It gave everyone a voice. 
Even the disorganized general creditors were given a committee that could assert 
their interests. That committee could employ lawyers, accountants and investment 
bankers to level the playing field. And, the fees for their services were paid out of 
the bankruptcy estate with no direct cost to the creditors.
Chapter 11 allowed the business to continue operating with existing management 
and with little disruption as it shifted into the formal bankruptcy process. It 
provided a nice set of tools designed to preserve the going concern value of the 
business. There was a comprehensive moratorium, forced contract assumption, 
and rescue financing. These tools helped to preserve the business’ going concern 
value, and sometimes even increased it. Chapter 11 provided an environment 
where the stakeholders could negotiate a workout, and it included some pretty 
strong incentives to reach a compromise. It included valuation and auction tools 
that largely ensured that the enterprise value was received by the estate in either a 
reorganization or a sale. It included an active judge on call to reign in dishonest or 
stupid management. It included an expedited dispute resolution process that could 
promptly address almost any legal issue facing the enterprise.
- It saved businesses;
- It saved jobs;
- It helped preserve communities; and
- It preserved value for stakeholders.
It also became a reasonably effective cross border restructuring tool. Three 
main factors account for that. The first was that our bankruptcy law applies 
extraterritorially. But that’s not very strange since most nations’ insolvency laws 
apply to the worldwide assets and affairs of entities subject to a proceeding. 
However, unlike most nations, we had a very low threshold for asserting jurisdiction 
over an entity. Basically, if any property, even a tiny amount, was located in the 
United States, then the US courts could take jurisdiction of the case. This was true 
even if the asset was moved to the US solely for the purpose of creating bankruptcy 
jurisdiction. While this principle has been criticized, I believe that if you look at 
the cases where the US courts retained jurisdiction you will see that they did so 
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because a US Chapter 11 was necessary to preserve the enterprise’s value. These 
two factors would only be interesting academic points if it weren’t for the third 
factor. The US had the world’s most important economy so virtually every major 
creditor or counterparty of a global enterprise had interests in the US that required 
it to obey the orders of the US courts.
What has changed? Well, we have added a number of special interest provisions 
and exceptions to Chapter 11 that make it less useful as a tool to save businesses. 
At the same time, we have allowed the costs to balloon to the point that it may 
no longer be an attractive restructuring option for many enterprises. But the other 
issue is competition. It started when the English embraced the rescue culture. 
Changes in its insolvency laws and innovative uses of pre-packs and schemes of 
arrangement provided a quicker and cheaper way to restructure the finances of an 
enterprise without interrupting its operations. Then, taking a page from our play 
book, the English courts interpreted their jurisdiction so broadly that virtually any 
enterprise from any nation could come to London to reorganize.
The English competition did not just take cases away from the US courts; it also 
took away cases from other EU courts. For the United States, London has mostly 
taken away some of the global enterprise cases we used to get. And many of those 
arguably had no business being in the US courts anyway. We really haven’t seen 
our local enterprises or global enterprises that we think of as American flock to 
London for their restructurings, although I suspect we may eventually see that 
too. However, that is not the cases for other EU countries. There London’s liberal 
rescue tools have been used by many enterprises that other EU member states view 
as local enterprises. I suspect that is why we are here today.
The European Commission recommendations merely invite all EU nations to join 
in the competition for restructuring cases. That invitation may have arrived a little 
late. Based on the 2014 INSOL report produced by Professor Stefania Bariatti and 
Robert van Galen, most of the EU member states already had laws incorporating 
major features of rescue before the Recommendation was formally issued. The 
competition to create a local rescue scheme that could lure German companies 
back to Germany, Spanish companies back to Spain and Dutch companies back to 
the Netherlands already was well underway.
Competition can be a good thing. Competition can drive us to excel, with each 
nation trying to build a better rescue process that will make the world a better 
place. It can also be a bad thing. We may become so afraid that our nation will lose 
its place in the insolvency world, and of depriving our insolvency professionals of 
lucrative fees, that we design our laws to attract insolvency business rather than to 
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achieve the best insolvency results. Features in our laws that protect creditors or 
make the process more open and harder to control may discourage the case placers 
from choosing our courts and our professionals. Competition puts pressure on us 
to remove or dilute those protective features of our laws.
So are we in a race to the top – or a race to the bottom? I fear that it is a race to 
the bottom. Unlike most competitive marketplaces, the insolvency market is not 
one where the buyers want the best product they can get for the best price. Instead 
the buyers are the managers or owners of the failing enterprises, or maybe their 
principal financiers. They are not looking for the best rescue system and do not 
care how other creditors, employees, contract counterparties or society are treated 
by the law they choose. They cannot be trusted to make a valid cost benefit analysis 
for society of the different available rescue options. Instead, they are engaged in 
a game of regulatory arbitrage, picking the system with the fewest limitations on 
their ability to achieve their goals. Then, using the EU treaties and regulations and 
cross-border tools like the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 
they seek to impose that result elsewhere.
My second serious thought is hope. I have hope that you might lead the rest of the 
world to a new understanding of what rescue means, new theories about what recue 
can or should be used to achieve, and maybe even some novel ideas about how best 
to achieve the goals of business rescue. The title of this conference is “Reimaging 
Rescue.” I really hope that you can.
So how does the current EU insolvency project look to me coming, as I do, from 
the United States? I am not sure what I can say that will be useful to you. My deep 
understanding of the US system may allow me to provide you with a few helpful 
insights. But I am feeling very unworthy of the honor of speaking to you today. I 
know that I lack a full understanding of the EU context. And, due to the limited 
number of current sources available to me in the United States, I cannot know the 
full range of national insolvency reform projects currently underway in England 
and Europe. Thus, please forgive me if some of my observations are naïve or miss 
the mark.
So what do I think? Honestly, I am a little bit bored with rescue. Almost forty years 
ago, the United States innovated with Chapter 11. That was pretty imaginative and 
pretty interesting -- when I was a MUCH YOUNGER MAN. A few years ago, the 
English innovated a little bit by adapting their scheme of arrangement to rescue 
situations. But that was basically just a Chapter 11 class cram down without the 
rest of the case. It is interesting that the English continue to act like their scheme 
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is not an insolvency process. Does that mean that I can’t really even count it as an 
innovation in this field?
I gather that most of the other European rescue schemes are variations on the same 
old composition and arrangement idea, with the addition of feature that permits 
the majority to bind a dissenting minority. It is interesting and important that the 
Commission Recommendation expands upon that idea and adds in an inter-class 
cram down so that an entire dissenting class can be bound by the plan. The English 
pre-pack isn’t much more imaginative. One of the really interesting things about 
it from a US perspective is that it proves the old saying that the United States and 
UK are two nations divided by a common language.
What we call a “pre-pack” looks more like an English scheme of arrangement. 
In our pre-pack, we propose an exchange offer and solicit acceptances outside of 
bankruptcy and then flip it into a Chapter 11 to get court confirmation and bind 
the dissenting class members. It was used just a few years ago in the MGM case. 
MGM was rescued by a pre-pack and was in and out of Chapter 11 in only 47 
days. Most importantly, the bankruptcy did not interrupt the on-going filming of 
The Hobbit, which proves my point about the importance of Chapter 11. It saves 
Hobbits. And if you saw the Lord of the Rings, you know that is no small feat!
The English pre-pack does not seem that imaginative to us. It is basically a section 
363 sale. Only it is usually a sale to insiders, without the protection of competitive 
bidding, or any serious scrutiny by a court, or any real opportunity for challenge 
by affected parties. Sure, there is a licensed Insolvency Practitioner overseeing the 
process. But after a host of accounting scandals, Americans tend not to believe in 
the integrity of licensed professionals, especially when they are selected by parties 
with financial incentives that may conflict with the interests they are charged with 
protecting. Of course, Americans tend not to believe in climate change either, so 
maybe our views on this are not worth much.
But back to my point – I’m bored. I read about legislation in other countries and 
attend lectures on new developments globally and, to stick with my movie theme, 
I feel like I do when I see the most recent summer movie sequel. Take your pick, 
Jurassic World, Mad Max Fury Road, Avengers: Age of Ultron . . . you get the 
idea. My thoughts are:
“I think I’ve seen most of this before. I wish that someone would 
come up with a truly new idea instead of just some variation on the 
same old theme.”
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Please re-imagine rescue! If anyone can do it, you can. Here is where the 
innovations are coming from now.
The US is stuck in legislative gridlock so there is almost no chance of any serious 
legislative innovation. The US academics are either focused on very broad theories 
that are very interesting but have little practical application, or they are focused 
inward, mostly on minor tinkering rather than bold new concepts. For example, 
although I think the recent ABI Commission study is wonderful, it is mostly minor 
tinkering with the details of our law and not an attempt to radically re-imagine 
it. There is much to be learned from that Report. At a minimum, you can learn 
from the mistakes we have made and be forewarned about the issues we are now 
struggling with a quarter of a century further down the rescue path.
As an American I wonder whether I am seeing such familiar rescue models in 
Europe because Chapter 11 was the first modern legislative rescue scheme that 
worked reasonably well. Your best insolvency professionals have become familiar 
with our law, so it is natural that you might borrow ideas from it. Alternatively, 
I may keep seeing the same models because we already have discovered the 
principal rescue tools, so there is not much left to imagine. I hope that is not true.
But, it seems to me that this is the assumption behind the European Council 
Recommendation. It is not an invitation to be creative and design completely new 
recue models. Instead, the Recommendation includes a list of traditional rescue 
tools and directs Member States to align their laws to those traditional rescue 
models. This is a document designed to advance conformity and to limit creativity; 
not one to encourage new innovation. So maybe we will not be reimagining rescue 
after all.
While I would love to see some real innovation, I think this is the right approach 
for the EU. Frankly it doesn’t go far enough. My US perspective is that you 
need a single EU-wide law for EU-wide enterprises. Harmonized laws, or even 
inconsistent laws, might be OK for businesses operating in only a single nation. I 
suspect that, except for small entrepreneurs, strictly local businesses are becoming 
very rare in the EU. They will become even rarer as you move closer to the goal 
of a single market.
Two hundred years ago, when the founders of the United States created our common 
market among our states, they recognized the bankruptcy laws had to be uniform. 
That idea is enshrined in our Constitution. With our adoption of the UNCITRAL 
Model Law and the growth of cross-border cases, we have had to accept some non-
uniformity in insolvency outcomes for global businesses operating in our market. 
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But under the Model Law, we have discretion to reject those outcomes if they are 
too divergent from our own law. The EU Insolvency Regulation does not give your 
member states that option.
I understand that there are serious political problems with implementing an EU-
wide insolvency law at this point in the EU’s development. The harmonization that 
the Recommendation advances may be the best that can be expected as a practical 
matter. But that is not what the Recommendation and commentary about it says. I 
read that one justification for mere harmonization is that it would not be proper to 
impose an EU-wide law because the local insolvency laws reflect the deeply held 
cultural views of each member state. But, the most cursory look at the current state 
of affairs in the EU cast doubt on that rationale.
It appears to me that, as a practical matter, every EU country currently is subject 
to the English insolvency laws. Companies and individuals can freely and fairly 
easily shift their COMI. Or, companies can change the governing law of their debt 
instruments in order to use the English restructuring tools. And it seems to me 
that the recent revisions to the EU Insolvency Regulation will institutionalize that 
practice, not eliminate it. So why should Germany be subject to English insolvency 
law or be forced by competition to adopt a local law that does not reflect German 
values in order to woo cases back home?
I understand that the Principle of Subsidiarity in Article 5 of the Treaty of the 
European Union pushes you away from a uniform approach. That principle requires 
that action be taken at the E.U. level only if that is more effective to the goals of the 
Union than action taken at the national level. But this is such a case. The goal is a 
single market, and a single market needs a single bankruptcy system. While there 
will be important local concerns, it seems that the better approach would be one 
that provides a uniform set of restructuring options, with accommodations, carve 
outs, and choice of law rules that protect important areas of local interest. The EU 
Insolvency Regulation already reflects this approach.
Having said that, I do recognize that international co-operation involves 
more process than product. Viewed as a process, the European Commission’s 
Recommendation is a major step toward a uniform European insolvency law. The 
Commission’s evaluation in October may confirm that the laws already are largely 
harmonized. And, the process of review will no doubt nudge member states to 
reconsider those laws that are not. As the laws become more similar, there will 
be less resistance to a single uniform law. But there also will be less need for it.
Reimagining Rescue: The View from the United States
182 Reimagining Rescue
Reimagining rescue. Maybe we need to define the project better. What are we 
trying to rescue? And what are we trying to rescue it from?
Here, I feel like we are ships passing in the night. As Europe and much of the 
rest of the world race to copy us and adopt rescue regimes, we have moved to a 
quick sale model. We file Chapter 11, but rather than use the restructuring tools 
it provides, we instead use our section 363 to sell the viable parts of the business 
as a going concern. Your Commission Recommendation does not address this 
type of business recue. It should. Section 363 not only permits a sale, but more 
importantly, it permits a sale free and clear of liabilities that might otherwise 
follow the business. This can be an effective tool for cleansing a business that has 
legacy costs that otherwise would make it unattractive to any buyer.
The Commission Recommendation speaks of the need to preserve jobs and focuses 
on the impact of rescue on society. This is another place where we are traveling 
in opposite directions. As you try to add these goals to your insolvency systems, 
we have been removing them from ours. Our academics are enamored of the law 
& economics movement and its approach to law. They have pushed our thinking 
to focus solely on maximizing value. That is not bad goal, but the only value that 
gets into the equation is measurable dollar value and even then only the dollar 
value return to the parties with a debt or equity stake in the enterprise. No soft 
values like the impact of failure on the workers and communities, or our national 
industrial policy count.
It may surprise you that the text of Chapter 11 gives no official recognition to the 
interests of employees, communities or society. We used to believe it was part 
of our law, but the major modern proponent of that theory, Professor Elizabeth 
Warren of Harvard Law School, decided to become a senator, and she apparently 
is one of the few Americans not running for President. Does this mean that I think 
Chapter 11 is a failure? No, and I have several thoughts about that.
First, what is hard to measure when we talk about the success of our system is the 
shadow effect. Once the law becomes clear, deals get done without using it. Why 
would rational parties incur the expense and risk of a Chapter 11 when they can 
lock in comparable results through an agreement? Chapter 11 casts a very long 
shadow. But actual cases are filed only when something goes wrong, like when 
one party is not realistic, or has an ulterior motive or when the problem involves 
too many players or too rapid a collapse for a workout. When you look at the cost 
of Chapter 11 and the situations where it fails, keep in mind that your sample is 
already filtered to include only problem cases.
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We also don’t have that many Chapter 11’s anymore. Part of the reason is that it is 
no longer as needed. We used to need Chapter 11 to force a creditor to acknowledge 
that its USD 100 debt was only worth USD 40. Bank lenders in particular were 
unwilling to acknowledge that and take a write down without a fight. Also our 
banks could not voluntarily accept a debt-for-equity swap even if that made 
economic sense. Chapter 11 was an important tool to overcome thoseproblems.
What has changed? First, our lending markets have changed. The new lenders are 
not banks and are much more focused on reality and maximizing their economic 
returns. Also we have a very active distressed debt market. In fact there is not 
enough distressed debt to meet the demand. You may have seen some of our 
players come to Europe looking to acquire distressed debt and distressed assets. 
Many times we do not need to use bankruptcy to write down debt since the holder 
bought it at a deep discount and has expectations that match the debtor’s ability 
to pay.
These players also can make rescue much harder. They are not the traditional 
creditor we think about who is looking to salvage what they can from a bad lending 
decision and who may have an on-going relationship with the debtor. They often 
buy into the debt with an ulterior motive beyond making a reasonable return on 
their investment. Maybe they want to acquire the enterprise. Maybe they plan to 
acquire a blocking position and extort value from other stakeholders. Maybe they 
bought into the debt planning to engage in scorched earth litigation tactics. Think 
of Argentina and you get the idea. These are not going to be easy rescue cases and 
the “let’s get together and work things out” theory that most restructuring laws are 
based on will not work. Our Chapter 11 is simply not robust enough to deal with 
this change cheaply or effectively.
Next, you need to get over insolvency. Insolvency is not a former lover whose 
memory should distort your current thinking. The European Commission 
Recommendations focus on creating pre-insolvency systems, but even there the 
view is that insolvency must be imminent and that the pre-insolvency system must 
prevent it. Why is insolvency even relevant? Is this merely a vestige of your earlier 
punitive systems that viewed failure and insolvency as a wrongful act committed 
by a business?
If you move away from a fault-based model of failure and focus instead on a 
solution-based model, you may see rescue as merely part of a single continuum of 
tools for addressing problems that a business might encounter. The English scheme 
of arrangement is a good model for this. Mostly it is used to address financial 
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restructuring problems faced by businesses that are successful. But, it can also 
address a financial restructuring that is needed because the business is in distress.
Insolvency and burdensome debt loads may be the most pressing current problem 
that the business is facing, but insolvency usually is not the type of thing that 
“happens” to a business like a fire or other calamity. Instead, the insolvency problem 
is usually nothing more than the result of some other business problem that was not 
addressed in a timely fashion. If you recognize that, you might envision your rescue 
regime as merely part of a broader set of tools for addressing business problems. 
You also might decide that the rescue tool should be available long before the 
underlying business problem has metastasized into an insolvency problem.
The Commission Recommendation fails to recognize that bankruptcy and secured 
debt go together. I do not envy your problem. One goal of the Recommendation 
is to help create a single credit market that flows freely across borders. But if 
you want a single credit market you don’t just need a uniform or harmonized 
insolvency law, you also need uniform or harmonized secured credit laws, at least 
for movable and intangible property. Secured debt is another reason our Chapter 11 
is not working well. When Chapter 11 was adopted, one famous scholar declared 
that it was the “death of secured credit”. Our history has been a running battle 
between secured debt and bankruptcy. In our 1978 Bankruptcy Code, the public 
policy of business reorganization trumped secured credit. It took a while, but in 
2001 our states revised their secured credit laws, our UCC Article 9, to greatly 
enhance the security rights of creditors. I’ve criticized those changes in an article 
that called that revision the “Anti-Bankruptcy Act”.
Now a secured creditor can effectively opt out of the reorganization process or 
co-op it for its own purposes because it controls the bankruptcy case. Make no 
mistake, secured credit cares only about its own recovery. It is not concerned about 
worker rights, society or national industrial policy. Other opt out strategies have 
also gained traction in the United States. Why do you think asset securitization 
structures that shift an operating company’s income stream into a bankruptcy 
remote special purpose entity are so popular?
Take the case of LTV, a major steel manufacturer. In that case a large amount of 
going concern value could be preserved by continuing the business operations for a 
short period of time after the bankruptcy filing. But there was no free cash because 
all of the accounts receivable had been securitized and sold to a bankruptcy remote 
special purpose vehicle. The bankruptcy judge used procedural arguments to 
temporarily override the purported ownership rights of the securitization parties 
so the going concern value could be realized.
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Lenders similarly use complex corporate structures to keep essential assets out of 
the shared pool. During the recent financial crisis the credit markets froze forcing 
General Growth Properties, one of our largest shopping mall operators, to file 
Chapter 11. For lending purposes, each shopping mall property had been placed 
in a different legal entity and the lenders refused to upstream the cash from rental 
income that was necessary to rescue the enterprise. In an opinion that has been 
criticized by commentators, the bankruptcy judge overrode those limitations. The 
end result was not merely the avoidance of a wave of value destroying liquidations 
of shopping malls around the country, but a successful restructuring plan that even 
returned billions of dollars in value to shareholders.
And we wonder why Chapter 11 is so costly and no longer so effective. We don’t 
just do our reorganizing in Chapter 11 plans anymore. No buyer wants to acquire 
a business if it comes with potential massive successor liability risk. We use our 
section 363, which provides for a sale of the business free and clear of obligations, 
to continue business operations free of old debt. As I mentioned, the Commission 
Recommendation does not address this tool.
Can you do a section 363 sale to an entity created solely for the purpose of 
continuing the business without the liabilities? That is exactly what was done in 
the General Motors bankruptcy case, and the Chrysler case was not much different. 
Again, our bankruptcy judges permitted these sales even though most observers 
think they pushed beyond the limits of our statute. But does anyone in this room 
doubt that both General Motors and Chrysler would be gone if that had not 
been done? And, with GM and Chrysler gone, most of the US based automotive 
supplier chain would have failed. Without that local supply network, our third 
major automotive company, Ford, could not have maintained its manufacturing 
presence in Detroit.
So our restructuring tools do not merely save Hobbits; they saved the American 
automotive industry. American industrial policy was well served, but over the 
strenuous objection of the economic stakeholders with secured bonds. Did this 
happen because Chapter 11 is such a wonderful law? No, frankly Chapter 11 has 
not kept up with the times. It is too weak to deal with the modern challenges 
to rescue. Fortunately our bankruptcy judges have been willing to push the 
envelope to do what a true rescue regime should do. But they will only do that in 
exceptional cases.
While the lack of a rescue process inhibits rescue, the real threats to business rescue 
are that the tools we are using are not up to the task. The European Commission 
Recommendation pushes the idea of creating a framework for a negotiated 
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workout. That is an important goal. But the Recommendation is deficient in not 
providing the essential tools to preserve a viable but distressed business.
Where are the tools to block “opt out” strategies? Where is the override of 
bankruptcy termination clauses in contracts? Where are the standards for addressing 
legacy obligations? Where are the standards for super-priority rescue financing? 
Over-indebtedness is a problem that threatens the survival of the business. But 
most likely it is merely the symptom of deeper problems. If you want to re-imagine 
rescue, then identify those problems and design a system that addresses them.
Just like our half century old Chapter 11, the rescue systems advanced by the 
Commission Recommendation are simply too weak to address even the existing 
opt out strategies. I hope you can design more robust rescue systems that balance 
the interests of stakeholders with those of society. But, unless it is an EU-wide 
system or the jurisdiction rules limit forum shopping, the case placers will simply 
avoid it.
I look forward to hearing many new ideas today and tomorrow as we re-imagine 
rescue. As your American competitor, I hope you can come up with some ideas 
that we can copy.
Thank you.
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